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ABSTRACT 
In practice, construction firms are in business to achieve profitability. Construction 
companies operate in a highly competitive business environment characterised by low 
profit margins and high failure rates. At times firms will seek to grow in an attempt to 
increase profitability. At other times, firms will be concerned with survival and 
avoiding failure. Often firms plagued by poor performance seek to take higher risks. 
This may lead especially where resources exist to increased diversification. Against 
this background, the research focuses on the twin areas of corporate financial 
performance and the effects of merger activity. Prior studies in economics and 
accounting provide evidence that financial statement analysis can be utilised by 
possible investors or strategic planners to aid in the future plans and direction of the 
firm or to classify economic events such as mergers or failures. 
The present study examines the financial performance of the UK construction industry 
and the Global construction industry, and investigates the financial characteristics of 
merging construction companies. This research examines the financial performance of 
UK firms in different sectors of the construction industry. This analysis involves the 
use of descriptive statistics, which provides a valuable aid in the visual presentation of 
the range of the possible outcomes. In addition a probabilistic analysis of the 
distribution of profitability has been undertaken. This involves the use of inferential 
statistics which concentrates on the role of significance testing. The profitability 
performance of the plant hire sector was found to exceed that of contracting and 
materials sector. An examination of the impact of the national environment on 
international competitive performance and an assessment and comparison of the 
performance of global construction is also provided in the study. 
The research also investigates the financial profile of UX failed and solvent firms. 
The use of statistical models and accounting ratios in an effort to predict company 
failure for up to five years is examined. The results for the univariate analysis indicate 
that failing construction firms during the 1996-2001 period have low profitability and 
are highly geared. The testing of previous statistical failure prediction models provide 
little evidence of compatibility to the construction industry. 
i 
The analysis on mergers and acquisition investigates the performance of construction 
companies involved in the acquisition process and examines the motives behind the 
merger process. Analysis of the relation between measures of costs and firm size in 
over 100 UK construction companies indicates the usefulness of scale economies. 
However, the evidence suggests that beyond a certain size the cost benefits appear to 
become exhausted. Large companies have to re-examine scale to ensure that they are 
employing it to their company's greater advantage. Abnormal share returns are also 
examined throughout a period surrounding the announcement of both successful and 
unsuccessful acquisition and merger bids. The overall results indicate that mergers in 
the construction industry create wealth for shareholders. The evidence shows 
significant increases in the performance of the target firms' shareholders over a 40 day 
event window surrounding the announcement. The results also show that bidding 
firms' experience no significant abnormal returns in a short period surrounding the 
announcement date. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Remarks 
The construction industry in the UK is characterised by high competition and high 
failure rates due to the large number of firms, the relative ease of market entry and 
sensitivity to economic changes. Construction companies must therefore undertake 
regular assessment of their performance and that of the market and industry in which 
they operate in, in order to ensure survival and growth in business. Hillebrandt and 
Cannon (1990), observed that the management of a construction firm is essentially 
the 'management of change, coping with changes in the environment and making 
adjustments to its strategy, diversifying where necessary'. How quickly and 
effectively management responds to changing conditions in the product and financial 
markets determine to a great extent which firms survive and grow and which do not. 
The evaluation of business performance is of crucial importance to the construction 
industry. This evaluation is of direct and immediate importance to the business itself 
and the community at large. The very survival of a business depends ultimately on its 
ability to select competitive strategies which will enable it to achieve expected 
performance measured by criteria considered necessary by its shareholders. 
Performance is concerned with the achievement of objectives, objectives may include 
profitability, growth, continuity of existence, market share, turnover and size. 
In an industry which is defined by a harsh competitive environment and low profit 
margins, with the danger of failure constantly looming over contractors such 
evaluation and strategy selection is critical. The evaluation of corporate performance 
is not just concerned with the past and present but it is also directed towards the 
future in the selection of alternatives which will shape the strategic direction of the 
business and ensure its future survival. 
Interest in construction company accounts has been consistent in the UK construction 
economics literature, (Asenso & Fellows, 1987; Ball, 1988; Akintoye & Skitmore, 
1991; Ball et al, 2000). Corporate annual reports are aimed at stockholders, the 
financial community, existing and potential customers, employees and the business 
community in general, (Preece & Male, 1997). Financial reporting should provide 
decision makers and investors with useful information. One qualitative characteristic 
of useful financial information is its classificatory value. Prior studies in accounting 
and economics provide evidence that balance sheet and income statement ratios can 
be utilised to classify economic events such as mergers and bankruptcy which are of 
interest to corporate executives, strategic planners and investors. 
1.2 The Global Economy 
A major challenge for the construction industry is the area of emerging markets and 
competition. With pressures increasing on profit margins and market boundaries the 
evidence is mounting that construction organisations address alternatives to 
traditional markets. Boundaries accepted as the limits of market focus can no longer 
constrain the organisation from exploring alternative income opportunities. The 
knowledge to identify, find and pursue these opportunities must be developed as part 
of an expanded construction organisation strategy (Chinowsky, 1999). 
As with all industrial and commercial sectors, the construction industry has become 
internationalised and globalised over the past twenty years and this is set to continue 
(Pettinger, 1998). A consequence of this is that there is competition for work from 
companies from all parts of the world for traditional and domestic markets. As 
companies face global competition on their own patches, they in turn have to seek 
work elsewhere (Pettinger, 1998). 
The construction industry has become increasingly global characterised by very large 
multinationals. Intense competition among firms, industries and countries on a global 
level is a recent development, due to decline of trade barriers, increases in foreign 
investments and the gains in technology. The proximity to markets and customers is 
the driving force behind decisions to expand globally (Male & Mitrovic, 1999). Most 
large contractors put a meaningful overseas construction presence as an important 
part of the strategy to remain at the forefront of the UK construction industry 
(Construction News, 2002). Increasingly, the world is occupied by clients who seek 
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to procure construction on a global basis (Langford & Male, 1997). Providing 
competitive advantage and building ever stronger relationships with global clients is a 
key strategy for large construction firms. 
The overseas activity of British firms has almost doubled in the past ten years. 
International diversification seeks to use internal resources and capabilities to exploit 
global market imperfections. Table 1.1 shows the levels of international construction 
carried out by British firms in 1991 and 2001. 
Overseas Activity 1991 2001 
New Contracts 2,349 4,712 
Work Done 2,317 4,574 
Work Outstanding 1,285 3,045 
Table 1.1 Overseas Construction activity by British companies (Department 
of Trade and Industry)(Figures in; Em). 
North America accounted for 40% of the total overseas construction activity in 2001 
with countries of the European union accounting for a further 15%. 
A key aspect of globalisation of construction activity is the increasing tendency for 
construction firms to co-operate strategically across national borders (Betts & Ofori, 
1992). The formation of multinational consortia and strategic joint ventures are 
becoming commonplace. Increased corporate activity in recent years has seen 
mergers and acquisitions instigated to improve market share and presence, and boost 
operating profits and margins. More UK companies are working in developed and 
developing countries taking on board valuable partners to gain knowledge and new 
capabilities. However, this can also be viewed in the reverse where foreign 
competitors threaten the UK companies. This has led to a number of take-overs and 
mergers within the UK industry simply to survive against foreign competitors. This 
has increased the consolidation occurring in the construction market with large 
multinational organisations accounting for a larger percentage of the market. 
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The most common means of achieving multinational status is the amalgamation of 
two different companies which in turn can operate on a bigger scale as one company. 
This formation usually involves mergers and acquisitions and to a certain extent 
strategic alliances. Alliances with local finns may also help market penetration and 
many countries require foreign companies to forge alliances with local firms (Male & 
Mitrovic, 1999). Another method of becoming a large global player is through 
organic growth which involves direct penetration of a foreign market and expansion 
of its resources. This method takes many years under normal circumstances and could 
be even impossible in a strongly competitive market such as the construction 
industry. 
Mergers and acquisitions are two forms of restructuring. They represent both strategic 
opportunities and threats for construction firms. A reason for the formation of 
powerful groups in the construction field is the intense competition from foreign 
multinationals which are claiming more of the big projects globally. Another reason 
is that the expansion of activities into foreign countries is served by the co-operation 
of powerful construction groups. The emergence of global players results in 
increasing pressures on the industry to consolidate through mergers and acquisition. 
The field of strategic management has come to the realisation that often and 
increasingly competitive advantage can be gained only from a global view of 
competition (Schendel, D, 1991). 
In recent years in the UK, there has been an increase in mergers and take-overs in the 
construction industry perhaps because of the need to increase market capitalisation. 
Large firms also have a lower cost of capital and furthermore through economies of 
scale there is the potential to add value by reducing production costs. Overall merger 
activity has increased dramatically over the past decade. The latest figures from the 
national statistics office (Table 1.2) reinforce this viewpoint. Expenditure on 
acquisitions of companies by UK companies increased from E13 billion in 1992 to a 
record level of E285 billion in the year 2000. It is also predicted to continue to rise in 
the following years. The level of expenditure on acquisitions in the UK by overseas 
companies has also increased dramatically. Overseas companies expenditure on UK 
companies increased from f. 4 billion in 1992 to nearly E64 billion in the year 2000. 
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Transactions By UK Companies Transactions in the UK by 
overseas companies 
Years Value Emillion Value Emillion 
1992 13205 4139 
1993 16276 5 187 
1994 23433 5213 
1995 44567 12817 
1996 44119 9513 
1997 46005 15717 
1998 84442 32413 
1999 137356 60860 
2000 285671 63990 
Table 1.2 Summary of M&A activity in the UK (National Statistics Office, 2001) 
The continuing popularity of mergers and acquisitions is probably a reflection of the 
widespread belief among managers that acquisitions and mergers provide a quicker 
and seemingly easier route to achieving growth and diversification objectives. 
Another belief is that the larger the company becomes the smaller the risk of the firm 
itself being acquired. Motives for mergers can range from increasing profitability to 
increasing managerial prestige. 
Strategic management of construction organisations has to take place within the 
context of the fortunes of the construction industry, Langford & Male (2001). The 
generation of a suitable corporate strategy for a firm involves an assessment of the 
external business environment in which the company operates. The search for an 
appropriate competitive strategy also involves examining the company's capabilities 
and distinctiveness and the potential within the market for corporate growth and 
profitability. There can only be one justification for the introduction of a system of 
corporate planning into a company, a belief that it can lead to improved results 
(Hussey, 1974). 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
The UK construction industry is a complex and highly diversified industry which 
exhibits characteristics of a manufacturing based industry and also of a service based 
industry. The industry is characterised by a large number of construction 
organisations, intense competition and high rates of corporate failure. Firms' outputs 
are not usually confined to a single product. In the construction industry, not only do 
firms produce different products within the contracting operation, but they also go 
outside the contracting business into property development, plant hire, materials 
production and other activities (Hillebrandt, 2000). Markets for construction firms are 
defined first in terms of the end product and then geographic location, with the latter 
especially important for international work (Langford and Male, 2001). 
Diversification into more prosperous markets is an attractive alternative for large 
construction companies. In the domestic and international markets, mergers and 
acquisitions are strategic alternatives currently being pursued by contractors. 
In practice, construction firms are in business to achieve profitability. At times firms 
will seek to grow in an attempt to increase profitability. At other times, firms will be 
concerned with survival and avoiding failure. All construction organisations work 
within an environment that is developing in many ways and where the rate of change 
is increasing. The construction environment is changing in global and local terms. 
Globalisation, corporate accountability and public awareness are affecting 
construction organisations. Additional issues facing today's construction organisation, 
include cultural change, technology transfer, mergers and acquisitions. 
The major contribution of this work was to examine the performance of the UK 
contracting organisations, examine the performance of potential domestic and 
international markets in which they can operate in and assess the effectiveness of 
employing the strategic alternative of mergers and acquisitions to enter into these 
markets. Against this background, the research focuses on the twin areas of corporate 
financial performance and the effects of merger activity. 
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The primary research objectives in this study are: 
1. To examine the profitability in the UK construction industry showing to 
possible investors or strategic planners the relative profitability levels in each 
of the major sectors in construction. 
2. To examine the financial performance of both failed and solvent UK 
construction firms with the objective of defining financial characteristics of 
finns with a high probability of corporate failure. 
To evaluate and assess the leading world markets and the leading providers of 
construction services on a global stage. Examining the nature of competition 
and profitability in a range of international construction markets. 
4. To provide a comparative analysis of the corporate financial performance in 
the leading international Construction Markets. 
5. To assess the relative financial performance of UK construction companies 
that have pursued acquisitions or mergers from a number of economic 
motives. 
Secondary Objectives: 
1. To review the economic situation of the UK construction industry over the 
period of the project. 
2. To examine the output and the characteristics of the construction industries in 
the leading nations in global construction. 
3. To examine the effect of internationalisation on the performance of the 
leading global contractors. 
7 
4. To review the previous studies of predicting failure and to assess their 
suitability for forecasting corporate failure in the UK construction industry. 
5. To investigate the different theories and motives of mergers and acquisitions 
with related empirical evidence. 
6. To examine the effect of size on the cost effectiveness of large firms in the 
UK construction industry. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The methods which attempt to achieve the thesis objectives were made possible by a 
number of techniques. The comparative performance of national and international 
markets were examined by assessing and analysing the annual reports and financial 
data of the companies involved in the research. This comparison also involved the use 
of various statistical techniques and the role of international accounting techniques in 
this assessment. 
The method used to determine failure characteristics of construction companies 
involved a combination of two techniques financial ratio analysis and Z-score 
models. The object was to distinguish between two groups, namely failed and non- 
failed groups by selecting from a collection of traditional financial ratio measures 
which characterise the expected difference. Again, analysis of company accounts was 
essential in this study. 
The techniques required in assessing the performance of UK companies that have 
pursued acquisitions and mergers, involved examining the share price values of the 
companies involved. The attractiveness of increasing company size in the 
construction industry was evaluated by focussing on the cost efficiency of the top UK 
construction companies. Chapter three outlines the research design and methodology 
adopted for this study. 
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1.5 Outline of Thesis 
The following chapters are structured to allow the reader a clear and concise 
understanding of what is involved in the thesis, keeping in mind the objectives stated 
earlier. 
Chapter One presents an introduction to the nature of corporate strategy and 
performance in relation to the construction industry. It examines the role of mergers 
and acquisitions in the global construction market. The scope and aims are also 
described in this chapter. 
Chapter Two reviews the concept of strategic management in the construction 
industry and investigates the different theories and motives of mergers and 
acquisitions. Previous methods of strategic management and investigations of 
mergers and acquisitions are reviewed. The evaluation of corporate performance 
involves determining the possibility of corporate failure. The final part of this chapter 
examines the role of traditional financial ratios as a tool to predict company failure. 
Some common failure prediction techniques that are currently in use are assessed. 
The contribution of this chapter is to review and describe the different hypotheses and 
theories put forward in previous literature. 
Chapter Three outlines the research design and methodology adopted in this study. 
The chapter begins with a brief review of the research design method available and 
the method used. The chapter also includes the sample selection criteria, selection of 
variables, methods of measurement and the statistical procedures used in examining 
the research objectives. 
Chapter Four presents and explores the UK construction industry. Firstly, there is a 
brief review of the characteristics and output of the UK construction industry. This is 
followed by an analysis of profitability of firms in the UK construction industry. The 
three sectors examined in the construction industry are contracting and housebuilding, 
plant hire and materials distribution. The study was conducted in two parts. The first 
section involved a visual presentation of the profit ranges for each sector. The second 
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section involved the use of inferential statistics to examine the conclusions drawn 
from section one. The contribution of Chapter Four is to show to firms, possible 
investors and strategic planners the profitability of the main sectors in the UK 
construction industry. 
Chapter Five examines the financial performance of failed and solvent contractors in 
the UK construction industry. The chapter begins with an examination of the failure 
rate of the construction industry in comparison to the overall economy and in 
comparison to other industries. The chapter examines the financial characteristics of 
failed firms and solvent fin-ns in construction, identifying immediate differences 
between failed and solvent firms. This is achieved through graphical mean analysis 
and statistical testing. In this study 15 financial ratios were calculated and statistically 
examined as potential indicators of failure. The study also reviews and assess the 
development of methods which aid the prediction of potential corporate insolvency. 
The major contribution of Chapter Five is to identify the limitations of previous 
prediction models and ratios and to identify financial characteristics and performance 
of failing firms. 
Chapter Six presents the results of a study of the leading nations in the global 
construction industry. The countries included in this study are the US, Japan, 
Germany, Italy and France. The country studies examine the key features of the 
respective economies and construction's role in each country. The performance of the 
construction industry in each country is examined in terms of construction output, 
investment and possible developments. It also examines the characteristics and 
competition in each industry. The contribution of this chapter was to assess the 
performance of global construction. 
Chapter Seven seeks to explore the corporate financial profitability performance of 
large contractors from the six leading nations in construction. The study uses 
statistical techniques to assess and compare the performance of the contractors. The 
chapter also tests the relationship between the performance of the top ten contractors 
and the degree of intemationalisation of the firms operations. The effects of the 
differences in national accounting standards on the ratios used in the measurement of 
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each firm's performance are also examined in order to evaluate their effect on the 
observed profitability of firms in each country. The overall contribution of this 
chapter is to examine the corporate performance of the top contractors from the 
leading nations in construction. 
Chapter Eight discusses and examines some of the expected benefits associated with 
mergers and acquisitions in the construction industry. The chapter analyses the 
benefits of increasing firm size in relation to costs. The study examines the three main 
sectors in the construction industry. This study also contains four case studies of 
construction companies that have been involved in merger or acquisition activity. The 
final part of the chapter investigates the impact of merger announcement on acquiring 
firms and target firms stock performance in the UK construction industry. The major 
contribution of this chapter investigates the expected value that a merger or 
acquisition adds to a construction firms performance. 
In Chapter Nine the conclusions drawn from the results and analysis carried out in the 
study are stated. Recommendations of areas for future research are also highlighted. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE, REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The traditional philosophy of management in construction places great emphasis on 
the ability to plan and execute construction projects. In contrast, strategic 
management and corporate performance has received less attention in the 
construction industry. Strategic management of construction firms has to take place 
within the context of the construction industry (Langford & Male, 2001). This chapter 
begins with examining the construction industry, the markets within the industry and 
the role of the construction firm. It then reviews the concept and principles of 
strategic management applied to construction organisations. Areas that firms must 
address to compete in an ever increasing global construction marketplace are 
discussed. 
A construction firm in developing its strategy is faced with a range of alternatives 
from which it must select those most appropriate to its objectives, constraints, current 
circumstances and environmental position. In the domestic market, mergers and 
acquisitions are strategic alternatives currently being pursued by a number of 
construction companies to ensure corporate survival and growth. This chapter 
investigates the different theories and motives of mergers and acquisitions. 
In order to select appropriate strategies a construction company must have a means of 
evaluating these strategic alternatives in whatever terms it deems appropriate and 
relevant. The process of evaluation can be achieved through measurement and 
prediction of performance. The evaluation of corporate performance can involve 
determining the success of the firm. It can also involve examining the possibility of 
corporate failure, especially in the construction industry where high failure rates are 
common. The final part of this chapter examines the role of traditional financial ratios 
as a tool to predict company failure. It also deals with other methods of failure 
prediction, including the Z-score model. 
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2.2 The Construction Industry 
"The construction industry comprises all those organisations and persons concerned 
with the process by which building and civil engineering are procured, produced, 
altered, repaired, maintained, and demolished. This includes companies, firms and 
individuals working as consultants, main and sub-contractors, materials producers, 
equipment suppliers and builders' merchants", (ClB TG 29,1998). The construction 
industry plays an important function in the economy as it produces and maintains the 
built environment. The overall performance of the industry is vitally important to the 
economy because of its size and provision of the infrastructure necessary for other 
industries. 
The construction industry offers an end product which involve the services necessary 
to produce durable buildings and infrastructure. Chinowsky (2000) describes the 
construction industry as an industry which is generally focused on the production of a 
single and unique end product. Langford and Male (1991) classify the construction 
industry into four areas of I)Building; 2) Civil Engineering; 3) Repair and 
Maintenance; and 4) Materials manufacture. However, these broad categorisations 
can be sub-divided even further such that civil engineering may include highways, 
water or telecommunications. The construction industry is made up of several 
different sometimes overlapping markets. 
2.2.1 The Construction Market 
The idea of a conventional market is an organisation whereby buyers and sellers of a 
particular homogenous product or commodity are in close contact with each other 
that a single price for the commodity prevails. Fellows et al (2002) define the market 
as an interaction between a grouping of customers who have similar requirements for 
particular goods or services on the one hand, and a strategic group of competitors 
competing to meet these requirements on the other hand. The construction industry in 
the UX has traditionally been perceived as being sub-divided into the civil 
engineering and building industries (Langford & Male, 2001). However, the 
construction industry is comprised of many interwoven markets. It may be broken 
down into several different markets containing some very different groupings of 
competitors and customers. The building market could be divided to include an 
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industrial market, a housing market or a commercial market. The housing market 
could further be broken down into a public housing market and a private sector 
market. It might even be necessary to break down this market further such that it 
distinguishes between new housing, residential repair or renovation and the size of 
housing. The markets within construction may be divided by various parameters 
including geography, type of work, size and the complexity of work The effect of 
location may include firms not going outside a certain area of operations because of 
the cost of transport of materials or plant. 
Within each market, whether a profitable one or not, there is competition between 
those supplying the goods and services to the customers. Porter (1980) argues that the 
intensity of competition in an industry is neither a matter of coincidence or bad luck, 
but more a question of how that industry is structured. Porter (1980) proposed afive 
forces analysis as a means of identifying the forces which affect the level of 
competition in an industry, and which in turn might help managers to identify bases 
of competitive strategy. This analysis can be used to compare relative potential for 
superior business performance between different industries and industry segments, 
(Betts & Ofori, 1992). These competitive forces are depicted in Figure 2.1. 
Potential Entrants 
Threat of 
Entrants 
ý 
The Industry- 
Suppliers 10 
Competitive 
Rivalry 
4 Buyers 
Bargaining 
Power 
Bargaining 
Power 
Threat of 
Substitutes 
Substitutes 
Figure 2.1 Five Forces model (Porter, 1980) 
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The threat of new entrants: The likelihood of new entrants is dependent on presence 
or absence of barriers to market entry. It is considered that the construction has 
relatively low barriers to market entry. This can be true in the case of certain markets 
within the construction industry where start up costs and skills needed can be very 
low. However, in certain sectors the increasingly large investment in computing and 
engineering technology is providing barriers to entry. In the market for large 
structures or extractive materials it is uncommon to see new entrants as the 
acquisition of the necessary skills takes time and the start-up costs are high. However, 
Male (199 1) concludes that from the evidence the presence or role of entry barriers is 
inconclusive. Typical barriers to entry include: economies of scale, capital 
requirements, product differentiation, access to distribution channels. 
The power of buyers and suppliers: These two forces can be linked as the relationship 
of buyers and sellers can influence the margins of an organisation. If the buyers and 
suppliers are powerful, then profit margins can be pushed down. In the construction 
industry there are often many different suppliers of different materials and products. 
Therefore the bargaining power of suppliers may be low. A buyer is powerful when 
buying a large proportion of the firms output. In construction this could pertain to a 
building which is a significant proportion of a contractors turnover. 
The potential of substitute goods for services: Choices and alternatives that the client 
could make away from the current range of activities. One form of substitution is the 
selection of different procurement methods, for example, a client may select design 
and build or construction management. 
Rivalry amongst existing competitors: The nature of competition between those 
conducting their business and competing. If competition and jockeying for position is 
intense in construction, then marketing costs may be higher and prices lower. The 
construction industry has traditionally been recognised as a fierce competitive market 
(Fellows et al, 2002) (Betts & Ofori, 1992). These five competitive forces can be 
directly related to the construction industry. 
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2.2.2 The Construction Firm 
The definition of a construction company refers to any business involved in an aspect 
of construction (Betts & Ofori, 1992). Figure 2.2 shows a simplified model of the 
construction firm and its environment. 
The Construction Market 
Boundary Construction 
Finn 
Figure 2.2 The Firm and its Environment 
Firms operate within an external environment. This environment is generally wide 
ranging and will consist of all those influences that can act on an organisation. These 
influences include business, political, social, economic and technological factors 
which shape the industry. The boundary of an organisation is the point of contact 
between the firm and the external environment and strategic decisions can shift this 
boundary, (Langford & Male, 1991). 
Firms can be viewed as having some form of hierarchy structure, which are made up 
of a series of tiers, each having authority over the levels beneath them. The number of 
levels may vary from two to three in a small building firm to a dozen or more in some 
large construction organisations. In considering the hierarchy of a construction firm, 
Langford & Male (200 1) identify three different levels of management. The strategic 
level is concerned with adapting the organisation to the external environment. The 
organisational level is concerned with mediation between the strategic level and the 
technical level. The last level, the technical or production level is concerned with 
producing the outputs which can subsequently be sold in the market place. The 
corporate governance of UK firms comprises a unitary board with a board of directors 
made up from top management executive directors and external non-executive 
directors (Miozzo & Dewick, 2002). In Hillebrandt et al (1995), a study on major 
construction firms revealed that a major shift has occurred over the past twenty years 
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from family owned or controlled businesses towards managerial control and public 
financing. Miozzo & Dewick, (2002) found that there has been a shift toward 
institutional ownership and away from share ownership by individuals. Because of 
this structure, UK construction firms are concerned about low share prices, profit 
levels and their corporate image. 
Whatever structure or form a firm takes, the ultimate measure of success is whether it 
meets the needs of the people who have an interest or stake in it (Fryer, 1997). The 
key goals of or aims of the organisation usually embrace all the major units and 
functions of the organisation (Cole, 1994). The purpose or objectives of the firm may 
include: 1) To provide a fair return to shareholders; 2) To satisfy clients requirements; 
3) To utilise resources efficiently; 4) To improve the company's position in the 
market; 5) To develop products which can be sold profitably. Other objectives may 
include social objectives and technological leadership. Hillebrandt (1985) contends 
that the primary objective of a firm must be to make adequate profits. The second 
objective is to remain in business and the third is to progress and expand for the 
benefit of shareholders. 
2.3 The concept of Strategic Management 
There are a wide variety of definitions adopted by writers for the term 'strategy' 
within the business world. Channon (1978), defines strategy by the extent of 
diversification, international activity and acquisition policy. Studying various UK 
construction firms, he considers that the strategy may evolve over time. It may not be 
thought out and not planned but may happen through a number of significant 
decisions. This strategy is perceived as the evolutionary mode. 
Newcombe (1990) defines strategy as the extent of market diversification and the 
spread of activities geographically. He concludes that firms start small and in a single 
market but gradually grow and expand into different markets through deliberate 
strategic decisions and changing their structure to suit a particular strategy. This 
strategy can be viewed as the planning mode where the strategies are thought out and 
developed. Bates and Parkinson (1982) describe corporate strategy as relating to the 
long term aims and policies of the organisation. It is not concerned with the detailed 
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day-to-day administration, but with the overall nature of business and how it can 
adapt to changing circumstances. Business strategy or competitive strategy is 
concerned with how strategic business units compete in particular markets. 
Mintzberg et al (1998), Mintzberg (1994), presents five definitions of strategy: plan, 
ploy, pattern, position and perspective. Strategy as a plan is where strategies are 
mapped out in advance of the actions to which they apply and are then developed. 
Plans may be general or specific, as a specific plan a strategy can be a ploy too. A 
ploy is seen as specific manoeuvre used by a company that is intended to outwit its 
competitors or rivals and disguise the real intention of the company. The third 
definition is strategy as a pattern, which according to Mintzberg, is the consistent 
behaviour and processes which emerge from strategic thinking, whether as a result of 
intended or unintended actions. This implies that the strategy of a company can be 
read by observing the strategy that emerged from its historical actions. Mintzberg 
sees plans and ploys as deliberate strategies, while pattern strategies are seen as 
emergent strategies. Deliberate strategies were intentions that existed previously. 
They were planned, executed and realised by management. Emergent strategies are 
strategies where patterns develop in the absence of intentions, possibly as the result of 
internal or external pressures. These strategies are classified into eight types, differing 
by the extent of managerial input: planned, entrepreneurial, ideological, umbrella, 
process, unconnected, consensus and imposed (Warszawski, 1996). 
The remaining two definitions are position and perspective. Position refers to a means 
of locating an organisation to an environment. Therefore, the strategy of an 
organisation would become a niche in the market or its standing in relation to its 
competitors. Perspective strategy involves the looking at the perception the members 
of an organisation have on the intentions and behaviour of the organisation. 
2.3.1 The Strategic Management process 
Langford and Male (2001) describe the strategic management process as three 
interlocking parts: 
e Strategic Formulation 
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0 Strategic choice 
9 Strategic implementation 
Johnson and Scholes(I 998) 'Strategic planning model' and Warszawski (1996) gives a 
broader summary of what strategic management entails namely: 
1. Examining and defining the company's mission and objectives, 
2. Assessing the market environment - PEST factors opportunities and threats, 
3. Assessing the company's strengths and weaknesses, 
4. Identify and assess strategic choices/alternatives. 
5. Monitoring the strategic performance. 
The success of strategic management in an organisation can be measured by their 
achievement of the stated goals and objectives by the top management. Objectives of 
firms' may include profitability, growth or even survival. Stage 2 and 3 which 
combine the analysis of external and internal issues affecting organisational 
performance is known as a SWOT analysis. 
2.3.2 SWOT and PEST Analysis 
A SWOT analysis summarises the key issues from an analysis of the business 
environment and the strategic capability of an organisation. It is widely recognised 
that the heart of strategic planning is to identify and assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the organisation for comparison with opportunities in the future 
environment (Fellows et al, 2002). The concept of assessing the organisational 
changes in terms of strengths and weaknesses can be applied at different levels, 
corporate level, business level or section level. The concept of assessment may vary 
from one organisation to another, but most organisations are likely to select a few key 
factors and issues relevant to them. Factors to consider when assessing the strengths 
and weaknesses of a firm include (Argenti, 1990): 
9 Marketing and distribution channels 
Production and purchasing 
Technical and managerial personnel 
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9 Finances and Knowledge 
Marketing is the competitive process by which goods and services are offered for 
consumption at profit (Pettinger, 1998). Marketing objectives in construction may 
include generating a sufficient volume of work to support the size and scale of the 
firm. Also, generating customer loyalty and repeat business is important in 
construction. Purchasing or procurement in construction may include the purchasing 
of materials and equipment. The purchasing ability of the firm is to acquire at the best 
price and quality. Human resources are vital in a competitive environment to ensure 
success. This area should indicate if the company's personnel is better or worse than 
competitors, staff efficiency, limitations and assets. The measure of financial 
performance is the general capacity of a company to finance its long range and short 
range ventures (Warszawski, 1996). The profitability, cash-flow and growth in sales 
are some of the areas in which contractors must assess and compare their finances. 
As stated earlier, the external environment used to describe the construction industry 
includes political, social, economic and technological factors which shape the 
industry. To examine the opportunities and threats stemming from the external 
environment a PEST analysis can be implemented. Political factors affecting 
construction firms may include the number of investment programmes by the local 
and national government in infrastructure or housing. With public expenditure 
potential clients could include housing associations, government agencies or local 
government. Also, legislation by the government concerning building laws, 
regulations and environmental protection laws. 
General economic indicators would include: Interest rates, inflation, economic growth 
in local, regional or national markets, employment levels and the mortgage market. 
Small shifts in the interest rates may have an influence on the house buying behaviour 
of individuals. This could also envelop the mortgage market and increases and 
decreases in mortgages depending on interest rates. An increase in economic growth 
rates could lead to an increase in demand for the firms product. However, most 
opportunities carry threats too and with this increase in demand more firms may enter 
the market to supply the demand, thus creating more competition. This is a common 
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occurrence in the lower end of the construction industry where small firms will enter 
in times of growth and fail in times of recession. Also, when the construction industry 
is booming it may experience a shortage in the labour force, especially the skilled 
section. 
Social factors may include: Levels of home-owner occupier, levels of education, 
income distribution, mobility of labour, population demographics and divorce rates. 
Technological developments may take place in: IT, raw materials, plant equipment, 
and expenditure on research and development. Two of the current technological 
advances in construction are taking place in use of robotics in construction and E- 
procurement. Technology innovation in construction materials and plant is constantly 
updating. When conducting a PEST analysis the rate of change in each area is varied. 
For example, the political and social changes may be relatively stable, but economic, 
business and technological changes may be taking place with bewildering speed. 
2.3.3 Strategic Alternatives 
Having examined the firm's strengths and weaknesses and the environmental 
opportunities, organisations have to decide which parts of the market they serve and 
the basis on which to compete. Porter (1980) identified three distinctive competitive 
positions shown in Figure 2.4; 
Strategic Advantage 
Uniqueness perceived by Low cost position 
The customer 
Industrywide 
U 
Particular 
Segment only 
I DIFFERENTIATI 
II 
COST LEADERSHIP I 
I FOCUS I 
Figure 2.3 Porter's Three Generic Strategies (Porter, 1980). 
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Cost Leadership-Reduction in cost of product or service, this may apply to materials 
or plant hire, in contracting open bidding systems allow contractors to achieve this 
strategy. However, a contractor may control costs by focussing on suppliers, 
technological advance and adopt the most efficient construction procedures. 
Differentiation - Firms creates a product different to its competitors, concerning 
performance, quality and possibly uniqueness. There are possibilities of 
differentiation in a construction company, which could include a higher standard and 
quality of product. 
Focus - On a particular market, in terms of cost, product, buyer or geographical 
location. Thefocus strategy has gained popularity in construction in recent years with 
more construction firms' defining focus to clients and market as a key strategy. 
Construction firms are developing long order books based on customer loyalty, 
providing more focused and more to the point market focused business operations, 
(Construction News, 2002). 
Competing on the basis of one of these strategies may require a change of direction 
through diversification. Different forms of diversification are discussed in the next 
sub-section. 
2.3.4 Diversification 
One of the major strategic alternatives open to companies is diversification. Ansoff 
(1987) describes it as one of four main corporate strategies a company can adopt as a 
strategic alternative. Within the concept of diversification there are two distinct 
activities; related and unrelated diversification. Related diversification is development 
beyond the company's present position, but still within the broad confines of the 
industry, or possibly the market, within which the company operates. The possible 
gains from this type of diversification include; control of supplies, control of markets, 
cost savings, spreading risk and control of price. This type of diversification can take 
different forms, typically vertical or horizontal integration. Unrelated diversification 
is development beyond the present industry into activities that may bear no clear 
relationship to the present market or industry. Possible advantages for the use of 
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unrelated diversification may include; exploitation of under utilised resources, escape 
from present market, personal objectives or values and spreading risk. 
Strategic options that a firm may pursue include market development, product 
development, market penetration or diversification, domestically or internationally. 
Diversification is essentially development of new products in new markets and in 
recent years many organisations have diversified through mergers or acquisitions of 
other businesses rather than through organic growth. Diversification may further be 
classified as horizontal, vertical or conglomerate diversification. 
Horizontal diversification is sideways expansion into same types of markets with 
related products. Vertical diversification is upward expansion into markets covered 
by suppliers or downward expansion into products covered by other firms. In 
conglomerate diversification a firm expands with new products in new markets with 
unrelated technology. Any of these forms of expansion may take place either by 
internal development or by merger or take-over. 
When a company has chosen diversification as its strategy, it then must decide on 
which market to enter. Newcombe (1990) defines market strategy in terms of market 
diversification and geographical expansion. Due to the nature of the construction 
industry distinctly different markets exist within the industry. Hillebrandt et al (1995) 
found that diversification strategies for construction firms in the 1980's included 
moving into: Property, Housing, Building Materials and Plant Hire. 
Four market diversification strategies are identified; single market, dominant market, 
related and unrelated markets. Single market expansion is where firms grow within 
one market. Dominant market diversification is where firms have one main market 
and also smaller secondary markets. Geographical expansion or diversification is 
where firms choose to expand locally, nationally or internationally. Competing 
internationally is a necessity rather than a matter of discretion for many firms (Porter, 
1986). Almost all of the large enterprises in the developed countries are international 
in character. 
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2.4 Mergers and Acquisitions 
When a company believes that it is not possible to develop its traditional business fast 
enough to meet corporate goals or objectives, it may look outside its respective 
markets or industries for a solution. This is where diversification becomes a 
significant corporate strategy. When diversification is chosen as the relevant strategy 
the choice of market is the most important element of this strategy. However, closely 
followed is the process in which to enter the chosen market. The most common 
means of entry into new markets are mergers and acquisitions. 
'A merger and acquisition strictly defined, occurs when an operating enterprise 
acquires control over the whole or part of the business of another enterprise' (Kang 
and Johansson 2000). Acquisition of an existing company involves one company 
purchasing the shares or assets of another, with the acquired firm's shareholders 
ceasing to be owners of that company. In a merger a new entity may be formed by the 
combination and sharing of the same resources to achieve common objectives. The 
shareholders of the combining firms often remain as joint owners of the combined 
entity (Sudarsanam 1995). 
Most of the available literature to date on mergers and acquisitions comes from the 
scrutiny of the financial sectors in the US and UK. However, the last two decades 
have seen an increase in the volume of literature on mergers and acquisitions in the 
UK construction industry. Hillebrandt and Cannon, (1990), Betts and Ofori, (1992) 
and Junnonen, (1998) all examine the role of mergers and acquisitions in the strategy 
formation in construction firms. Langford and Male (1991) indicate that market 
diversification appears to be the dominant reason for take-over activity in UK 
contracting. Male and Mitrovic (1999) identify acquisitions and mergers as the 
common route for market penetration and growth in size in the construction industry. 
One of the primary triggers for the use of diversification is the growth policy the 
company may undertake. The topic of corporate growth, through mergers and 
acquisitions is topical among researchers, managers and j oumalists alike, (Kreitl et al, 
2002). There are various motives for corporate growth and development. In 
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construction, size is important because the size of project is large and often needs to 
be financed as well as undertaken on the building site, (Hillebrandt and Cannon, 
1990). Other reasons for increased growth of the contracting side of the business 
include the desire to become multinational type of business. 
The move into other geographical regions may be spurred by poor prospects for 
growth in the areas the company is established. This type of diversification would be 
considered horizontal or related diversification. Also, size gives confidence to the 
client in the capability of the company. There are other possible motives for growth 
such as profit, cost, revenue and prestige. The means of achieving corporate growth 
can occur through internal or external growth. Langford and Male (2001) identify 
three means of achieving corporate growth and development: 
* Internally, where the finn invests its own capital to set up and operate a new 
venture. This option is often the primary vehicle of growth. 
Externally through acquisition or merger. This option is often used where speed is 
of the essence. 
A combination strategy which combines elements of internal and external 
development through contractual agreements. 
A joint venture is an example of a combination strategy, where in the construction 
industry the establishment of a new firm is in the ownership of the founding firms. In 
the construction process, the contractual relationship is between the client and the 
joint venture. Joint Ventures sometimes mature into formal mergers. The formation of 
a new company implies entering a new business from 'scratch'. This route will give 
total managerial control to the owners of the new company. Organic growth is 
considered too slow for the rapidly changing industry and this is one reason for 
mergers and take-overs, (Hillebrandt and Cannon, 1990). Fellows et al (1983) 
describe merging with a complimentary contracting firm as a method of achieving 
rapid expansion or diversification. Taking over a firm with a fund of expertise in a 
particular area whether that is service/product area or a geographical area avoids the 
problem from starting from scratch and the danger of costly mistakes. This is called 
start up synergy, for considerable cost and time savings can be made by acquiring a 
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going concern. Brown and Howard (1982) describe mergers under two different 
sections, the first definition is that of the accounting definitions. These include the 
following. 
1) Absorption - The acquisition by an existing company of another company which 
is then liquidated. 
2) Amalgamation -A new company is formed to take over existing companies, the 
old companies are liquidated. 
3) External Reconstruction -A new company is formed to take-over an existing 
company which is experiencing financial or other difficulties. It is reorganised to 
facilitate better trading. 
They also give Economic definitions that describe mergers as follows: 
1) Vertical Mergers - The combination of companies outside their respective 
markets but still within the confines of their industry. 
2) Horizontal Merger - The combination of businesses of a similar kind. 
3) Conglomerate Merger - Combination of different companies to reduce risk to 
particular industries. 
Both, vertical and horizontal mergers are considered as related diversification. These 
types of mergers are expected to produce greater efficiency and financial benefits. In 
construction, increasing efficiency can be achieved by controlling the source of 
supply of materials to avoid high prices, poor quality or long waiting periods. Porter 
(19 8 7) and Haspeslagh and Jemison (199 1) argue that related acquisitions involve the 
consolidation of both human and physical assets and because of opportunities to 
generate economies of scale and scope through resource sharing and transfer and 
reduce overall operating costs, superior performance may be achieved. Samuels et al 
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(1990), examine the differences between Mergers and Acquisitions in terms of their 
accounting techniques. 
1) Goodwill - Goodwill is disclosed in acquisitions. In mergers goodwill is not 
recognised as none is acquired. 
2) Value of shares - In acquisition, shares issued to acquire another company are 
recorded at market value. Merger shares are recorded at nominal value. 
3) Profits - Profits of any acquired company are frozen. The profits distributable 
before merging are distributable after merging. 
2.4.1 Motives for Mergers 
One important aspect of understanding mergers and acquisitions is to examine and 
analyse the motives that drive the deals. Motives for mergers have been the subject of 
extensive research conducted within the framework of three main branches of 
business: economics, finance and strategic management. Most researchers agree that 
mergers are caused by a complex pattern of motives which sometimes overlap or 
compete with each other (Brouthers et al, 1998). More recently, scholars have 
suggested that managers may have multiple motives when undertaking a merger or 
acquisition, (Brouthers et al, 1998). From this perspective, managers are attempting to 
achieve several goals with the merger. 
However, when examining the motives for merger activity two fundamental 
explanations have emerged: (1) the shareholder wealth maximisation and (2) the 
manager wealth maximisation. According to the shareholder maximisation theory, 
acquisitions are motivated by a desire to maximise wealth of the firm to shareholders. 
Sudarsanarn (1995) states that all firm decisions including mergers and acquisitions 
are made with the objective of maximising the wealth of the company's shareholders. 
There are two occasions when managers feel that they can achieve the above 
objective (Pike & Neale 1999); 
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(1) When managers believe that the target company can be acquired at less than 
it's 'true value'. 
(2) When managers believe that the two enterprises will be worth more merged 
than if operated as two single companies. 
This shareholder maximisation hypothesis predicts that the wealth of the shareholders 
of bidding and target firms increase as a result of mergers or acquisitions. The neo- 
classical view that managers make decisions to further the interest of shareholders is 
not always true. Managers sometimes undertake mergers and acquisitions to further 
their own interests. Sudarsanam (1995) explains that managers may pursue growth to 
increase their power and status. They also may wish to diversify risk and minimise 
the cost of financial distress and bankruptcy so that they have job security. 
Most of the empirical evidence on the wealth of merger activity (Draper & Paudyal 
1999), (Kennedy & Limmack 1996), (Sudarsanam et al 1996), (Dickerson et al 1997) 
has indicated that most of the gain from merger activity accrue to the shareholders of 
the acquired company. This suggests that managers are not pursuing a profit 
maximisation policy as far as the shareholders of the acquiring firm are concerned. 
The motives for merger activity that ensure the underlying rationale of shareholder 
maximisation and managerial maximisation are wide ranging. Hopkins et al (1999) 
examines four related motives for the use of mergers and acquisitions: strategic, 
market, economic and personal. Brouthers et al (1998) suggest that the motives can 
be combined in three generally accepted categories of merger motives. These 
categories are shown in Table 2.1. 
Economic Motives Personal Motives Strategic Motives 
Economies of Scale 
Increase Profitability 
Create Shareholder value 
Increase Sales 
Managerial challenge 
Acquisition of Inefficient 
Management 
Pursuit of Market Power 
Acquisition of Competitor 
Search Motive 
Avoidance of Bankruptcy Managerial Prestige Environmental uncertainty 
Table 2.1 Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions (Brouthers et al, 1998) 
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The traditional theory of the firm postulates that only those firms which maximise 
corporate performance will survive and those which do not will be taken over or 
eliminated (Kennedy & Limmack, 1996). Most of the motives given in Table 2.1 
overlap into other categories, one such example is market power. Strategic motives 
involve acquisitions that improve the strength of a firm's strategies. Companies 
involved in mergers and acquisitions view it as a growth alternative to internal 
investment. The process then becomes a function of long range strategic planning. 
2.4.2 Environmental Uncertainty 
As stated earlier, the decisions, operations and performance of companies are all 
inseparably related to the conditions of the environment of the company. Previous 
research has developed the theory that a merger is an attempt on the part of a 
company to reduce uncertainty and manage its environment (Aaronovitch & Sawyer, 
1975). Environmental conditions as discussed earlier in the chapter can be a major 
factor in determining a company's strategy. Some organisations openly try to avoid 
risk and uncertainty and actively search for ways of reducing these factors. 
One example of this uncertainty is shown in the construction industry where, with the 
increase in globalisation, national construction or regional firms have merged and 
consolidated to reduce the risk of acquisition and to increase the potential for growth 
in the global market. Finns may also purchase their competition as a way of reducing 
that competition in the market. 
2.4.3 Search Motive 
Mergers may occur as a result of corporate search. Cable (1983) argues that a firm 
may undertake acquisitions mainly to obtain information on potential investments or 
to strategically position themselves when investment opportunities arise. In the 
construction industry today companies are investing in areas which have the potential 
to lead to much larger rewards. 
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One example is the benefit of investing in Poland for larger companies. The chance of 
a stepping stone into Russia's large construction market could lead firms to invest in 
Poland. Firms resorting to mergers and acquisitions in their search for investment 
opportunities can actually benefit from synergy or economies of scale if the merger is 
horizontal or vertical. 
2.4.4 Market power 
The achievement of market power has long been considered the main economic 
justification for mergers and is a strategy that is pursued by many large organisations. 
One definition of market power rests on the value of having a high market share. 
Another rests on the notion of increasing the firm's power in its relationship with 
customers by offering a broad rather than narrow Product line (Hopkins, 1999). 
Increasing market power means increasing the size of the firm relative to other firms 
in the industry. In the construction industry only large firms can raise the financial 
resources necessary to undertake large projects. Larger firms usually have more 
sophisticated management teams and more access to resources. Also large and long 
established firms have a better chance of being supported by financial institutions and 
may have fewer capital, cash flow and payment problems than small firms, (Arditi et 
al, 2000). 
2.4.5 Operating Economies 
The traditional view of the main objective of the firm is to maximise its profits. In 
this way, mergers can be analysed in terms of profit and the effects on achieving 
profit. In particular one such effect is based on economies of scale (Silberston, 1979). 
Economies of scale have been considered to be the natural objective of horizontal or 
vertical mergers. But such scale economies have also been claimed in conglomerate 
mergers (Brealey & Myers, 1984). 
Economies of scale can be obtained by reducing costs. They can be subdivided into 
real and financial economies. Real economies occur when improvements in 
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operations within the firm are achieved, whereas financial economies depend upon 
lower input costs resulting from the advantages of possibly mass buying. Relevant 
savings from production can be achieved in backward integration. In construction, 
these savings would relate to the price of supply and level of efficient production. 
Forward integration would assume full control of the product until it reaches the 
consumer. 
In relation to the construction industry, economies of scale existing at the production 
stage can be applied to the plant hire or materials sector. In building, a project can be 
completed quicker and cheaper depending on the size of the company. This also 
applies to the selection of projects; larger companies have a wider selection because 
of their means and capabilities. 
2.4.6 Bankruptcy Costs 
A financial motive for mergers is to reduce or avoid bankruptcy costs. Shrieves and 
Stevens (1979) suggested that the avoidance of bankruptcy risk and the resulting 
savings can have an effect of the value of newly merged companies. Fear of 
liquidation of assets below their true value is a motive for financially distressed 
companies to seek a merger. 
However the savings gained from preventing failure would have to be balanced 
against the cost of a merger. Shrieves and Stevens (1979) study applied Altman's z- 
score model to 112 merging or acquiring companies. They found that from this 
sample of 112 firms, 17 of the firms were near bankruptcy or defined as already 
failed. 
2.5 Corporate Failure in Construction 
According to Frederikslust (1978), failure is the inability of a firm to pay its 
obligations when they are due. Altman (1993) defines a company as failed if the 
realised rate of return on invested capital, with allowances for risk considerations, is 
significantly and continually lower than prevailing rates on similar investments. 
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Abidali (1991) suggests that failure of a company is defined as having entered into 
receivership or voluntary or compulsory liquidation or having received government 
assistance. 
Construction companies operate in a highly competitive business environment. There 
are no barriers to market entry and the rate of failure of construction firms is very 
high. 'A contractor is at far more risk than his counterpart in almost any other 
industry', (Kangari, 1987). A contractor usually requires substantial production time 
and therefore the client is also subject to a greater degree of risk for a longer period of 
time during the construction process. Therefore a firm's capabilities should be 
confirmed before the construction process begins. 
2.5.1 Ratio Analysis 
Interest in business failure prediction has expanded considerably since Altman (1968) 
and Beaver (1966) first published their works. Much of the literature has focused on 
the use of financial ratios as the main predictor. Financial ratio analysis utilizes 
information from financial statements to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current financial status of a company (Kangari, 1992). Beaver (1966) and Argenti 
(1983) examined the discriminantory power of a large number of financial ratios. 
Beaver's study produced three good discriminatory ratios; 
1) Total Liability/Total Assets 
2) Net profit/Total assets 
3) Cash Flow/Total debt 
Beaver found a significant difference between the means of the three ratios for 
continuing firms and failing firms. He found that the three ratios in failing firms 
began to decline over the five years to failure. Beaver's study was conducted using 79 
firms which went bankrupt between 1954 and 1964 and 79 non-failed firms of similar 
size and industry type. 
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Table 2.2 gives the results of the financial ratios used as discriminators between 
failed and non-failed companies obtained in previous studies by Argenti (1983), 
Kangari (1992) and Abidali(1995). These ratios are discussed in more detail in 
chapter five. Argenti (1983) produced nine good discriminator ratios between failed 
and non-failed firms. He found that the profitability ratios provided the greatest 
discriminantory variable between failed and non-failed groups. Kangari based his 
study on the US construction industry and examined two ratios from the three 
variable groupings. Abidali's (1990) research on UK construction firms found that the 
profitability measure contributed most to the discrimination model. 
Argenti (1983) Kangari (1992) Abidali(I 995) 
A. Liquidity Ratios 
l. Current ratio xx 
2. Total liabilities to net worth x 
3. The quick ratio x 
4. Short-term loan to profit 
B. Profitability 
x 
1. Profit to capital employed xxx 
2. Profit margin x 
Males to Capital employed x 
4. Return on Total assets x 
C. Efficiency ratios 
I. Sales to stocks x 
Males to assets x 
3. Total Assets to sales x 
4. Sales to working capital x 
5. Debtors; collection period x 
D. Leverage ratios 
Lcurrent assets to net assets x 
2. Gearing ratio x 
Unterest cover. x 
Table 2.2 Results of traditional ratios from previous studies 
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Freear (1985) published ratios which have appeared in a significant amount of 
previous studies and were described as predictors of failure. 
The predictor ratios are as follows: 
1. Liquid assets ratio (Two studies) 
2. Acid test ratio (Two studies) 
3. Net worth to fixed assets (Five studies) 
4. Working Capital to Total Assets (Five studies) 
5. Net profit to Net Worth (Three studies) 
6. Net Worth to total Liabilities (Two studies) 
The first two ratios concentrated on the short-term liquidity of the firm or the ability 
to meet short term liabilities. The other measures concentrate more on the short term 
and long tenn position of the finn. 
2.5.2 Z-Model 
As a result of these studies a more sophisticated analysis was developed, combining a 
number of the single discriminatory ratios in a multivariate analysis to give a ratio 
model. A set of discriminant functions is usually constructed on the basis of sample 
data allowing classification or assignment of further individuals to one of the prior 
groups according to the values of their observation set. A company's z-score is 
calculated by adding together a number of financial ratios, each ratio having been 
weighted according to its usefulness. 
The most popular ratio model was developed by Altman (1968) and is known as the 
Z-model. Altman's model was derived from the financial data of the manufacturing 
industry and uses the statistical technique of multiple discriminant analysis. Various 
researchers have attempted to develop this model for use in specific industries, for 
example, Deakin (1972), Taffler (1983), Robertson (1984). The research has also 
included models specifically for the construction sector, for example, Mason and 
Harris (1979), Kangari (1988), Abidali (1990), Russell and Jaselski (1992). The basis 
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for the majority of the research in construction is to attempt to predict contractor 
failure prior to contract award. The Z-model is examined further in Chapter Four. 
2.5.3 Other Methods of Failure Prediction 
Although there is a great deal of emphasis on the use of financial analysis in the 
prediction of failure, the study of a firm's non-financial aspects is also analysed in the 
academic works on the subject of corporate collapse. Argenti (1983), is probably the 
most noteworthy of experts in this field. He assesses the influence of management on 
failure giving each management defect or error a rank or score. These defects were 
manifested through lack of responsiveness to change, over expansion, mishandling of 
large contracts and general incompetence. He describes these defects as A-scores. 
Some of the common management defects in his study of failed companies include: 
autocratic chief executive; a passive company board; a weak finance director; poor 
budgetary control and cash flow plan; and poor response to change. 
The A-score is based on the belief that if a company is in financial trouble, it is 
because of management defects and errors that were perpetrated over a period of 
time. It is believed that these errors could have been corrected by a careful observer 
before the signs of financial distress became visible. Abidali (1990), developed an A- 
score model specifically for use in the construction sector, using similar managerial 
defects to Argenti (1983), while also including construction based defects. These 
included lack of engineering skills and a defective bidding system. In contracting, 
where there is traditionally a strong emphasis on open bidding, a lack of experience 
in bidding or cross referring with management may result in a defective system. Also 
a good response to market changes involves reviewing the perspective of the market. 
In an ever changing construction market companies that don't either notice a change 
in the market or don't respond to it are displaying signs of bad management. An 
autocratic chief executive in failed firms was generally indicated by the preservation 
of a position of sole authority. In the construction industry this was a familiar trait 
with the existing founder or family the sole authority. However, as stated earlier, 
there has been a shift in policy from family ownership to managerial control. 
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2.5.4 Causes of Corporate failure 
Failure is the outcome of a complex process and is rarely dependent on a single 
factor. Kangari (1987) lists ten major causes of business failure in the US 
construction sector. Management incompetence, lack of experience, inadequate sales, 
difficulty collecting from debtors and market or economic decline are some of the 
major causes listed in business failure in the construction industry. Arditi et al, (2000) 
studied failures in the construction industry and found that 80% of all failures were 
caused by five factors; insufficient profits, industry weakness, heavy operating 
expenses, insufficient capital and institutional debt. 
There are various reasons of corporate failure. However it is possible to generalise the 
phenomenon of failure as a function of environment-dependent factors and strategic 
leadership dependent factors. Organisation theorists argue that the fate of an 
organisation is determined by environmental selection forces (recession, natural 
disasters), where strategic leaders have limited or no effect on the performance of the 
organisation, (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), (Kale & Arditi, 1999). 
In contrast, the strategic management school emphasises the importance of 
managerial decisions and actions in ensuring the survival and the enhancement of the 
performance of the firm. Organisations are able to respond to environmental 
opportunities and threats by altering their strategies and structure (Levitt and March, 
1988, ) (Child, 1972). These two perspectives are now considered complementary in 
explaining the causes of failure, (Kale & Arditi, 1999). 
2.6 Summary 
Today, the demand for construction work is changing dramatically in terms of 
quantity, quality and location, with competition intensified. The success or failure of 
a construction firm depends heavily on the capability to adapt to changes in the 
market environment. Thus, there is an increasing need for contractors to formulate 
fundamental policies for achieving growth and prosperity. In setting out basic 
strategies a company must accurately assess the conditions of the market and 
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competition as well as its own position. The need to adopt a strategic perspective to 
business operations has gradually been recognised in the construction industry. 
In an increasingly global industry, one of the strategic alternatives available to 
construction firms is the use of diversification. Diversification is defined as the 
process by which firms extend the range of operations outside those in which they are 
currently involved. This broad definition includes related diversification and 
unrelated diversification. Related diversification is development beyond the present 
market but still within the confines of the industry. Unrelated diversification is 
development beyond the current industry and into markets that bear no clear 
resemblance to the current market. Any of these forms of expansion may take place 
either by internal development or by merger or take-over. 
Internal corporate development is achievable by means of organic growth. This 
method of development allows firms to adjust according to the market needs and 
developments and also does not affect the organisational. structure and day to day 
running of the firm. However, this mode of growth is sometimes considered too slow 
for the rapidly changing construction industry and this has led to the use of external 
growth. External growth is realised through the acquisition of or the merger with 
another firm. 
A merger or acquisition occurs when an operating enterprise acquires control over the 
whole or part of the business of another enterprise. A compelling reason to develop 
by merger or acquisition is the speed with which it allows the company to enter new 
product or market areas. In today's consolidating markets, firms can create significant 
shareholder value by using mergers and acquisitions to cut costs and grow profits. 
There are various motives for mergers and acquisitions these include; economic, 
personal and strategic motives. In some instances these motives may overlap or 
compete with each other. However, two fundamental hypothesis have emerged when 
examining the motives surrounding mergers. The first is the shareholder wealth 
maximisation theory where acquisitions are motivated primarily to increase the 
wealth of the shareholder. The second is manager wealth maximisation where 
acquisitions are motivated by managers pursuit of increased status, prestige, power 
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and job security. Mergers may not only be a primary vehicle for growth but also a 
means of survival for a contractor faced with impending failure. 
Corporate failure in the highly competitive construction industry is a common 
occurrence. Construction companies must undertake a regular evaluation of their 
performance and ability to compete to ensure the survival of the company. Much of 
the literature to date has focussed on the development of financial ratio analysis in the 
evaluation of the company's strengths and weaknesses. These traditional financial 
ratios are utilised in the prediction of imminent failure. A more sophisticated analysis 
involves the use of financial ratios in a multivariate analysis, these are known as Z- 
models. The study of non-financial methods are also employed in failure prediction 
models. These methods assess the influence of management on contractor failure. 
However, it is possible to generalise the phenomenon of failure as a function of 
environment-dependent factors and strategic leadership dependent factors. 
In planning to diversify a company must accurately evaluate its own capabilities. 
Each construction company may compare itself with competitors with regard to 
performance in each specific market segment. This enables the company to rate itself 
as strong, weak or equal in each market. It will then become possible to obtain a clear 
view of market characteristics, competitors, and self-capabilities and to predict a 
market share for the short-term future and a growth potential for the long-term future. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research design and methodology adopted in this study. The 
chapter begins with a brief review of the research design method available and the 
method used. The chapter also includes the sample selection criteria and the 
collection of relevant information. The final part of the chapter examines the selection 
of variables, methods of measurement and the statistical procedures used in 
examining the research objectives. 
3.2 Research Design 
Research has traditionally been classified into two types: pure research which 
involves the discovery and supply of theories; and applied research which uses 
theories and tests them in the 'real world'. According to (Holton & Sonnert, 1999) and 
(Schmid, 2001), pure basic research and applied research are the two extremes of 
research approaches. The primary classification of methods adopted in research are 
mainly quantitative and qualitative research. 
Quantitative methods seek to gather factual data and to study relationships between 
facts and how such facts and relationships accord with theories and the findings of 
any research executed previously in literature (Fellows & Liu, 1997). Quantitative 
approaches adopt scientific techniques in which initial study of theory and literature 
yields precise aims and objectives with hypothesis to be tested. These methods rely 
on quantified data (measurements) to study and compare different subjects, yield 
results and conclusions, make decisions about hypotheses and make inferences from 
empirical observations. 
Qualitative methods explore a subject without prior formulation with a view to gain 
understanding and collect information and data such that theories will emerge. These 
methods can be used to either build or verify a theory and is usually based on 
meanings expressed through words. 
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Quantitative research is concerned with the collection and analysis of data in numeric 
form and are generally evaluated using descriptive and inferential statistics, 
qualitative data are usually reduced to themes or categories, involves collecting and 
analysing information in as many forms (chiefly non-numeric), and evaluated 
subjectively. However, while quantitative research may be mostly used for testing 
theory, it can also be used for exploring an area and generating hypothesis and theory. 
Qualitative research can be used for testing hypothesis and theories even though it is 
mostly used for theory generation (Blaxter et al, 1997). 
Gill & Johnson (1997) describe research as entailing a deductive approach and an 
inductive approach. A deductive research method involves the development of a 
conceptual and theoretical structure prior to its testing through empirical observation. 
Induction is the reverse of deduction as it involves moving from the plane of 
observation of the empirical world to the construction of explanations and theories 
about what has been observed. The deductive approach develops a theory or 
hypothesis and designs a research strategy to test the hypothesis. This method uses 
quantitative data. The inductive approach involves collecting data and developing 
theory using qualitative data. 
Phillips and Pugh (1994) describe research in a threefold classification system: 
Exploratory research; testing out research; and problem solving research. Exploratory 
research involves examining a new problem or topic about which little is known, so 
the research idea cannot at the start be formulated very well. The research would need 
to examine what theories and concepts are appropriate, developing new ones if 
necessary and whether existing methodologies can be used. Testing out research 
involves the researcher trying to find the limits of previously proposed 
generalisations. The amount of testing out to be done is endless and continuous, as 
general classifications are improved by specifying, modifying and clarifying. 
Problem solving research involves the definition of the problem and on particular 
solution or research method is immediately apparent (Schliefer, 1994). In this method 
the particular solution or research method has to be discovered. The researcher 
working in this way may have to create and identify original problem solutions every 
step of the way. 
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Throughout the study quantitative data was collected and analysed using various 
statistical procedures. The majority of the research methodology was conducted using 
Phillips and Pugh (1994) Testing out research method in which the study focused on 
examining previous literature and generalisations from other industries and tried to 
implement and examine these methods in the construction industry. It also included 
testing some preconceived ideas relating to the performance of construction firms. 
However, this research method include the use of Exploratory research in which 
various concepts and theories were examined for their applicability to the 
construction firm and the industry. 
3.3 Sample Selection 
Throughout this study, the variables subjected to analyses were taken over a period of 
5-6 years. The time period examined started from 1996 and finished in 2001. Since 
average ratios shift over a period of time and also due to the cyclical nature of the UK 
construction industry, it was necessary to keep the study period relatively small. The 
starting year of 1996 was dictated by the availability of the comprehensive array of 
financial information. Information preceding 1996 was incomplete in most firms and 
it was deemed necessary to restrict the study to the period examined. An analysis of 
the yearly aggregated profitability of the UK construction firms was made to show 
whether there was an increase in yearly mean profitability of the companies studied in 
line with the increase in construction output shown in Table 4.2. 
A list of companies was selected from the Construction News magazine to examine 
the corporate profitability of sectors in the UK construction industry. An initial list of 
failing firms and merging companies was also selected from the Construction News 
magazine and the UK business park review. The definition of a failed firm for this 
thesis were those which had entered into receivership, voluntary liquidation and 
winding up by order of court (Abidali, 1995). A construction firm leaving the 
construction market or winding up the business may not necessarily be deemed failed. 
The firm may not have been successful in achieving an appropriate performance from 
its owner's or investors perception and decided to wind up the business. To decide 
which construction firms would be included in the sample for the analyses in the 
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study certain criteria were used to screen the data. Construction firms were included if 
they met the following constraints: 
Finns chosen for the study of corporate profitability in UK construction had to be 
significant participants in one of the sectors examined; contracting, materials or 
plant hire. Significant here applies to the primary code in the standard industrial 
classification. 
Failure analysis involved matching the size of failed firms with non-failed firms 
in terms of size and year. 
It was desirable that international contractors were ranked highly in their national 
markets because the largest national contractors generate a significant amount of 
revenue from foreign activities. Thus, a multi-national contractor will include 
voluntary disclosures and restate their domestic report to an international standard 
suited to needs of foreign clients and foreign investors. This increases the 
suitability of the comparison of financial information. 
All take-overs, where both the target and bidding firm were involved in the 
construction industry and listed on the London stock exchange during the sample 
period were taken as the population. Companies that were included in the initial 
sample had to be quoted for a minimum period of two years before the 
announcement of the take-over bid. 
The list of construction firms that were selected in accordance with those criteria for 
failure analysis and international comparisons are given in Appendix B and C 
respectively. The theme of much of this thesis is examining and comparing the 
corporate performance of a number of firms involved in the construction sector from 
certain strategic positions. Accordingly, samples were selected to capture these 
performance and strategic measures. However the chosen sample has certain 
limitations which include: 
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9 The sample of construction firms for analysis was selected from a classification of 
the construction industry into three groups of contracting and housebuilding, 
materials and plant hire. However as explained in chapter 2 these basic groups 
could be further broken down into separate sectors. 
9 The sample base of firms are not representative of typical construction firms. The 
database of the construction firms consists of a major portion of firms from the 
top construction firms in their respective sectors. These firms are more 
sophisticated strategically and financially than the total population of the 
construction industry. 
However, in each sector particularly the materials and plant hire sectors, there is a 
group of very large firms that often straddle construction and other industries and 
then a much larger group of smaller firms beneath them. To aggregate together very 
large firms with smaller, but still relatively large contractors makes little economic or 
statistical sense. As a result the sample was selected to exclude those particularly 
smaller companies. This resulted in a downsizing of the sample from each sector. 
3.4 Data Source 
Information and data for this study was collected from publicly available sources and 
published data. For example, daily newspapers and magazines contain a wealth of 
data including reports about take-over bids and company share prices. The 
information from these sources were collected for specific construction firms and 
construction industry characteristics. The secondary data which was used in this study 
included both raw data and published summaries. Raw data exists where there has 
been little if any processing in the case of share prices. Published or compiled data 
has received some form of selection or surnmarising in the case of annual reports. 
The use of primary data often requires small sample sizes which can lead to questions 
surrounding the generalisability of findings. Due to the use of published data sources 
generalisability increases because data are available for a large number of cases. For 
many research questions and objectives the main advantage of using secondary data 
is the enormous savings in resources, in particular time and money, (Ghauri et al, 
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1995). When a research design calls for longitudinal data, publicly availability greatly 
reduces the time investment required since historical periods can be selected for 
which data already exists, (Ibrahim, 1995). For many research projects time 
constraints mean that secondary data provide the only possibility of undertaking 
longitudinal studies. Also for projects requiring national or international comparisons, 
secondary data will probably provide the main source. 
However, secondary data must be viewed with the same caution as primary data. Data 
from secondary sources may have inaccuracies and material inconsistencies. Also the 
fact that secondary data was collected for a particular purpose may result in other 
problems. The data that is used may represent the interpretations of those who have 
produced them rather than objective picture of reality. The published data in this 
study have been used with extreme caution with an assessment of the validity and 
reliability of the data. 
A number of different sources of information were utilised to gather the data 
necessary for this study. These sources included the following: 
1) Annual company accounts and reports 
2) FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) 
Published Information from associations 
" UK Business Park review 
" Construction News 
" Engineering News Record's top 225 global contractors 
" Building's (2002) top 300 
Japan Financials database 
Investment information 
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o Datastream database- Share prices, market index. 
9 FT prices CD Rom 
o Hydra Database 
The major source of data was the FAME database which was used extensively 
throughout the study to ascertain a UK construction firm's performance. The other 
sources were used to complete and compliment the information necessary for the 
different analysis in the study. Annual reports were used throughout to clarify and 
confirm data and were examined extensively in the study of international companies 
along with the Japanese financial database. The investment sources contained 
information on stock price performance, announcement dates and market indices. 
Published information from various magazines and associations revealed details on 
merging or acquiring firms, failed companies, and their ranking in the UK 
construction industry and international construction. The reasons why the FAME 
database was used as the main source of financial information were: 
* The database contained a sufficient number of firms and relevant financial 
information over a long period of time necessary for the analysis of UK 
construction firms. 
e The UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (UK SIC(92)) 
used to classify business establishments and other statistical units by the type of 
economic activities they are engaged in was provided in the FAME database. The 
primary activity of the company is listed along with secondary activities, which 
governs inclusion into the sample. 
e The database lists all relevant subsidiaries and holding companies associated with 
each firm. This allowed for the exclusion of companies that weren't identified as 
parent companies for the study. 
The FAME database gave detailed, financial and ownership information on 
companies in the UK construction industry and other industries. Throughout the 
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collection and analysis of the information reference was also made to other data 
sources to compare or clarify evidence. 
3.5 Selection of Variables 
In this study, a number of different variables were identified to examine the corporate 
profitability, failure analysis and merger performance. These variables used to 
achieve the thesis objective are traditional financial ratios, calculated from the 
construction firm's published accounts. A detailed discussion of ratio analysis is 
provided in chapter five and is also mentioned in subsequent chapters. However, 
several criteria were used to select the variables and the measurement of these 
variables. The criteria for identification and selection of these specific variables to 
examine corporate financial performance and merger performance are the following: 
The relevance of individual variables for the measurement of corporate 
performance and the suitability for assessing the effects of merger activity. 
The appearance and popularity of certain variables in previous research used in 
predicting failure, corporate profitability and merger performance. 
4, The variables used in the study were selected on the basis of effectiveness in 
previous and related studies. 
The availability of ratios over a period of time to allow for the implementation of 
a longitudinal study. 
The relevance and importance of certain variables to construction firms and the 
industry. 
3.5.1 Measurement of firm size 
For measuring the size of a corporation several different indicators including total 
assets, turnover, number of employees, market capitalisation, profits, etc. can be used 
(Krietl et al, 2002). The three most common types found in the literature are turnover, 
total assets and number of employees, (Ibrahim, 1995). The measure of the number of 
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personnel available to the company as the size measure raises a number of questions. 
The practice of subcontracting in the construction industry may give misleading 
impressions of size. There may be a far greater workforce than the number of workers 
directly employed taking into account the use of subcontractors who supply only 
workers. In the UK, there has been a steady increase in self employment in the 
industry, showing that labour only subcontracting has been preferred and contractors 
believe it to be cheaper than direct employment, (Hillebrandt, 2000). 
Turnover and assets are alternative measures of size. Turnover or sales measures the 
output of the firm. The asset measure is a measure of the value of everything a 
company owns: cash, securities, land, equipment -- even intangibles like goodwill. 
The use of assets as a measure of size is not entirely satisfactory as it suffers from the 
problems associated with valuation (Asenso and Fellows, 1987). During periods of 
inflation the historical system of accounting becomes unsatisfactory for measuring 
the assets of a company. The asset base for different contractors would vary 
depending on the hiring or purchasing policy of plant and equipment. Also the 
practice of sub-contracting may not encourage firms to increase their assets. 
However, because of the diversified nature of the top contractors their asset base is 
greater than plant hire contractors. 
A number of studies (Hitt et al, 1997), (Ibrahim, 1994), have found a high correlation 
between the use of total assets and turnover. Asenso and Fellows (1987) concluded 
that the choice of size measure is flexible, as all the measures are highly correlated 
with each other. The present study adopted turnover as the main measure of size, in 
line with other studies such as Akintoye and Skitmore (1991) and Lea and Langsley, 
(1977). However, for the analysis of scale economies the total assets of firms was 
deemed a more suitable measure for size as it would be a better indication of 
efficiency gains as it would control for shrinkage (a shrinking firm). Throughout the 
study the results of ratios containing one of the above size measures were analysed 
and compared. 
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3.5.2 Scales of Measurement 
The measurement of different types of data are identified in terms of the nature of the 
scales of measurement used. The variables can be classified into four levels or scales 
of measurement. The scales of measurement are the nominal, ordinal, interval and 
ratio scales of measurement. 
Nominal scales are the lowest level of measurement, their property is the property of 
identity. The nominal scales simply classify occurrences into two or more groups 
without any implication of distance between the groups. Ordinal scales measure a 
variable in order of magnitude. In ordinal scales, numbers are assigned to categories 
or groupings that are arranged in order so that some numbers represent more of the 
variable than others. Interval scales are scales on which equal intervals between 
objects represent equal and meaningful differences. Interval scales permit statements 
about distances between responses to be made but not about relationships in ratio 
terms between scores; this occurs as the zero point for the scale is selected as a matter 
of convenience rather than having some basic absolute fixity of reference (Fellows & 
Liu, 1997). However, ratio scales have all the properties of the preceding scale as 
well as a true zero point. All of the possible mathematical operations can be carried 
out using the ratio scales. 
The first two scale measurements can be attributed to qualitative data while the last 
two scales are used in the measurement of quantitative data. The statistical procedures 
used in this study are best measured using interval or ratio scales. Also, the data 
collected in the study was of a quantitative nature. All of the performance variables 
used were measured on a ratio scales. 
3.6 Statistical Testing 
To examine the corporate financial performance of construction firms and their 
effectiveness in mergers various statistical procedures were applied. There are two 
broad categories of statistics: descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. 
Descriptive statistics are used to summarise, simplify, and describe a large number of 
measurements. Inferential statistics go beyond the simple description and help to 
make inferences about the data. Both descriptive and inferential statistics are 
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important research tools and were used throughout the study. A brief description of 
the role of descriptive and inferential statistics is given below, followed by the 
statistical methods employed in the study and the rationale for choosing them. 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The process of describing data is usually the first step in statistical analysis; in 
addition to providing useful information about the sample, it is often used to be sure 
there are no obvious irregularities with the measures taken before inferential statistics 
(Furlong et al, 2000). Descriptive statistics can be defined into three groups: 1) 
frequency counts and frequency distributions, 2) graphical representations of data, 
and 3) summary statistics. The most basic descriptive statistic is frequency, which 
simply refers to how often something occurs. The simplest way of summarising data 
for individual variables so that specific values can be read is to use a frequency 
distribution. Another way of looking at frequency distributions is graphically. 
Frequency or grouped frequency distributions can be represented by either a bar 
chart, frequency polygon or histogram. If the variables are qualitative the most 
appropriate graph would be a bar chart. If the variable is quantitative, as is the case in 
the analyses, then a histogram can be used. Prior to using many statistical tests it is 
necessary to establish the distribution of variables containing quantifiable data, this 
can be shown from the histogram. Much of statistics uses a particular distribution 
which has been found to occur very commonly, the normal distribution (Fellows & 
Liu, 1997). 
The normal distribution is a continuous distribution specified by two parameters, the 
mean g and variance a. The measurements of the random variable are on an interval 
scale or ratio scale with the tails of the distribution tending towards infinity. In a 
skewed distribution the scores tend to one end of the distribution. However, Dowdy, 
(1991) states that if the sample sizes are large enough a normal distribution can often 
still be used to find certain probabilities associated with the testing because of some 
results that are known from the mathematical theory of statistics. With very few 
exceptions no matter what form the underlying population distribution takes, as n 
increases the sampling distribution of averages approach a normal distribution. The 
mean, median and mode are used to describe the central tendency. The measures of 
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variability are derived from the variance and standard deviation. Previous research by 
Deakin (1972) indicated that financial ratios very rarely fit a normal distribution. 
However, the population of companies within a particular industry exhibited more 
normal distribution than a population of companies from several industries. Since this 
study was mainly concerned with construction industry problems of non normality 
were significantly decreased. 
The use of descriptive statistics gives a rapid impression of how and where data are 
located, i. e. the mean value, around which most of the data will be located. They are 
excellent in terms of giving a broad picture of the pattern and distribution of the 
observations. However, this graphical description has its limitations as the 
interpretation of a histogram is subjective and lacks precision. It is conceivable that 
the wrong decision could be made, based solely on the distributions of the profit 
margins. A more precise evaluation of the results is to develop an analytical and 
objective measure which gives a clear numerical value. 
3.6.2 Inferential Testing 
In order to make a decision about a population, a sample is selected from the 
population, as is the case in this report, on the basis of this sample certain things are 
inferred about the population, this is known as statistical inference. This testing tests 
the difference between two population means. In the hypothesis testing situation a 
hypothesis is tested about the population quantity by means of a sample quantity. The 
hypothesis that is being tested is called the null hypothesis Ho, in the following 
calculations the null hypothesis is that the profit margins of each area being tested are 
equal, Ho: ýU ý ýM The hypothesis that will be accepted if the null hypothesis is 
rejected is called the alternative hypothesis Ha, If the alternative hypothesis is 
accepted, then further hypothesis testing is carried out involving a new null 
hypothesis and alternative hypothesis. 
There are two types of error associated with this type of statistical testing; 
Type 1 error - The null hypothesis is rejected when it should be accepted. 
Type 2 error - The null hypothesis is accepted when it should rejected. 
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Therefore, in any given situation it is impossible to make a decision which is known 
to be correct; instead, a decision which is likely to be correct is made. In hypothesis 
testing, a level of significance ((x) is applied to the test, these levels are usually 5% 
and 1%. This significance level specifies the probability of a type 1 error. To put it 
simply, the null hypothesis Ho will be rejected, when it is true 100oc percent of the 
time, when cc = 0.01 Ho is rejected 1% of the time, when Ho is true. 
3.7 Testing for mean differences 
3.7.1 Z-test and West 
The independent samples West and z-test is used to compare the means from two 
independent samples of subjects. This involves testing the null hypothesis that there is 
no difference between the population means. The equation to designate the two 
groups is given below: 
Normal distribution -Z= 
XI 
-X2 
s2 s2 
I- 2_ 
n, n2 
2) t-Distribution -T 
X1 
-X2 
n, +n2 -2 
ýn, 
n2) 
where X,, is the mean of sample n, and Sn is the standard deviation of sample n. 
The z-test requires that the population standard deviation is known and the value of 
the population mean. The value of z-critical is taken from the z-table which assumes 
that the distribution of random samples form a normal curve. This assumption maybe 
wrong and the z-test may be inappropriate. For small samples of less than thirty a 
normal distribution may not be formed. Therefore, most statisticians suggest that the 
51 
z-test be used only when the sample is greater than 30 (Furlong et al, 2000). It maybe 
more appropriate to a t-test for a sample less than 30. The general procedure for the t- 
test is similar to the z-test which involves computing the test statistic and then that 
value with a critical value of the statistic. The critical value is obtained from the t- 
tables. 
Although the t-test and z-test assumes that the data are normally distributed this can 
be ignored without too many problems even with the sample sizes of less than 30 
(Hays, 1994). The West and z-test can be easily applied, commonly used and useful 
when testing the difference between two groups. However, their disadvantages are 
that they can only compare two groups at a time. For the test of corporate profitability 
in UK construction the t-test and z-test were applied to the profit margins from the 
three sectors examined. 
3.7.2 Analysis of Variance 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to test the significance of differences among 
more than two sample means. It compares the means by computing and comparing 
different population variance estimates. Analysis of variance analyses the variations 
within and between groups of data by comparing means. ANOVA measures two 
types of variability in the data set: 1) the differences among individual scores within 
the same treatment group, and 2) the variability between or among the group means. 
The null hypothesis in the analysis of variance test is always that the population 
means of interests are equal. The statistical significance of the ANOVA is based on 
the F-test. This involves the ratio of the between-groups mean square to the within- 
groups mean square. When the null hypothesis is not true, the between group mean 
square should be substantially larger than the within group mean square as reflected 
in a high F-value. 
Hays(1994) lists the following assumptions to be met when using the ANOVA. First, 
each data value is independent and does not relate to any of the other data values, a 
low correlation. Second, it is assumed that the data for each group are normally 
distributed. Finally that the data for each group have the same variance. However, 
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provided that the number of cases in the largest group is not more than 1.5 times that 
of the smallest group, this appears to have very little effect on the test. 
Most of the analyses involved in the study are multi-level designs in which more than 
two groups are used. For those studies it was found that analysis of variance was the 
preferred method because it was flexible enough to handle any number of groups. 
Also, the analysis carried out using ANOVA was only examining the null hypothesis 
that the means of each group were equal, it was not searching for an alternative. 
Finally, ANOVA is mostly robust to violations of the assumptions in many 
circumstances (Ibrahim, 1995). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CORPORATE PROFITABILITY IN THE 
UK CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
4.1 Introduction 
The following analysis explores the profitability of markets within the UK 
construction industry. The three sectors examined are construction, plant hire and 
materials distribution. The analysis described in this chapter aims to show to possible 
investors or strategic planners the comparison of profit levels in each sector in 
construction and examine the difference in the profitability over each year. 
As with Akintoye and Skitmore (1991), the profitability was expressed as a profit 
percentage of turnover (POT). This is a widely used method of analysing a firm and it 
is useful in obtaining a quick and effective insight into a company's performance. 
Through the use of statistical analysis of financial data of construction firms in the 
UK a comparison of the profitability of contracting and housebuilding, plant hire and 
construction materials sector is examined. 
The profitability of 150 firms is analysed in this chapter. Mean values and variances 
of profitability have been calculated and aggregate data is provided for 100 
contractors, 20 plant hire firms and 30 material distribution companies. The data 
presented relates to the years 1996 to 2001 and results of the statistical hypothesis 
tests carried out are presented to assess the relative profitability of the sectors. 
The study is conducted in two parts. Part I involves the use of descriptive statistics, 
which provides a valuable aid in the visual presentation of the range of possible 
outcomes. In addition, a probabilistic analysis of the distribution of profitability has 
been undertaken. Part 2 involves the use of inferential statistics concentrating on the 
use of significance testing. 
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4.2 The UK Construction Industry 
The UK economy is similar in size to France and Italy but different from them in that 
it has always been a very open economy in terms of trade and international capital 
flows. The importance of construction in the economy stems from three of its 
characteristics. First its size and secondly it provides predominantly investment 
goods. Thirdly the government is one of the major clients of the industry. 
Construction plays an important role in the economy as it produces and maintains the 
built environment. Table 4.1 shows the national GDP and construction output in the 
UK for 2000 and 2001. 
2000 2001 
GDP 1,575 1,650 
Construction Output 116 123 
Proportion to GDP % 7.4 7.5 
Table 4.1. Construction Market (value converted to billions of curo)(FIEC, 2001) 
The UK construction industry contributes around 8% of GDP and employs about 1.5 
million people. Construction investment has been on the increase in the past few 
years. UK construction output is 12% of total European output and is the 3rd largest 
construction output in Europe and is the 5th largest in the world (FIEC, 2001). Total 
construction output has been on the increase in the past eight years. 
The output of the construction sector is divided into housing, infrastructure, industrial 
and commercial building and repair and maintenance. Table 4.2 shows the investment 
in the individual sectors in the UK construction sector. The figures shows output in 
the private housing sector and the infrastructure sector almost doubling in value over 
the years examined. The output of the repair and maintenance sector has also 
increased since 1992 . 
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Year Public 
Housing 
Private 
Housing 
Infrastructure Total 
New Work 
Repair 
& Maint 
All 
Work 
1992 1,243 4,841 5,715 24,815 22,658 47,473 
1993 1,414 5,213 5,543 23,555 22,767 46,322 
1994 1,671 5,746 5,148 25,085 24,353 49,440 
1995 1,659 5,474 5,660 26,671 25,971 52,643 
1996 1,422 5,592 6,337 27,926 27,317 55,243 
1997 1,232 6,751 6,311 29,929 28,424 58,351 
1998 1,068 7,360 6,182 32,491 29,570 62,060 
1999 1,012 7,406 6,200 35,558 30,118 65,704 
2000 1,320 8,665 6,452 37,660 32,017 69,676 
2001 1,438 8,797 7,147 39,970 34,720 74,690 
Table 4.2 Construction Output in the UK *prices in imillions (Department of 
Trade and Industry) 
The construction industry is an extremely diverse and a highly intensive competitive 
industry composed of contractors, hirers, consultants and building materials and 
product producers. With an annual domestic production of building materials of 
around 00billion, the materials sector supplies the largest single input to the 
construction industry and accounts for 40% of all construction output. 
It is dominated by SME's with a relatively small number of large companies. Table 
4.3 shows the number of firms by size in terms of employees. 
Size of Firm All Main Trades 
(By number employed) 
1-13 56,908 
14-79 2,325 
80 and over 476 
Table 4.3 Structure of Industry (Office of National Statistics) 
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The total number of trades registered in the construction industry is nearly 170,000 
(Office of National Statistics, 2002). The industry is comprised of a large number of 
very small firms carrying out local work, while a number of extremely large firms 
carry out the larger projects. In an industry characterised. by intense competition and 
small market barriers, it would seem low profitability margins are commonplace. 
However, with an increase in output and investment in construction there are 
opportunities for contractors to maximise their performance. 
4.3 Profitability in Construction 
In recent years in the UK, there has been an increase in mergers and take-overs in the 
construction industry perhaps because of the need to increase market capitalisation 
(Construction News, 2002). Large firms also have a lower cost of capital and 
furthermore through economies of scale there is the potential to add value by 
reducing production costs. 
In any industrial sector, some firms will be more profitable than others but the 
decision to diversify into a sector will to a large extent be dictated by the profitability 
of the sector. The purpose of examining company accounts is to investigate some 
hypotheses about construction firms or construction sectors from which 
generalisations can be made. Past studies on the subject of profitability (Akintoye and 
Skitmore, 1991) (Asenso and Fellows, 1987) (Lea and Lansley, 1975) have 
concentrated mainly on the relationship between profitability and size of firms. 
Akintoye and Skitmore (1991) assessed financial performance of construction 
contractors and house builders and found that variability of profitability reduced with 
increase in company size. This thesis presents an analysis of profitability of firms in 
the construction industry. The three sectors examined are construction, plant hire and 
materials distribution. Profitability is expressed as a percentage ratio of operating 
profit to turnover. 
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4.4 Collection of data and research methodology 
This study is based on financial data from the construction firms in the U. K. The data 
consists of annual observations for the period 1996 to 2001. The sectors from which 
the samples were drawn consist of companies operating in contracting and house 
building, materials and plant hire. The firms studied were selected from two sources: 
1) Construction News and 2) Dun and Bradstreet. 
The companies selected were the largest in their respective areas, "largest" being 
measured by turnover. The financial performance in terms of profitability, was 
analysed and presented in graphical form. The profit margins used in the analysis 
were derived from the figures obtained from the above sources. These figures account 
for pre-tax profit and turnover. 
The study was conducted in two parts with the principal aim of comparing the 
profitability of markets within the construction industry. Part I involve the use of 
descriptive statistics which provides a valuable aid in the visual presentation of the 
range of the possible outcomes. In addition a probabilistic analysis of the distribution 
of profitability has been undertaken. Part 2 involve the use of inferential statistics, 
which concentrates on the use of significance testing. The hypothesis considered in 
the testing is whether the profit margins are equal or unequal between sectors and 
from year to year in a given sector over the period considered. 
4.5 Probability Distribution of Company profits 
4.5.1 Analysis 
A total of 150 of the largest UK companies were selected for analysis over a period of 
six years, 1996-2001. The majority (100) of companies come from the construction 
and house building sector. The frequency distributions and histograms are valuable in 
providing a graphical representation of the data that is available. This type of 
statistics measures the tendency and the dispersion of the sample. The analysis gives 
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a clear indication of the distribution the data tends towards and a knowledge of these 
distributions is needed for hypothesis testing. 
4.5.2 Results 
The mean and variance of the annual profitability for each sector are shown in Table 
4.4 and Table 4.5. They are also presented graphically in Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.4 and 
Figure A. 1 to Figure A. 13 (Appendix A). The differences in means between sectors 
are noticeable with plant hire displaying the highest values. 
Plant hire Materials Construction 
Year 
2001 
2000 
1999 
1998 
1997 
1996 
Average 
Profit margin 
9.19 
13.14 
12.07 
10.91 
10.61 
12.04 
11.33 
Profit margin 
6.33 
6.36 
6.72 
6.83 
6.09 
5.63 
5.83 
Profit margin 
5.02 
5.01 
5.10 
4.62 
3.36 
2.50 
4.27 
Table 4.4 Mean Profit Margins 
The comparisons between each sector are analysed in the next section; the objective 
of this step is to define the distribution of the profit margins and to show the 
dispersion and range of profit. 
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I Plant hire Materials Construction 
Year Variance Variance Variance 
2001 6.68 13.001 6.46 
2000 9.37 6.13 5.98 
1999 7.37 4.84 5.45 
1998 4.85 4.56 4.80 
1997 5.40 7.38 4.26 
1996 5.20 5.52 5.41 
Average 6.48 6.91 5.39 
Table 4.5 Variance of profit margins. 
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Fig 4.1 Contracting and Housebuilding profit margins 1996 
Fig 4.1 shows the distribution of construction profit margins for 1996, the histogram 
tends towards the bell-shaped appearance of the normal distribution. The 1997 and 
1998 histograms closely resemble the 1996 distribution. Fig 4.2 shows the 
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distribution of 1999 and the subsequent two years conform to the 1999 distribution 
with these histograms skewed to the left distribution. 
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Fig 4.2 Contracting and Housebuilding profit margins 1999 
PI) 
The lack of any visual evidence of a probability distribution from Fig 4.3 and Fig 4.4 
is due mainly to the size of samples for plant hire and materials. Given the 
importance of the assumption of a normal distribution in statistical inference, the 
validity of assuming from the histograms that the data is normally distributed is tested 
further by using goodness-of-fit tests. 
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was applied to the construction profit margins and 
materials, (Plant hire sample is too small, t-distribution assumed for part 2). The basic 
procedure involves the comparison between an assumed theoretical distribution f(x), 
and the experimental cumulative frequency Sn(x). The maximum difference between 
Sn(x) and f(x) over the entire range of x is the measure of discrepancy between the 
theoretical model and the observed data. This maximum difference is tested at various 
significance levels. 
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The results of the K-S test confirm that materials' profit margins conform to the 
normal distribution at a 5% significance level over the six years (Appendix A). The 
1996 and 1997 construction distributions also display the same characteristics at a 5% 
level, with 1998 conforming at a I% significance level. However, the test for the final 
three years does not display any signs of normality at the various levels of 
significance. The maximum difference between Sn(x) and f(x) is greater than the 
critical value D, ,, 
0.163 (Ang and Tang, 1975). 
If the sample sizes are large enough a normal distribution can often still be used to 
find certain probabilities associated with the testing because of some results that are 
known from the mathematical theory of statistics. With very few exceptions no matter 
what form the underlying population distribution takes, as n increases the sampling 
distribution of averages approach a normal distribution, (Dowdy 1991). 
An obvious question is, "how large should the sample size be in order for this 
theorem to hold? ". The histogram for the construction sector is skewed in 1999,2000 
and 2001 for a sample size of 100. Consequently a value of n higher than 100 would 
be required to have the sampling distribution approaching normal. It is assumed for 
the testing in the second section that the distribution is normal. 
4.5.3 Discussion of Results 
The most important continuous probability distribution in the entire range of statistics 
is the normal distribution. The range of profit margins was expected to conform to 
this distribution. However, there is no real evidence from the graphs that the profit 
margins are normal. It is only evident that the graphs are normally distributed after 
applying the Kolomogrov-Smirnov test. 
The sample size affects the distributions for plant hire and materials, (a larger sample 
have described the distribution more clearly). However, the sample of firms in the 
construction sector is a large sample size and a clear distribution was expected. The 
reasons for non-compliance with the normal may be due to the intervals chosen for 
the histogram. An interval of 2.5% was deemed suitable for the testing. 
64 
On examination of the dispersion of profit margins for construction we see that the 
majority of all the companies fall within the 0-2.5% bracket. Taking this along with 
the figures from Table 4.4, we find a very low level of profitability for construction. 
This is not surprising in view of previous research undertaken in profitability levels. 
Akintoye and Skitmore (199 1) found that a profit margin of 3.2 per cent was average 
for the construction industry at that time. 
The studies examined have concluded that the profit margins have averaged around 
the 3% (Ball et al, 2000) (Akintoye and Skitmore, 1991) (Flanagan, 1990) (Lea and 
Lansley, 1975). This is surprising, considering all the economic changes that have 
taken place over the time period of these studies. However, the average profit margins 
for construction over the last six years have gradually increased to a level above the 
4% mark. 
The materials sector shows a higher average, with a value of 6%. Most of the 
companies examined are within the 0- 10% profit range. However, the most surprising 
value is the levels of profitability for plant hire. Although the sample size is small, the 
average level of profit is 11.5% with the majority of companies within the range of 
10-20%. 
The contrasts between plant hire and construction are evident. The level of 
competition, the costs, turnovers and the levels and variations of risk involved are 
factors which could contribute directly or indirectly to the different profitability levels 
(Hillebrandt, 2000). Construction firms are good businesses and generate good cash 
but low profit levels. It is not as attractive as the plant hire market which gives a 
relatively fast return on capital outlay. The pursuit of market share in a fundamentally 
unattractive industry can be seen by some investors as a wasted effort, and 
diversification strategies into more attractive sectors as advantageous. 
65 
4.6 Significance Testing 
4.6.1 Analysis 
Statistics has been described as the science of making decisions on the basis of 
incomplete information. In order to make these decisions, certain conclusions are 
inferred about the population on the basis of observations on a sample. Any basis for 
comparing profitability must rest on an ability to infer something about the respective 
sectors. The hypothesis testing in the following analysis tests the difference between 
two population means by means of two sample quantities. 
Much is known from the previous section about the distributions of the profit 
margins. The hypothesis testing will seek to deny or confirm some preconceived 
ideas that might have been obtained from the distributions. However, there are certain 
criteria the testing must conform to; if the sample sizes are smaller than 30, then a t- 
test is used to test the hypothesis, even if the samples are normally distributed. 
As the sample size for materials and plant hire are less than 30, a t-test is assumed in 
the calculation. The t-test can be avoided while testing the difference between the two 
samples from construction and materials. The two samples are normally distributed 
and as the combined sample size tends towards 130 the t-distribution tends towards a 
normal distribution. 
In the construction vs. materials analysis the number of degrees of freedom is 128. 
The z-value for this test gives an excellent approximation to the t-value, ZO. 025 -= 1.96, 
tO. 025=1.98. The assumption made about the value of the population mean is known 
as the null hypothesis, because it is assumed that there is no difference between the 
profit margins of each sector. If that hypothesis is rejected then the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted, stating that the profit margins are unequal. The levels of 
significance((x) applied to the analysis are 0.01 and 0.05. 
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4.6.2 Results 
It is recognised that the data from construction and materials are described by a 
normal distribution. It is assumed that data from the plant hire sector follows the 
student's t-distribution. The test statistics for the t-values and z-values are shown in 
table 4.6. The comparison of construction and materials is inconclusive. 
Years 
A 
Z-value 
B 
T-value 
c 
T-value 
2001 0.63 -2.96 -1.83 
2000 -0.99 -3.73 -2.92 
1999 -1.46 -3.79 -2.78 
1998 -2.14 -4.72 -2.67 
1997 -2.27 -5.93 -2.52 
1996 -1.997 -6.40 -3.63 
Table 4.6 - Calculated values of t and z. 
Notes: A= Construction Vs Materials B= Construction Vs Plant hire 
C= Materials Vs Plant hire 
Critical Values A B C 
5% Level Of Significance Z=-1.9604 Z=-1.9604 t--2.011 
Two-Tailed 
5% Level Of Significance Z=1.6452 Z=1.6452 t--l. 677 
One-Tailed 
1% Level Of Significance Z=2.5762 Z=2.5762 t--2.682 
Two-Tailed 
1% Level Of Significance Z=2.3268 Z=2.3268 t=2.407 
One-Tailed 
Table 4.7 - Critical Values at 1% and 5% levels 
Notes: A= Construction Vs Materials B= Construction Vs Plant hire 
C= Materials Vs Plant hire 
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The null hypothesis, that the profit margins are equal, is rejected at a 5% level of 
significance for the 1996-1998 years. The alternative is therefore accepted. The 
alternative hypothesis is that material profit margins are greater is accepted for years 
1996-1998. The final three years of the analysis accepts the hypothesis that materials 
profit margins are actually equal to the construction sector. 
Testing at a 1% level of significance the null hypothesis is accepted each year, stating 
that the mean profit margins are equal. Comparing construction against plant hire, it 
was found that the null hypothesis, is rejected at both the 1% and 5% significance 
level. The null hypothesis is the profit margins are equal; the alternative hypothesis, 
plant hire profits are greater, is accepted. 
The final comparison between plant hire and materials is also inconclusive. At the 5% 
level of significance the null hypothesis is rejected with the acceptance of the 
alternative, stating that the mean profit margins of plant hire are greater than 
materials. Tests at the 1% level, show that the 1997,1998 and 2001 profit levels are 
deemed equal. 
To complete the hypothesis testing, the sectors were taken individually to analyse the 
change in profit margins over each year and over the four year period. The first 
analysis involved construction. It was found that over each year the profit margins did 
not change from year to year. This was tested at both the 1% and 5% level of 
significance. However, when analysing the period from 1996-2001, we find that the 
null hypothesis, stating the profit margins in 2001 are the same as 1996, is rejected. 
The alternative hypothesis, saying that 2001 is greater than 1996 is accepted. 
Materials displays similar characteristics to construction the mean profit margins at 
5% and 1% do not change on a yearly basis. However, unlike construction, the null 
hypothesis is accepted for the 1996-2001 at both the 1% and 5% levels of 
significance. The final analysis involving plant hire also displays exactly the same 
characteristics as materials. 
68 
4.6.3 Discussion of Results 
The results obtained from the inferential testing indicate to a certain extent the 
conclusions drawn from visually analysing the distributions. However, there are 
certain areas where there is insufficient evidence to suggest the correct outcome. The 
comparison of materials and construction conform to this statement. 
Table 4.4 indicates that average profit levels for materials are higher each year than 
construction. But using the variance of profitability and hypothesis testing, it was 
discovered that at a I% level of significance the mean profit levels are equal. There is 
nothing to suggest they are unequal. This hypothesis (that they are equal) was 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
The 5% value is the most commonly used value in hypothesis testing. The 1% level 
provides more confidence in the result. There is some disagreement as to the correct 
level of significance that should be used. It may be the case that researchers are 
prepared to accept the lower level of confidence, 95% (Montgomery and Runger, 
1999). 
As Lehmann(1993) points out, the numerical convenience of obtaining the 
conventional levels of significance has led researchers to overlook the computation of 
the more exact P-value. The calculation of this P-value requires a considerable effort 
or a computer programme. This study persists with the conventional levels and the 
results are still highly significant. 
The remaining comparisons all reinforce the conclusions from part 1. Plant hire profit 
margins are greater than materials and construction at both the 1% and 5% levels of 
significance, except for the years 1997,1998 and 2001 where for these three years the 
profit margins between plant hire and materials are equal at the 1% level of 
significance. The final statistical inference involved the calculation of the difference 
between the yearly mean profit margins of the sectors studied. The lack of any 
significant difference from Table 4.4, between the average profit margins for 
materials and plant hire are confirmed by the hypothesis testing. 
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Construction however, shows a marked improvement from 1996 to 2001 and this is 
confirmed by the testing. The reasons for this improvement may be due to a number 
of factors; a growth in knowledge of strategic management, an upturn in the fortunes 
of construction from the early 90's or a better focus on profitability rather than 
turnover. Other factors include macroeconomic stability characterised by low interest 
rates, changes in contractual arrangements from competitive bidding to partnering. As 
stated earlier the main research on profitability focused mainly on the relationship 
between firm size and profitability, in most cases firm size was measured by turnover. 
Akintoye and Skitmore(1991) found that there was no evidence of any positive 
relationship between turnover and a higher profitability. 
Asenso and Fellows(1987) research supports this theory. They concluded that size 
and profitability are independent. The average turnover for each sector over the six 
year period is shown in Table 4.7. A correlation analysis was calculated for each 
sector using the values in Table 4.7 and the average mean profit levels. The 
correlation coefficients (r) are given in the table. The construction sector displays a 
very high positive correlation indicating a strong relationship between turnover and 
profitability, thus showing that as the company grows the profit grows. 
Construction Plant Hire Materials 
Years Em Em Em 
1996 311.46 73.59 1445.35 
1997 337.90 92.60 1297.67 
1998 371.10 255.73 1345.98 
1999 428.12 86.36 1334.98 
2000 1388.9 99.07 1388.9 
2001 1614.03 108.99 1614.03 
r-values 0.89 -0.23 -0.83 
Table 4.8 Average Annual turnover and Correlation Coefficients 
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This criterion of profit growing with turnover only lasts to a certain point or trade-off 
Beyond this trade-off mark, the harder a company tries to increase its turnover the 
smaller will be its best attainable profit. There is no significant correlation in the 
materials sector between size and profitability. There is a negative correlation value 
from plant hire which means that as turnover increases profit decreases. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Strategic management of construction organisations has to take place within the 
context of the fortunes of the construction industry, Langford (2001). Therefore the 
generation of a suitable corporate strategy for a firm involves an assessment of the 
market or markets, in which the company is placed. The analysis described in this 
chapter indicates the level of profitability in the three largest sectors in the 
construction industry. 
Average profitability for the contracting and house building sector was found to have 
an average profit margin of 4% for the six years, with profit levels increasing by 88 
percent since 1995. The level for the materials sector is slightly better at an average of 
5 to 6%. After applying statistical testing it was found that there is little or no 
variation in the profit levels between contracting and materials. 
The analysis suggests that the plant hire sector seems an attractive market, with an 
average margin profit margin of 11% and statistically more profitable than 
contracting or materials. Evidence was also found to suggest that the larger the 
contractor in ten'ns of turnover the more consistent and higher their profitability 
levels. 
There is no absolute criterion on which to measure profitability; some firms try to 
achieve more than 10% gross profit on sales. In the construction sector low profits 
tend to be commonplace. If the strategy of a firm is one of growth by profitability, 
then the UK contracting sector does not seem to provide an alternative. It would seem 
therefore, that if the corporate strategy of a contractor is to increase profitability, 
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diversification into a market outside the sector but still in the broad confines of the 
industry may seem appropriate. 
Construction is a highly competitive industry, where sub-markets can be entered, 
'raided' or left with relative ease, Ball (2000). However, if a firm wishes to maintain 
its position or grow in terms of turnover, then expansion in the construction sector 
may seem a more appropriate strategy. Ultimately all construction enterprises will 
have to consider strategic concepts to be able to perform effectively and successfully 
in such a competitive industry. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CORPORATE FAILURE IN THE UK 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
5.1 Introduction 
While some aspects of finance have been in use since the invention of the wheel, the 
emergence of financial management as a key strategic activity is a far more recent 
development, especially within the construction sector. The change has been brought 
about largely through the need to respond to the changes in the economic climate. 
This change has seen the emergence of financial management as a major contributor 
to the survival and growth of a construction company. 
The construction industry in the UK is characterised by a large number of firms, 
intense competition and high rates of corporate failure. Construction firms must 
always be aware of the possibility of failure. Macroeconomic and industry trends 
must be analysed to evaluate any changes of the chance of failure. More importantly, 
companies must undertake a regular evaluation of their performance and ability to 
compete to ensure the survival of the company. 
The use of accounting data for predictive purposes is at the heart of financial decision 
making. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of failure prediction and the 
use of statistical models and accounting ratios in an effort to predict company failure 
for up to five years. This chapter examines the financial profile of UK failed and 
solvent finns. It investigates whether the profile of financial characteristics of the 
observed firms provide a useful criterion for identifying those firms with a high 
probability of failing. It discusses and evaluates the traditional financial ratio 
analytical method showing graphically the mean behaviour of the ratios under 
investigation for a group of failed contractors and a group of solvent contractors. 
It then discusses the use of the Z model in predicting insolvency. It applies this 
technique to two large construction comPanies which have recently been on the verge 
of failure and a third successful contractor. This chapter also examines the 
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performance of the construction industry in terms of its failure rates and in terms of 
its comparison to other industries in the economy. 
5.2 Analysis of business failure for the UK Construction Industry 
Business failure in the construction industry is an event that can produce substantial 
losses to all concerned. The construction industry has always experienced a relatively 
high proportion of insolvency compared with other industries in the UK economy 
(Edum-Fotwe et al, 1996). In such a highly competitive industry with no barriers to 
market entry, it is not surprising that construction has such a high volume of 
corporate insolvency. 
The annual report on insolvency from the Department of Trade and Industry is often 
greeted with a mixture of sensationalism and 'as expected' as far as the construction 
industry is concerned, (Harvey et al, 1993). The latest figures reinforce this viewpoint 
that construction still carries one of the greatest risks of any industrial sector within 
the UK economy. 
1 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Insolvencies 
Construction. 
Total no. 
Insolvencies. 
Bankruptcies 
Construction. 
Total no. 
Bankruptcies 
4397 3287 2659 2381 2041 1957 2096 2143 
21259 17172 14977 13902 13087 13769 14852 14890 
6115 4764 3921 3940 3344 2979 3098 2861 
31016 25634 21933 21803 19892 19647 21611 21550 
Table 5.1. UK Business Failures (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001) 
Table 5.1 summarises the picture over the last eight years, comparing the total 
number of failures to the total number of failures in the economy. Fig 5.1 gives a 
graphical representation of the link between insolvency in construction and the total 
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number of insolvencies. The term bankruptcy used in Table 5.1 relates to individuals 
and self-employed. Insolvency is a broader term relating to the liquidation or 
receivership of a company. 
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25000 Total Insolvencies 
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Fig 5.1 Relationship between Construction failures and the Economy. 
(Department of Trade and Industry) 
Fig 5.1 shows a decline in the number of firms' involved in construction going 
insolvent. The final years of the study shows a slight increase in failures. However, 
these results can be inconclusive, because although the number of failures may be 
decreasing or increasing, the number of firms' involved in construction may also be 
decreasing or increasing depending on the circumstances. 
Therefore, a more precise evaluation of failure tendency in the construction industry 
is the business failure rate. This takes into account the number of failures in relation 
to the number of actual active businesses in construction. Fig 5.2 shows a comparison 
of the failure rate in construction with that of the total business failure rate. 
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Fig 5.2 Relationship between the rates of failure(National Statistics Office). 
The very high rates of failure from the earlier period of the decade represent the 
economic recession that affected that period. On its own, the business failure rate for 
construction shows a marked improvement from the early nineties, when over two 
percent of construction companies were faced with insolvency. Fig 5.2 demonstrates 
the importance of using failure rate as a failure indicator, because although, the 
number of companies involved in construction has decreased from over 250,000 in 
1992 to 170,000 in 1998, the failure rate takes into account this factor and still 
displays a decrease in the number of insolvencies. 
The decrease in the rate of construction failures is in line with the decrease in the total 
rate. However, the last year shows an increase in the rate of construction failures, 
exceeding that of the total rate of failures. In 1999,14.5% of all insolvencies were in 
the construction industry. Although, this figure has declined steadily from a high of 
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20% in 1992, it still represents the largest proportion of companies going insolvent in 
any sector of the economy. 
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Fig 5.3 Failure rate by industry(National Statistics Office). 
Fig 5.3 compares failure rates in the construction industry with that of agriculture and 
other basic industries. The graph shows that construction has considerably outscored 
other leading industries for the past decade. 
This graph and the previous graphs highlight the need for extensive study on the 
causes of failure in construction as the possibility of failure in a construction 
company is very high. The high failure rates from the early '90s in Figure 5.2 
represent the economic depression that affected that period. Construction companies 
in particular suffered high failure rates due to the recession. 
This prompts the question of what drives a company to failure. It is known that a 
recession can certainly increase the risk of failure. The figures from Table 5.1 show 
that during a harsh economic period the rates of failures do increase and Richardson 
el al (1998), discuss the impact of a recession on the prediction of corporate failure. 
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However, if a set of firms is facing the same hardship with approximately the same 
resources, some will survive and others will fail. 
Therefore, although the economy can contribute to the eventual failure of a firm, it 
seems that 'in almost all cases the fundamental business failure problem lies within 
the firm itself, Altman (1983). Consequently, it is appropriate that companies must 
undertake a regular evaluation of their performance and ability to compete to ensure 
survival. 
5.3 Ratio Analysis 
Ratio analysis provides a very quick and effective way of obtaining an insight into a 
company's performance. When ratios for several consecutive years are graphically 
presented, a moving picture of a company's performance can be established, (Edum- 
Fotwe et al, 1996). Practitioners may use financial ratios to forecast or predict the 
future success or failure of companies, while the researchers' main interest has been 
to develop models associated with these ratios. 
Langford et al (1993), state that ratio analysis looks at the operating performance in 
terms of-, (I)whether the firm is utilising its assets, (2)whether its profits are in line 
with its assets, (3)whether the business is adequately financed, (4)whether it is 
efficient and (5)whether there are signs of liquidity. Previous research on the 
classification of financial performance ratios into different categories has been varied. 
Salmi & Martikainen (1994) categorised in general terms; three categories of 
financial ratios, profitability, long-term solvency and short-term solvency, 
(Liquidity). Altman (1968) classifies ratios into five standard ratio categories; 
profitability, liquidity, leverage, solvency and activity ratios. However these variables 
can be broadly defined into four categories, liquidity, profitability, Leverage and 
activity(efficiency), (Harris & McCaffer, 1995)(Edum Fotwe et al, 1996 ) (Abidali, 
1991). 
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The profitability ratios measure the overall performance the company has achieved. 
The liquidity ratios give an idea of the liquidity of the firm. That is, its ability to pay 
off short term liabilities, or those liabilities that are likely to fall due within the next 
twelve months. Leverage or gearing ratios measure the relationship between the funds 
provided to a company by shareholders and the long-term funds with a fixed interest 
charge, such as debentures. Activity or efficiency ratios concentrate on the 
performance of the management of a company in terms of its resources. Table 5.2 
shows ratio measures from each category. 
Financial Ratio Measure Definition 
Structure 
Current Ratio Current assets/ Current liabilities 
Solvency Ratio Total Assets-Liabilities/Total Assets 
Liquidity Working Capital / Total (Current assets-Current Liabilities)/ 
Assets Total Assets 
Liquidity (Quick) Ratio (Current assets-Stock)/Cuff Liabilities 
Profit Margin (Profit & Loss)/Sales 
Return on Assets Profit before Interest & Tax/Total Assets 
Profitability Profit/Current liabilities Profit before Interest & Tax/ Current 
Liabilities. 
Return on Capital Profit before Interest & Tax/ capital 
Employed 
Debtors Turnover Sales/Debtors 
Activity Debtors collection period Debtors x 365/Turnover 
Sales/Net assets Sales/Total assets- Current liabilities 
Sales/Total assets 
Gearing Long-term Liabilities + Overdrafts/ 
Leverage Shareholders Funds 
Debt/Equity Long term debt/Equity 
Interest cover Profit before Interest & Tax/Interest 
Table 5.2 Measures of Financial ratios 
79 
In this study, fifteen financial ratios were calculated and statistically examined. The 
ratios were chosen on the basis of their, 1) Popularity in previous research on failure, 
2)Potential relevance to this study and also as a representative of the four financial 
perfonnance ratio categories. 
5.3.1 Liquidity ratios 
The first category is liquidity. If there is insufficient funds available to pay bills as 
they fall due, the company will be unlikely to survive for very long. The principal 
ratios adopted to focus on short-term liquidity are the current(working capital) ratio 
and the quick(liquidity) ratio. These ratios try to assess how much cash the firm has 
available in the short term. The final liquidity ratios deal with the company's ability to 
meet medium and long term liabilities. 
1) The current ratio 
The current ratio indicates the ability of a company to pay its short-term creditors 
from its current assets. It is concerned with the current assets and current liabilities of 
the firm. Current assets consist of stocks, work in progress, cash and debtors. Current 
liabilities consist of creditors, bank loans and any short to medium loans. A current 
ratio value of less than I would be seen as risky as it would indicate that the company 
is not generating enough cash to meet its current liabilities. For a contracting firm this 
value may be lower than the average due to low levels of stock and the work in 
progress mainly being financed by trade creditors. However, the current ratio could 
be manipulated using the working capital position by delaying or accelerating 
transactions close to the accounting year end. 
2) The quick ratio 
The quick ratio shows whether the company has sufficient cash to meet immediate 
liabilities. Liquid assets are those components of current assets which are readily 
available as cash or near cash. They are alternatively known as quick assets and can 
consist of cash, debtors and short-term investments. All of these assets can be cashed 
relatively quickly. A value at or above I is generally considered appropriate (Ibrahim, 
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1995) (Abidali, 1995). However, this value may be lower than I for contracting firms 
as they may have a large amount of cash tied up in stocks and work in progress. 
3) The solvency ratio & working capital ratio/Total assets 
The solvency ratio is used to gauge a company's ability to meet its long term 
obligations. It is calculated as total net worth divided by total assets. The final ratio of 
working capital to total assets is frequently found in studies on corporate failure. This 
ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm relative to the total capitalisation. 
5.3.2 Profitability ratios 
The second category of financial ratios relate to the profitability of firms. There are 
several key measures of profitability on capital employed that are used in the analysis 
of companies. 
1) Profit margin 
Calculating the return on capital employed gives a far better idea of the firms 
profitability than merely looking at the absolute level of profitability. The simplest 
and widest used version is the profit margin ratio. This ratio indicates the 
performance of the company in achieving the maximum sales possible, while at the 
same time keeping the costs to a minimum. Sometimes low profit margins may be set 
deliberately to avoid paying the additional tax, but in general low margins suggest 
poor performance. 
2) Return on assets 
The return on assets measure provides an indication of how efficiently a firm employs 
its assets, this ratio avoids any tax or leverage effects. This is an important ratio for 
companies deciding whether or not to initiate a new project. The basis of this ratio is 
that if a company is going to start a project they expect to earn a return on it, ROA is 
the return they would receive. 
3) Return on capital employed, Profit/current liabilities 
The return on capital employed indicates whether or not a company is generating 
adequate profits in relation to the resources invested in it. A persistently low return on 
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capital for any part of the business suggests it could be a candidate for disposal if it is 
not an integral part of the business or it could be the subject of a takeover target 
(Ibrahim, 1995). The final measure examines the profitability compared to the short- 
tenn debt. 
5.3.3 Efficiency ratios 
The third category of financial ratios deals with the efficiency of companies. The first 
two ratios deal with how efficient the company has been in converting debtors into 
cash and the amount of resources tied up in debtors. If the debtors are slow in paying, 
the firm may find it has run into cash flow problems. Debtors' period can be 
expressed as the collection period in days by multiplying by 365. These two ratios 
determine if the amount of resources tied up in debtors is reasonable and whether the 
company has been efficient in converting debtors into cash. The size of a company 
can affect this ratio as big contractors are able to exert pressure on their buyers. The 
final two ratios determine how effectively the assets are being employed. It can be 
interpreted as showing how many pounds of turnover is generated by each pound of 
investment. There are several variants of this measure; the two used here examine 
turnover in relation to net assets and total assets. 
5.3.4 Leverage ratios 
The final category of ratio measures examines the means by which a company 
finances its operations. Gearing or leverage has important implications for the long 
term stability of the company because of its effect on financial risk. The measures 
used are shown in Table 5.2. The gearing ratio includes all debt on which interest is 
payable. The higher the proportion of debt to equity the more volatile the residual 
rewards to equity will become and the greater the financial risk to the shareholders. 
However, debt is a cheaper source of finance because it is an allowable expense when 
determining taxable profit. Also, smaller contractors who wish to maintain control 
over their companies will borrow first rather than losing a controlling interest in the 
business. Since companies can affect either the current ratio or the long-tem debt to 
equity ratio by altering their mix of short term and long term borrowing, the gearing 
ratio can be more useftil than the other two. 
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5.4 Sample Selection 
The data analysed in this sector was obtained from the following sources: UK 
Business Park review; Construction News; FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy); 
Datastream The first two sources provided the names of failing contractors and the 
relevant failure date. The last two sources provided sufficient financial information 
on both the failed and non-failed firms. The initial sample size chosen consisted of 95 
failed firms and 95 solvent companies from the UK construction industry. However, 
due to the problem of obtaining the required information for a large number of failed 
companies caused mainly by the lack of financial information available, the final 
sample consisted of 45 failed firms and 45 solvent firms (Appendix B). 
The failed group consisted of firms which failed between 1996 through to 2000, a 
period of five years. The reasons for failure are stated in Appendix B. 1. Since average 
ratios shift over a period of time and also due to the cyclical nature of the UK 
construction industry, it was necessary to keep the study period relatively small. The 
mean asset size of the failed finns ranged from between E2 million and; E20 million. 
Unlike Mason and Harris (1979), and Abidali (1991), where they avoided matching 
company size and financial year considerations, this study attempted a careful 
selection of non-failed firms. This study adopted this approach for three reasons. 
Firstly, in Akintoye and Skitmore's (1991) work on contractor profitability, they 
found a positive correlation between profitability and size of a company. Altman 
(1968), (1983) also adopted the approach of stratifying by size. 
Most small firms were formed in boom periods where entry to construction work was 
freely available without qualification of past work, (Abidali, 1991), and due to the 
absence of comprehensive financial data and background information, small firms do 
not provide a good standard and would not be representative of a non-failed group. 
In addition, the occurrence of failure in a very large sized firm is quite rare, although 
it does happen. The non-failed firms chosen are matched in size to the failed firms. 
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Similarly, the financial data collected are from the same years as those compiled for 
the failed firms. The ratios used in the study are given in Table 5.2. 
5.5 Results 
This section investigates the financial characteristics of the failed group and the 
solvent group. The section shows graphically the mean behaviour of the ratios under 
investigation for the two different groups. For each financial ratio explained earlier 
there is a graph that shows its mean value for the last five years before failure. 
5.5.1 Profitability Ratios 
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The figures clearly show that the performance of the solvent firms in terms of the 
profitability ratios under investigation are far superior compared to the performance 
of the failed groups. This superiority gets more significant within two to three years 
of the failure date. The profit margins for the solvent companies averaged around the 
4% mark. This is in line with the work on the profitability of contractors in chapter 
three. 
The return on capital employed measure declines dramatically the year before failure. 
This ratio indicates the overall return on all capital employed including loans and 
equity. The final two ratios in Figure 5.6 and 5.7 have also shown a significant 
decrease in final three years. The measure for profit to current liabilities show 
negative values for the three years before failure, while the solvent firms values have 
remained consistent. The final ratio of return on assets shows negative values for 
failed firms in the two years before failure compared to consistently positive results 
for the solvent firms. Analysis of variance was undertaken to test the statistical 
significance that the means are equal. The four variables produced highly statistically 
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significant results, indicating the means between the failed group and solvent group 
are not equal. 
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5.5.2 Liquidity 
Figures 5.8 to 5.11 show the liquidity characteristics of the two groups. 
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The liquidity dimension is examined through the figures shown. The two most 
common ratios used for measuring short-term liquidity, the current ratio and the quick 
ratio show no significant differences between the failed group and the solvent group. 
The current ratio for the failed group averages between I and 1.2, while the average 
for the solvent group was 1.4. The values remain consistent over the five year period. 
A two-way analysis of variance was carried out on the current ratio means. 
There was no statistical significant difference in means at a 1% level of significance. 
The quick or liquidity ratio means were also examined using an analysis of variance 
test. The results showed a difference in means over the five year period. However, 
when each year was taken individually, the differences in means was only statistically 
significant for the third and fourth year before failure. The final two ratios compare 
the medium to long-term liquidity of the companies. 
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The working capital to total asset ratios show significant differences between the 
means and is also statistically significant. The solvent group also display higher 
average values of solvency compared to the failed group. This difference is also 
shown in a two-way analysis of variance test. 
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Fig 5.11 Solvency Ratio 
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5.5.3 Efficiency Ratios 
The figures display the measures of efficiency for the two groups. 
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Both the failed and solvent group seem to face similar credit limits to their debtors. 
The two groups display no significance differences either graphically or statistically 
in the collection of their debt. 
The debtors turnover ratio is a reflection of the combination of the trade practice and 
the effectiveness of the firms credit control. Again the failed group shows similar 
effective performance to the solvent group. The failed group display a decline in the 
average debtor turnover in the three years before failure. However, there was no 
statistical difference found between the means of the debtor turnover at a I% level of 
significance. The final two ratios involved the asset turnover ratio which measures 
how effectively a finn is employing its assets. The failed group would seem to have 
the best performance of the sales to total assets and sales to net assets. 
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The leverage dimension which shows the position of a firm in terms of its borrowings 
is shown in the figures. The figures shows the failed firms relied heavily on debt in 
order to finance their activities. Gearing has fallen in the last five years before failure 
for those failed firms, however, it still remains high. The long-term debt to equity 
ratio also displays highly significant differences between the two groups. The final 
leverage ratio examined is the interest cover ratio or 'income gearing' ratio. This is the 
amount of interest a company has to pay on its liabilities in relation to the profits 
available. The performance of the failed group in terms of interest cover is 
significantly lower that that of the solvent group. The failed group shows a significant 
decline in interest cover over the three years before failure. 
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5.6 Discussion of results 
uI1 
The financial characteristics of the failed group differ to those of the solvent group. 
The performance of the solvent group in terms of the profitability ratios under 
investigation is far superior to that of the failed group and is more significant closer to 
failure. Most failure models postulate a negative relationship between profitability 
and the probability of failure (Theodossiou et al, 1996). 
The average profit margins for the failed firms was less than 1%, with a negative 
value the year before failure occurred. Argenti (1983) concluded that a profit margin 
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of one percent or under will always indicate trouble. However, such a ratio by itself 
may be misleading because it fails to take account of the assets or capital used to 
achieve the profit margin. An analysis of variance test was carried out on each ratio, 
the results are given in Appendix B. 2 and shown in Table 5.3. 
Variable Failed 
Group Mean 
Non-Failed 
Group Mean 
F-Value 
Gearing 170.4 67.6 30.2 
Debt/equity 59.4 18.3 30.2 
Interest Cover 7.70 22.3 8.01 
Current Ratio 1.11 1.43 35.4 
Liquidity Ratio 0.88 0.94 2.65 
Working cap/Total assets 3.20 19.3 56.1 
Solvency 17.6 30.7 64.9 
Return on capital employed -2.4 26.6 18.9 
Profit margin 0.18 4.35 64.0 
Return on assets 0.13 9.00 60.8 
Profit/ Current Liabilities 0.71 16.5 55.9 
Debtors Turnover 15.3 16.8 0.47 
Debtors collection(days) 40.8* 39.6* 0.07 
Sales/ Net Assets 14.1 9.80 8.50 
Sales/Total Assets 2.77 2.44 8.16 
Table 5.3 Variable means and Test of Significance. *figure in days 
The F-ratios for the analysis of variance show the profitability variables are highly 
significant, indicating extremely significant differences between groups. The highest 
F-values are in profit margin and return on assets. Abidali (1995) states that return on 
capital employed appears positive in solvent companies and tends towards the 
negative in failed companies. The mean values of the failed companies in this report 
display a negative value while there is a positive value for solvent companies. 
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The profitability ratio (earnings before interest and tax by total assets) indicates one 
of the most significant differences between failed and solvent groups. Altman (1968) 
found this variable to have the highest contribution to his failure prediction model. 
Taffler (1977) also found that the profitability measure of profit before tax to current 
liabilities made a 53% contribution to his model. This measure is also an extremely 
significant variable between the failed group and solvent group. 
The liquidity position of the solvent group seems to be superior to the position of the 
failed group. However, there was inconclusive evidence from two of the liquidity 
ratios examined. There was no statistical differences between the means of the failed 
and solvent group for the current ratio variable. Primarily, the rule of thumb for this 
ratio is 2: 1, a ratio higher than two is probably excessive and will reduce the overall 
return on capital. Harris and McCaffer (1995), suggested in there study on 
construction management a value greater than I is considered satisfactory for 
construction contractors. A value of less that 1 would indicate that the company has a 
deficit of working capital. 
The results in Table 5.3 show a significant difference between the quick ratio of the 
two groups. However, on closer examination of the individual years before failure 
only two of the years show a variability. The quick ratio is considered the ultimate 
test of liquidity by most financial specialists because it reduces the risk of relying on 
a ratio which may include slow moving or redundant stock. A value at or above I is 
generally considered appropriate (Ibrahim, 1995) (Abidali, 1995). However, a ratio of 
less than 0.7 could mean danger. The final two liquidity ratios examined show a 
significant difference between the two groups. Both the solvency ratio and the 
working capital ratios displayed high F-ratios and a large difference in means. Both 
Fadel(1978) and Altman(1968) used the working capital variable in there respective 
models. 
In terms of leverage, the failed group seems to be highly leveraged in comparison to 
the solvent group. The results from the study indicate significant differences between 
the two groups in terms of long-term debt to equity and the gearing ratio. These ratios 
examine the proportion of a firm's capital that is financed by borrowings. The higher 
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the gearing the greater the proportion of borrowed money to equity. A higher geared 
company will have greater vulnerability if there is a sudden fall in profits or if there is 
an increase in interest rates. According to Padget (199 1) there is no optimum level for 
this ratio, however a higher value of this ratio implies a greater exposure to financial 
risk. 
The final leverage ratio examines the amount of interest the company is committed to 
pay on its total borrowings as a ratio on the profits available. The analysis shows no 
significant differences in interest cover in the first two years of the study. However, 
the interest cover for failed companies drops dramatically in the three years prior to 
failure in comparison to the solvent group. Results show that most companies with a 
ratio of 5 to I are in comfortable situation (Abidali, 1991). The average ratio for 
failed companies a year before failure was 2 to 1. Solomon and Pringle (1980) 
indicated that a higher interest cover is associated with lower financial risk. 
The fourth category of ratio measures deal with how efficiently a company is using 
its resources. The first two ratios deal with the performance of management in terms 
of debtors. There seems little difference statistically and visually between the groups 
for the debtor turnover and the debtor collection period. On average the debtor 
collection period was 40 days for both groups over the five year period. Most 
financial specialists like to see collection periods well below six to seven weeks, eight 
or nine is common, (Abidali, 1991). 
The final efficiency measure used is the capital turnover ratio illustrating the sales 
generating ability of the firms assets. The results show a difference in the means of 
the two groups for both measures of asset turnover. The asset turnover seems to be 
higher in the failed group. This would indicate that failing firms are better at 
generating sales from their assets. However, as Abidali (1995) indicates failed firms 
have high ratios resulting from an increase in turnover accompanied by a decline in 
net assets, whereby some companies may have raised turnover as a result of 
overtrading. Overtrading is where the company expands but does not have the 
resources available to finance this expansion and runs out of cash. 
97 
5.7 Z-Score models 
The traditional Z-score model developed by Edward Altman in 1968 used the 
statistical technique of multiple discriminant analysis to identify insolvency. A 
problem that arises frequently when applying social or behavioural. sciences to data is 
that of classifying objects into one or a number of possible categories. 'Multiple 
discriminant analysis in its most simple form attempts to derive a linear combination 
of those characteristics which best discriminate between the groups', Altman (1968). 
In this instance the two-group situation is that of failed and solvent companies 
constituting the data from which the Z-score model is derived. The characteristics 
mentioned above, are financial ratios taken from the five standard ratio categories; 
Profitability, Liquidity, Leverage, Solvency and Activity. Each of the financial ratios 
is weighted in accordance with the discriminant analysis technique. Mason and Harris 
(1979), added that the more variables the higher the discriminatory power, but for the 
model to be of use in the industry it must be quick and easy to apply. Therefore it is 
important to keep the variables to a minimum while arriving at a model that supplies 
good discrimination. The final discriminant function is usually in the form: 
Z= CA + C2X2 + 
Where Ci, C2 are the ratio weights and Xi, X2 are the discriminating financial ratios. 
A large number of Z-score models now exist and all follow the original concept of 
Altman's work. 
5.7.1 Altman's Z-model 
His model, initially developed in 1968, utilised data from the US manufacturing 
industry. He selected thirty-three companies that had filed a bankruptcy petition and 
paired them with thirty-three solvent firms chosen on a stratified random basis and 
industry and size stratified the firms. 
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An initial list of 22 potential ratios was compiled for analysis. The ratios were taken 
from five standard ratio categories The ratios were eventually narrowed down to 5 
variables and when combined into a discriminant function, predicted failure. The five 
ratios Altman selected are: 
X, Working capital/Total Assets; 
X2 Retained Earnings/Total assets; 
X3 Profit before tax and interest/Total assets; 
X4 Market value of equity/Book value of total debt; 
X5 Sales/Total assets. 
To each of these ratios Altman applied weighting, giving the final discriminant 
function of the form: 
Z=1.2XI + 1.4X2+ 3.3X3+ 0.6X4 + LOX5 
Altman proceeded to develop cut-off scores from the firms that were misclassified by 
the discriminant model in the initial sample. A Z-score above 2.7 (originally 2.9), 
indicates the non-bankrupt sector. Those below 1.81 are classified as showing the 
characteristics of a failed company, whilst those in between 1.81 and 2.7 are 
considered in the zone of ignorance, deemed to be potentially at risk. 
5.7.2 Taffler's Model 
In 1977, Taffler developed a similar model to that of Altman's, using a database of 
UK companies. Taffler's model was developed explicitly for analysis of the 
manufacturing and construction industries. Taffler's sample size was 46 failed and 46 
non-failed companies, the sample was taken over a period of eight years, and 
Altman's was taken over a period of twenty years. A list of 80 potentially useful 
ratios was compiled for the analysis, taken from the various categories. Taffler 
produced a four variable model based on the following ratios: 
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X, Profit before tax/Current Liabilities 
X2 Current assetsfrotal Liabilities 
X3 Current Liabilities/Total assets 
X4 No-credit interval 
No-credit interval = (Immediate assets - current Liabilities)/(operating costs- 
depreciation) 
Taffler's final discriminant function is of the forin: 
Z=0.53X1 + 0.13X2 + 0-18X3 + 0.16X4 
Taffler established a solvency threshold of Z=O; anything above is deemed solvent, 
anything below deemed insolvent. A score of above 0.2 or 0.3 would have the same 
characteristics as a company that has good long-term solvency. A score below zero is 
a company displaying the characteristics of a failed company. 
5.7.3 The Mason and Harris Model 
The previous models were developed for the US and UK manufacturing respectively. 
Mason and Harris (1979) developed a model for evaluating construction firms. This 
model was developed from a number of discriminant variables derived from 
published accounts of UK construction companies. The sample size was 20 failed 
firms and 20 continuing firms, taken over a period of eight years. In their study 28 
discriminating variables were considered for the statistical analysis. They produced a 
six-variable model and the ratios adopted were: 
R, = Profit before interest and tax/Opening balance sheet net assets; 
R2= Profit before interest and tax/Opening balance sheet net capital employed; 
R3 = Debtors/Creditors; 
R4= Current liabilities/Current assets; 
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R5 = Loglo days debtors; 
R6= Creditors trend measure; 
The function is in the form: 
Z= 25.4 - 51.2R, + 87.8R2 - 4.8R3 -14.5R4 - 9. IR5 - 4.5R6 (4). 
Mason and Harris found both the first and fifth ratio figure as good discriminators, 
while the third and sixth variable are the least discriminant variables. Mason and 
Harris suggest the cut-off to be zero for failed companies, anything above zero is 
deemed solvent and anything below insolvent. 
5.8 Assessment of Financial Ratio Models 
Three large International construction companies were selected for the purposes of 
this assessment (Appendix B. 3). Their annual accounts were obtained and subjected 
to ratio analysis and the Z-models. Two of the companies, company A and company 
B were recently rescued from the brink of insolvency by outside parties. Company C 
has been largely successful over the previous five to six years, maintaining its 
position as one of the top UK firms. 
1 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Altman 1.446 0.963 1.046 1.158 1.317 
Taffler 0.183 0.114 0.152 0.114 0.150 
Mason & -27.10 -15.73 -75.21 -18.30 
Harris 
Table 5.4 Z-scores for company A 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Altman 2.090 0.442 0.279 1.041 1.539 1.101 
Taffler 0.257 -0.141 -0.020 0.055 0.214 0.226 
Mason & -41.28 -67.41 45.11 -3.379 -26.06 
Harris 
Table 5.5 Z-scores for company B 
1 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Altman 
Taffler 
Mason & 
Harris 
2.428 2.443 2.789 2.840 2.524 2.556 
0.222 0.228 0.249 0.274 0.260 0.277 
-4.845 3.253 3.163 1.011 
Table 5.6 Z-scores for company C 
5.9 Summary and Comments on the Results 
5.9.1 Predictions by the Altman Model 
The results from Table 5.4 predict insolvency for company A, the Z-scores are below 
the cut-off point of 1.81. This company was saved from insolvency in 1999 by a late 
intervention. The results show the company has continually struggled to stay afloat, 
the potential for insolvency has been evident since 1994. The Z-scores from company 
B indicate potential insolvency for 5 out of the 6 years. The first year of the survey 
shows the company in the grey area. Company B also floundered on the brink of 
extinction for a number of years. It disposed of a large number of its subsidiaries in 
the mid '90s. 
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However, due to the intervention of interested parties and change in leadership, the 
company survived. The figures for company C, a company that is considered one of 
the top companies in Europe and mainly successful, indicate that for the last two 
years the company has increased its risk of failure. It is by Altman's model 
considered to be in the grey area. However, the scores are very close to the safety 
zone of 2.7. These results, albeit over a very small sample, indicate that Altman's 
model shows relatively promising predictive measures for construction companies. 
There are certain results that remain erratic, in particular the figures from the analysis 
on company C, a company which at present is continuing rather successfully. Its 
ability to give adequate degree of warning is questionable; the warning provided for 
company A is 5 years, for company B the length of warning was 1 year. 
5.9.2 Predictions by the Taffler Model 
The Z-score for company A again presents a picture of potential insolvency. 
Although the cut-off for Taffier's model is zero, he suggested a score of below 0.2 
exhibits characteristics of companies that have failed in the past. Company A scores 
below the 0.2 mark for each year. 
The second group, company B, exhibits solvency in the first year of the analysis, but 
then proceeds to drop down dramatically in the following two years, to a level well 
below insolvency. For the final two years it improves to a state of potential long-term 
solvency. These results do not give a true indication of what was happening to the 
company, (it has a negative Z-score for 1994 and 1995), and it did not give due 
warning of the possibility of failure in the Z-score from 1993. The scores from 1997 
and 1998 predict solvency. These figures indicate that the company is gradually 
recovering from near insolvency, which would appear to be an accurate assessment. 
The scores for company C reflect the company's strong financial position. The results 
seem to indicate that Taffler's model can be used on construction companies. Taffler 
has not dislosed the full detailed mathematical equation, therefore it is open to 
misinterpretation. The definition of the 'no-credit interval' is somewhat misleading. 
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Taffler (1983) defines it as a measure of days a company can continue to finance its 
operations from its own immediate assets after its revenue has ceased. Langford et al 
(1993) and Edurn-Fotwe et al (1996) describe the ratio as sales/total assets. 
However, the results obtained from using the sales/total assets ratio suggests the three 
companies are solvent each year, whilst the results from defining the 'no-credit 
interval' in days, also gives very misleading answers. The definition used by Inman 
(199 1) is the definition used in this analysis (eqn 2). 
5.9.3 Predictions by the Mason & Harris Model 
This model was designed specifically for the UK construction industry. The Z-scores 
for company A are in line with Taffler and Altman's results. However, the scores for 
B and C are highly erratic and do not reflect the financial standing of the companies. 
The model predicts insolvency for company C in 1996. In 1997 it predicts solvency 
for company B. This model like Taffler's depends on the evaluator's interpretation of 
some of the variables. 
The first two variables include net assets and net capital employed, respectively. 
Edum-Fotwe et al (1996) describe the two factors as the same measure. Langford et 
al (1993) support this conclusion in his analysis of the model. However, Abidali 
(1990) defines net capital as net assets + short-terrn loan. With this in mind the author 
carried out a separate test using this definition. The results ranging from -45 to -68 
show that each company is exhibiting signs of failure for each year of the survey. 
5.10 Conclusion 
Prediction of failure and insolvency is very desirable especially in an industry as 
high-risk as construction. The analysis of business failure show that after a seven year 
decline the number of yearly failures in construction is on the increase. When 
compared to total failures, construction remains the most prone to failure. Companies 
must be aware of the possibility of failure, realise the factors that cause failure and 
prevent it from occurring to their firm. 
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Financial ratios can be used to provide management with an evaluation tool to 
determine the financial standing of the firm and provide early warning signs of 
possible distress. The findings of this study lend support to the importance of 
financial ratios in measuring the performance of a company. The importance of 
profitability ratios in prediction of insolvency is well documented in previous 
research. 
The findings in this study suggest that profitability measures are a good predicator of 
failure. The profit generated by a firm's operations provides funds for future 
investments and enables the firm to meet long and short term obligations. Therefore a 
company experiencing continuing losses will find it increasingly difficult to meet its 
obligations. Basic economy theory says that firms exit when they incur losses and 
stay in markets when they are profitable. Several studies have shown that profitability 
has a positive impact upon the survival of firms (Mata, 2002). All of the profit 
measures were found to be significant in the comparison of failed and solvent groups. 
The findings from the ratio measures also showed a positive relationship between 
leverage and the probability of failure. The failed companies were found to be highly 
geared the five years before failure. As the profit levels are found to be decreasing for 
failed companies in the five years before failure, so the interest cover ratios start to 
decline in the three years before failure. Interestingly, some of the liquidity measures 
found to be important determinants of failure in previous research were found to be 
insignificant in this study. As Altman (1968) reported and these results confirm, the 
working capital to total assets ratio showed greater significance than the current ratio 
and quick ratio. 
The efficiency ratios studied also showed no significant differences in the measure of 
failed and solvent groups. However, the results did indicate that failed firms seemed 
to be involved in over-trading. While the findings have shown various measures 
which are useful in raising questions about the performance of a company and 
highlighting ratios which may give an indication to failure, financial ratio analysis is 
greatest when making inter-firm comparisons. 
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The use of a combination of financial ratios to give a single score -a Z-score aids 
business failure prediction. Three different Z-score models have been reviewed and 
applied to three large international construction companies. The testing gives an 
indication as to which model is best suited to construction. The answer automatically 
should be the Mason and Harris model. In addition to having been designed 
specifically for the construction industry, it is also based on UK companies. However, 
the Z-scores produced from testing the model are erratic and do not give a consistent 
indication of the company's financial position. The results from using Altman's 
model are quite promising and do give good indications of failure. However, the 
Altman model is strongly biased towards a good asset base. It also takes into account 
retained earnings which discriminates against young companies, possibly in a positive 
manner. 
Taffler's model also gives promising results. It is a European based model and 
strongly emphasises liquidity, Inman (1991). Liquidity measures a company's ability 
to meet its short-term liabilities. A poor measure of liquidity can lead to failure. Fadel 
et al (1978) define the principal cause of failure as a lack of liquidity. In an industry 
like construction, where profit margins are low, a company can continue in existence 
quite happily for a number of years, provided it has good liquidity. This would 
suggest that the Taffler model is best suited to the construction industry. However 
because of the size of the sample and the choice of companies, it is difficult to assess 
which method is better. Also, it was found in the previous section that the liquidity of 
the failed group was not significantly different to the solvent group. 
The construction industry is such a diverse industry that it seems necessary to develop 
a model specifically for each sector within construction. The application and success 
of these statistical models depend largely on the quality of data and the interpretation 
of the data. There are certain question marks hanging over the reliability of data from 
published accounts. When a company is in trouble, it could resort to 'creative 
accounting' or 'window dressing' which destroys the usefulness of the Z-score. This 
could involve manipulating the working capital position by accelerating or delaying 
transactions close to the accounting year end. 
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The Z-score is a useful tool for clients assessing and selecting prospective contractors 
for projects. However, the use of the Z-score could just be speeding up the process of 
failure for a company. If it were straightforward it would be expected in a competitive 
environment that banks and creditors would bail out at the first sign of distress. Some 
of the Z-scores from company C show the company is at risk of insolvency. 
Therefore potential clients examining these Z-scores may decide not to award a 
contract to this company on the basis of these results. Z-scores alone cannot predict 
failure; non-financial analysis is also needed to reinforce the prediction. 
It is true from the results that the vast majority of companies which fail exhibit high 
borrowings and low profitability before failure. However, not all companies which 
carry high levels of debt and report low profits necessarily go bankrupt. Many will be 
turned around. Some may be taken over or bailed out by governments or banks. Some 
may turn around because of remedial action by management or a cyclical uptum in 
the economy. 
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CHAPTER SIX: INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
6.1 Introduction 
The last twenty years has seen an increase in competition among countries, industries 
and firms on a global level. In a world characterised by global markets and large 
multinationals, growing awareness of the performance of national markets by global 
clients and the growing international penetration of the national construction markets 
has meant that the strengths and weaknesses of the national market have been closely 
scrutinised. The following two chapters examine the performance of the nation and 
the performance of the firm. The aim of this analysis is to examine the impact of the 
national environment on international competitive performance and to assess the 
performance of global construction. 
The following country studies aim to provide an insight into the key features of the 
economy, the performance of the construction industry and likely developments. The 
studies provide an insight into the variations of perfonnance, tradition and legislation 
between the leading countries in construction. 
Previous research on the performance of construction companies in international 
markets indicate that the major share of overseas activity is conducted within 
developed countries, rather than developing regions. For this chapter, five of the top 
world construction markets were examined in a country study. These markets 
included the US and Japan markets and three European countries; Italy, France and 
Germany. This analysis examines the construction investment and construction 
output in each country. It also examines the structure of the industry and special 
characteristics of each country. 
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6.2 The Japanese Construction Industry 
6.2.1 General Remarks 
During the last 20 years or so, Japanese contractors and designers have emerged as 
major global players. The eyes of the construction world have focused on Japan' s 
construction industry and on the Japanese approach to construction. Japanese firms 
have an enviable reputation for high quality of the product and the quality of the 
personnel. In Japan, clients are prepared to pay a very high price for construction 
work as they consider an excellent relationship between their contractor over many 
years far more important than potential cost savings obtained on any project, (Fraser 
& Fraser, 2001). 
The Japanese are among the world leaders in construction technology. The large 
Japanese contractors are active in developing new technologies and have invested 
heavily in research and development (Bennett, 1993) Earthquake engineering is 
important and the Japanese are generally regarded as world leaders in both research 
and use of robots in construction and the development of intelligent buildings (Fraser 
& Fraser, 2001). 
The Japanese construction market is extremely large; it is the largest construction 
market by value in the developed world. While the Japanese market is large, it is also 
fiercely competitive. This large and competitive domestic market has been an 
excellent training ground for Japanese contractors, (Raftery et al, 1998). The industry 
is dominated by a group of very large contractors, known as the Big Five, and a large 
number of smaller contractors. 
Entry into the Japanese construction market had been virtually impossible for non- 
Japanese firms. The market was protected from incursion by non-Japanese companies 
through a range of bureaucratic and cultural barriers. However, in 1996 a new 
government procurement agreement extending the rule of non-discrimination to 
foreign contractors was implemented. Since then, at least one US constructor has 
been able to enter successfully (ENR, 1996). However, in most cases, non-Japanese 
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firms work in partnership with a Japanese company because of the difficulty of the 
customs and language, and also because of client loyalty and the Government's 
requirement for the undertaking of research and development. 
6.2.2 Construction Output 
Although Japan is a small mountainous separate and densely populated island, its 
GDP is far greater than that of Eastern Europe, nearly half that of the USA, over half 
that of western Europe and also nearly three times the size of the rest of Asia. Table 
6.1 shows the comparative statistics relating to the economy and construction output. 
Japan, 
2000 
USA, 
2000 
Western 
Europe, 1999 
Eastern Europe, 
1999 
Asia, 
1999 
GDP 513.9 1,073.7 1000.5 31.6 158.5 
Construction 86.2 99.8 3.6 
Market 
Proportion to 16.8 10.0 11.5 
GDP % 
Construction 70.4 87.9 57.4 2.5 22.0 
Investment 
Proportion to 13.7 8.2 5.7 8.0 13.9 
GDP % 
Table 6.1 Construction Markets by Country and by Region (Research 
Institute of Construction and Economy, Japan) (trillions of yen) 
The value of construction output of Japan in 2000 was 86.2 trillion-yen or 16.8% of 
GDP. Its construction output is slightly less than that of western Europe but far 
greater than that of eastern Europe. Its construction output as a percentage of GDP is 
also greater than western and eastern Europe. Japan's investment in construction is 
second only to the USA, in terms of GDP it has the second highest proportion of 
construction investment. 
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However, from a high value of $700 billion in 1992, construction investment has 
dropped to $586 billion in the fiscal year through March 2001 and is projected to 
decline even further in the following years (Normile, 2001). Asia has the highest 
proportion of investment in construction as a percentage of GDP, the reason being 
that both GDP and construction output is low in absolute tenns. 
Table 6.2 shows the role that the government and the private sector play in 
construction investment in Japan. The level of investment in housing has fallen 
during the 1996 to 1998 period, however there is a slight increase in 1999. This is in 
relation to the increase in housing starts for the first time in three years. The number 
of housing s=s in 1999 reached 1.226 million an increase of 4.0% on the previous 
year. This increase is due to the amount and scope of loans from the housing loan 
corporation, and tax refonns including a deduction for housing loans. 
FY 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total 828,077 764,641 718,000 708,600 
1. Construction 457,742 398,474 349,100 342,800 
(a) Housing 294,396 238,025 209,900 216500 
Government 20,388 17,546 18000 18800 
Private sector 274,008 220,479 191900 197700 
(b) Non-Residential 163,346 160,449 139200 126300 
Government 41,925 40,680 36500 33700 
Private Sector 121,421 119,769 102700 92600 
2. Civil Engineering 370,335 366,167 368900 365800 
(a) Government 288,649 288,542 294900 297300 
Public works projects 252,907 254,785 261800 262400 
Others 35,742 33,757 33100 34900 
(b) Private Sector 81,686 77,625 74000 68500 
Government Total 350,962 346,768 349400 349800 
Private Sector Total 477,115 417,873 368900 358800 
Table 6.2 Building investment in Japan (Units in Y 100m) (Ministry of 
Construction) 
The government's investment in public works projects (i. e. flood & erosion, 
control/coastlines, roads, disaster prevention, ports/airports, living environment) has 
also increased over the four-year period. However the private sector building starts 
decreased for the third consecutive year by 4.8% over the previous year. Private 
sector investment has also fallen over the four years in all other areas of construction. 
Over 50% of construction activity is concentrated in the Kanto and Kinki regions 
which encompass Tokyo and Osaka, Japan's two largest conurbations. Although the 
basic materials and methods of construction in Japan are similar to that of the major 
developed countries, there are however noticeable differences in detail. Generally, 
structures consist of heavy reinforced concrete, steel framed reinforced, or steel frame 
with spray-applied fireproofing for large buildings, whereas for housing timber 
frames is predominant, (Spons, 1997). 
The major public works clients in Japan are: (1) The Ministry of Construction, (2) the 
Ministry of Transportation, (3) The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, (4) 
the Japan Highway Public corporation, (5) the Japan Water resources department 
public corporation, (6) approximately 50 district Governments which are called 
prefectures. 
6.2.3 The Role of the Government 
The largest public works owner is the Ministry of Construction (MOC). It oversees 
all aspects of construction. Among the responsible of this agency are control of rivers 
and lakes, nationally owned roads and highways, housing, planning and supervision 
of private housing developments, building code enactment, storm water prevention, 
research institutes. Other ministries such as the Ministry of Transport also monitor 
construction, which is in charge of control of harbours and most aspects of 
transportation except roads. The MOC formulates and implements national strategies 
and policies relating to construction fostering the technological and financial capacity 
of the Japanese construction industry, (Raftery et al, 1998). 
The Japanese Government at all levels takes a very active role in the orchestration of 
the construction activity both locally and internationally, (Abdul-Aziz, 1994). Both 
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the Japanese government and the construction industry have been accused in the past 
of practising "Dango" in awarding public works project. Dango or cartels allegedly 
rig bids for public projects so that only their members benefit. All contractors 
participating in this collusive exercise receive either a cash payment or a profitable 
portion of the job when it has been awarded to the pre-designated 'low-bidder'. 
Also the Japanese construction industry has been developed very closely under the 
protection of the government with the public agencies having sovereign power over 
the construction industry including protection from foreign competition by regulation. 
To combat this the MOC is improving the bidding and contracting systems for public 
works projects in co-operation with the Ministry of Home Affairs, introducing 
database systems for bidders, tighter inspection and an open bidding system. 
Japarfs first law governing the bidding process for public works contracts covering 
both the national and local governments came into effect in April 2001. The motives 
for this new law is to publicise the outlook on orders to be placed, publicise 
information on bidding and contracting, totally ban the subcontracting of the entire or 
major portion of public contracted work and eliminate unfair practices. 
6.2.4 Characteristics and Structure of the Industry 
Construction companies in Japan usually carry out both design and construction for 
private projects. However, the top contractors may undertake all the design and 
management activities but subcontract the direct construction work, (Bennett, 1993). 
Design departments of contractors may employ up to as many as 1000 professionals. 
The top contractors may have as many as 10,000 professional staff, most of who are 
engineers. The construction method is established and planned before the 
manufacturing and construction process begins. In most cases the project manager 
will be involved in all stages of the construction process including the preliminary 
stages. 
For the public sector projects design is normally undertaken by public in-house 
design departments and the construction contract is then let. In particular, most civil 
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engineering work is publicly sponsored and the public sector offices either have their 
own design sections or hire specialised consultant firms to design their projects. It is 
quite usual for firms of consultant engineers to employ over 500 people. The largest 
architectural firm has over 1000 employees and many have several hundred, (Spons, 
1997). 
About 10% of the working population, or 6.57 million people, are employed in the 
construction industry. As of at the end of March 1999, there were 586,000 
construction companies and traders, the highest in history, licensed either by the 
Ministry of Construction or by the Governors of the prefectures. Most of these 
contractors are generally quire small but there are several extremely large companies. 
The top contractors in Japan are known as the big five (Bennett, 1993) (Fraser & 
Fraser, 2001), and these contractors are amongst the biggest in the world. They 
consist of Taisei, Kajima, Shimizu, Obayashi and Takenaka. Each of these 
contractors has an annual turnover in excess of US$ 10 billion. They all provide a 
comprehensive range of construction services in building, civil and heavy 
engineering. They can find construction sites for clients, help finance and then design, 
contract and maintain high quality buildings and engineering projects. Below the big 
five there are many contractors who are much smaller in size with broadly similar 
capabilities. 
The major Japanese construction companies belong to Keiretsu (industrial groupings) 
which are a source of strength and research capability. The affiliated banks provide 
preferential funding and, thus, enhance the constructor's ability to compete for 
projects. Financial information, research expertise and technological sophistication 
are exchanged within the Keiretsu. The Zaibatsu is another enterprise group 
organised around money cliques. With a strong domestic market base, Japanese firms 
have developed internationally and have been formidable contenders in the world 
markets for over 30 years, (Paulson, 1991) (Raftery et al, 1998) (Fraser & Fraser, 
2001). According to Engineering News Record, in 2000 the top 225 international 
contractors earned over US$116 billion in international revenues (defined as 
contractors revenue earned abroad, ENR 2001). Twenty Japanese contractors had a 
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7.6% share of the world market of the top 225 international contractors compared to 
28 contractors in 1995 with 22% of the market share and 27 contractors in 1992 with 
8.5% of the world construction market. In the top 100 international contractors there 
are only 16 Japanese contractors compared to 28 in 1995. However, in the rankings of 
the largest in terms of total construction revenue the bigfive are ranked in the world 
top 10, with the Taisei Corporation ranked number two. Japanese firms account for 
over a quarter of the total revenue from the top 225. 
Company Rank in ENR! s Top 
225 International 
Contractors 
Total Revenue 
US $ billion 
International 
Revenue as a% 
of Total 
Taisei Corporation 64 13.4 2.70 
Kajima Corporation 18 11.8 11.6 
Shimizu Corporation 37 11.4 6.25 
Obayashi Corporation 30 10.9 8.10 
Takenaka Corporation 45 10.7 5.60 
Toda Corporation 120 5.13 1.70 
Kandenko Corporation 185 4.21 0.30 
Nishimatsu Construction 62 4.15 9.10 
Kinden Corporation 97 3.95 3.19 
Penta-Ocean Corp. 43 3.62 17.1 
Table 6.3 Major Japanese Contractors in 2000 (Engineering News Record) 
Table 6.3 shows the percentage of international revenue of the top 10 Japanese 
contractors, the overall international turnover of most contractors is less than 10%. 
The Japanese contractors have worked abroad mainly to service Japanese investors, 
though mostly using local contractors and suppliers. They have then become 
developers abroad and have gradually gained non-Japanese clients, often for design 
and build projects. 
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6.2.5 PH in Japan 
The principle of introducing private capital and expertise into the public 
infrastructure, originally developed in the UK, is gaining support in Japan as a means 
to offer new business opportunities to the private sector. This is recognised as Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI). The law on the Promotion of Public Facilities Improvement 
Utilising Private-sector Funds was enacted in September 1999. The Ministry of 
Construction has established working groups for four projects on urban 
redevelopment, city park facility, toll road and public housing. 
6.2.6 Research and Development 
It is argued that one of the fundamental differences between Japan and the other 
major construction nations lie at the heart of the collaborative, long term orientated 
relationships between the major stakeholders (clients, construction firms, materials 
suppliers, universities and government) and the Japanese contractors commitment to 
research and development (Fraser & Fraser, 2001). In the Japanese construction 
industry, building research expenditure amounts to 0.28% of the gross expenditure on 
construction. 98% of investment in R&D is privately funded with the final 2% mostly 
funded by the Ministry of Construction (NIST, 1996). 
Japanese contractors have invested heavily in research and development in recent 
years. It is estimated that Japanese contractors spend between 1-3% of turnover in 
research, (OECD, 1992, Miller, 1990, Raftery et al, 1998, Fraser & Fraser, 2001), 
greater than any other construction industry in the world. The prosperity of the 
research institutes is a result of legislation that allows contractors to absorb R&D 
costs into client fees. 
It is generally accepted that both private and government clients look favourably 
upon contractors who perform R&D. The Ministry of Construction regards private 
R&D to be fundamental to the health of the Japanese construction industry (Fraser & 
Fraser, 2001). The Ministry of Construction initiate major research projects. 
However, the financing falls on the private sector. A recent committee set up by the 
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M. O. C for the construction industry technology, comprising representatives from 
civil engineering, architecture and surveying experts from public, private and 
academic sectors formulated the 'Construction Industry Technology Strategy' in 
March 2000. Under this strategy various systems are used to promote new technology 
development, (General technology development project, pre-project research on 
leading construction technology, joint public-private research). 
The range of research undertaken in Japan is very wide and considerable, from soil 
testing to air supported domes. Earthquake engineering is important and the Japanese 
are generally regarded as world leaders in both research and use of robots in 
construction and the development of intelligent buildings (Raftery et al, 1998). 
Japarfs construction industry have developed and established certain proprietary 
positions in innovative construction methods. 
6.3 The American Construction industry 
6.3.1 Introductory Remarks 
The US construction market is the largest construction sector in the world. It is 
characterised by liberalistic tendencies and market orientation, where barriers to entry 
in general contracting is low (Oyegoke, 2001). In the last five years construction 
output has risen by more than 50%. The market has been in extended expansion for 
several years. It has benefited hugely over the past few years from the economic woes 
of the rest of the world, with the dollar becoming a save haven for investors. The 
legal and regulation structure of the construction industry is marked by an 
extraordinarily high degree of decentralisation with every state having different 
regulatory requirements. 
Due to the size of the USA there are many local markets within the industry. The US 
has a wide range of geographical and geological conditions which results in US 
contractors developing management and construction techniques for difficult and 
extreme conditions. America is home to some of the world's largest contractors. The 
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Bechtel group, Fluor corporation and Halliburton are all US based and are world 
leaders in their niche markets. 
The US construction market is a mature one which suffers from intense competition. 
A lot of new work is emerging in environmental matters and restoration works, with 
the US government investing more money into environmental projects (Engineering 
news record, 2002). Residential construction is also on the increase, accounting for 
about half of all construction put in place in the US last year. 
6.3.2 Construction Output 
The construction industry is the second-largest industry sector in the USA (Building, 
2000). It also represents 21% of the worlds $3.7 trillion in construction spending 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics). The US construction industry has been in an extended 
expansion for several years. The value of gross output of new construction in 2000 
was US$731.7 billion, this value has increased yearly since 1997 as seen in Table 6.4. 
The annual value in 1997 was $603 million. The level of GDP in construction has 
also increased over the previous four years with construction output having 4.7% of 
the total GDP in 2000. Table 6.4 shows the comparative statistics relating to the 
economy and construction output. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
GDP 
Construction Market 
Proportion to 
GDP % 
Gross output 
In Construction 
8318.4 8781.5 9268.6 9872.9 
338.2 380.8 425.5 463.6 
4.1 4.3 4.6 4.7 
603.0 633.8 689.2 731.7 
Table 6.4 Construction Market ($ billions)(Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
The industry has been expanding for nine years; in 1999 it grew at an astonishing rate 
of 10%, slowing to 3% in 2000. The US investment in construction is second to none 
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(RICE, 2002). Table 6.5 shows the role that the federal government and the private 
sector play in construction investment in the USA. 
Fiscal Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total 615900 653429 704724 763786 815414 861181 
1. Private sector 476638 502734 551383 596280 640554 666519 
Residential 281115 289014 314607 350562 374274 395716 
Non-residential 155858 173875 190710 193935 210140 208699 
Farm 3658 3815 4284 5008 5158 
Public utilities 33202 33638 39212 44066 48084 
2. Public sector 139263 150695 153341 167507 174860 194662 
Buildings 63471 69860 71776 76542 82275 93505 
Housing 5048 5299 4922 5138 5228 6281 
Educational 28590 33552 34828 38966 43560 49302 
Other 29833 31009 32026 32438 33487 37922 
Highways 39464 42602 45565 51374 52088 57485 
Other 36328 38233 36000 39591 40497 43672 
Table 6.5 Annual value of construction put in place in the US. ($ dollars) (US 
Census Bureau) 
The level of investment in private residential building has risen steadily over the past 
six years. This is in relation to the increase in housing start. The number of housing 
starts in 2001 reached over 1.6 million an increase of 8.5% on starts in 1996, (US 
census Bureau). This increase is due partially to the low interest rates in the previous 
five years. The drop in federal interest rates and home mortgage rates in 2001 has 
cemented a demand for homes that began during the mid 1990s. 
Residential construction accounts for about $390 billion of the $860 billion put in 
place in the US last year. The rest is spent on non-residential construction and public 
projects. The government's investment in public works projects (ranging from 
highways and bridges to sewer systems and public schools) has also increased over 
the five year period. Investment in highways has also been on the increase, spending 
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in this sector is set to increase dramatically. The massive hike is due to the TEA-21 
legislation (Transportation Equity Act) which has authorised $48bn a year spending 
on highway construction and repair over the next six years (ENR, 2002). 
6.3.3 Characteristics of the US Construction Industry 
The composition of the industry in terms of size of companies follows the traditional 
pattern of other industries and a very large number of small to medium-sized 
contractors complete the major portion of all construction put in place annually. In 
2001 the construction industry had over 6.9million employed with over a million 
establishments. This accounted for 5.2% of the total employment in the US and 
10.1% of all establishments(Bureau of Labor statistics). The employment levels have 
increased by over 50% since 1992. 
Three broad types of classifications are covered in the industry: 1) Building 
construction by general contractors or by operative builders, 2) Heavy construction 
other than building by general contractors and special trade contractors, 3) 
construction activity by other special trade contractors (OSHA, 2002). Building 
construction general contractors are primarily engaged in residential, office buildings, 
stores and other building construction activities. 
General contractors and special trade contractors for heavy construction are primarily 
engaged in the construction of highways, pipelines, communications and power lines, 
sewer and water mains and other heavy construction projects. Other special trade 
contractors undertake activities of a type that are specialised to building construction 
or may be undertaken for building or non-building projects i. e. bridge painting, traffic 
lane painting, electrical work on bridges or power plants. 
Trade unionism has lost its stranglehold on the industry over the last twenty years 
and, as a consequence, less than 40% of main contractors and trade contractors are 
union contractors which use union registered employees and negotiate wages with the 
unions (spons 1997). Open shop contracting has become the major trend especially 
within the housebuilding sector. 
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Measured in tenns of revenue, the US is base to some of the largest contractors in the 
world. Construction revenue for the top 400 contractors in the US rose 3.2% in 2001 
to $200.93 billion from 2000's $194.63billion mark (Engineering news record, 2002). 
And like 2000, the revenue generated from the domestic market led the way, rising 
5.7% in 2001 to $178.9 billion. However, on the international side, revenue for the 
top 400 contractors was down, the total fell 13.4% in 2001 to $22.03billion. Table 6.6 
shows the top 5 US contractors in terms of international revenue in 2001. 
Contractors International 
Revenue 
Total 
Revenue 
New 
Contracts 
Skanska 8640.0 10808.0 13868.0 
Bechtel 6811.0 12390.0 13276.0 
Fluor 3280.2 7823.7 9644.0 
Halliburton 3955.0 5283.0 5135.0 
Foster Wheeler 1983.0 2758.0 3916.0 
Table 6.6 Top US Contractors ($ millions) (Engineering News Record, 2001) 
Type of Work Revenue(million) Percentage of Total 
Building 99,420.20 49.5 
Manufacturing 10,091.00 5.0 
Industrial 10,969.80 5.5 
Petroleum 17,444.70 8.7 
Water 2,867.70 1.4 
Sewer/Waste 3,047.20 1.5 
Transportation 21,356.80 10.6 
Hazardous 5,899.10 2.9 
Power 19,346.60 9.6 
Telecommunications 5,884.50 2.9 
Other 4,663.20 2.3 
Table 6.7 Market Analysis (ENR, 2001) 
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Table 6.7 shows the different construction sectors in which the top 400 contractors 
gained their revenue. Contractors gained nearly half their revenue from Building 
work. The American's contribution to research and development is small compared to 
the Japanese firms and government. Except for a few of the major players the vast 
majority of US builders refrained from funding proprietary developments (Abdul- 
Aziz, 1994). Obtaining new technologies from external sources is the preferred 
choice. 
6.3.4 Contractor type 
Most states classify contractors according to trade. The industry identifies five main 
sectors, namely a) residential, b) commercial c) institutional, d) industrial, e) 
engineering. The contractors who work in these sectors are either residential, general 
or engineering contractors. It is a violation for a trade contractor to operate outside its 
licensed speciality. 
Residential contractors build either single family dwellings, multi-family units or 
work in the home improvement markets. Available data (US Bureau of census) 
indicates that almost 80% of last year's private residential building was single family 
units. Apartment builders accounted for about 18% of residential building. Operative 
builders who build on their own account for resale are also included in the residential 
sector. However, investment builders who build structure on their own account for 
rental are classified as real estate, (OSHA, 2002). 
General contractors, because of their versatility and expertise in many styles of work 
are the backbone of the industry. Most of the large residential builders act more as 
general contractors than builders. General contracting is wide ranging, from office 
building to schools, hospitals to process plant construction, with some of the 
prominent American builders in this sector such as Fluor and Halliburton. General 
contractors usually assume responsibility for an entire construction project, but may 
subcontract to others all of the actual construction work or those portions of the 
project that require special skills or equipment. 
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The organisational structure of the sector consists of a large number of small 
contractors with an annual turnover of less than $1million. The next level consists of 
a smaller number of contractors with a annual turnover of $1-5million and then 
finally a very small group of very large contractors. 
Engineering contractors construct non-traditional types of projects and are either the 
highway or heavy construction classification. Some of the American contractors are 
truly market leaders in this field. Approximately 50% of the world's capacity in 
ammonia and ethylene comes from technologies owned by Halliburton and Lummus 
crest. Half of the world's nuclear reactors were built by Bechtel, (Abdul-Aziz, 1994). 
Entry into this market demands a high inventory of mechanical equipment, which acts 
as a natural obstacle to casual entrants. 
6.3.5 Environmental Regulations 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the US federal agency primarily 
responsible for protecting the environment and enforcing environmental restrictions 
and obligations contained in federal environmental statutes. EPA's mission is to 
protect human health and to safegaurd the natural environment - air, water and land. 
As a result various federal environmental statutes which can significantly impact 
business activities have been set up: Clean air act, Federal water pollution control act 
(Clean Water act) Comprehensive environmental response, compensation and 
liability act (CERCLA), Resource conservation and recovery act (RCRA). The 
cleaning, removal and disposal of hazardous materials, such as asbestos, has also 
created a new and potentially lucrative market for a select few contractors. 
Brownfield regeneration is one such environmental initiative which could lead to 
prosperity for UK companies. Examples of brownfields regeneration includes closed 
manufacturing plants or military bases. Although brownfield regeneration in the US 
is not as advanced as the UK it has gathered pace in the last few years. The EPA has 
provided over $250 million in brownfields funding and also leveraged more than $3.4 
billion in cleanup and economic redevelopment monies (EPA, 2002). 
123 
6.3.6 Problems and Opportunities 
The long-standing position of the U. S government is to encourage and maintain open 
capital markets for the free flow of investment. The prevailing view in the United 
States is that foreign investment provides substantial benefits through increased 
employment, the introduction of new technology, the reduction in the cost of capital 
to US firms, and the strengthening of the capital markets. This attitude is reflected in 
the relative absence of restrictions compared to those imposed by other countries. 
A major hurdle for foreign contractors concerns the establishment of the construction 
business and performance track records. Since the corporate records of the contractors 
are all offshore, establishing financial and technical credibility becomes extremely 
difficult. Another difficulty in operation is 'Build America!, which is a patriotic slogan 
which has piqued the country's nationalism. Associated with this is the 'Buy America 
Act'. Under this act only articles, materials and supplies produced in the US may be 
acquired by the federal government for public use. Also, in construction contracts for 
the federal government, contractors and suppliers may ordinarily only use US 
produced goods. 
Cultural differences are also difficult for UK companies operating in the US, with 
differences in the standard of living and language jargon. Also, any foreign party 
interested in extending its operations to the US must consider the potential risks of 
environmental liability early in the process of entering into a transaction. 
6.4 The German Construction Industry 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The construction industry in Germany is the largest construction sector in Europe. 
The gross value of construction output is E229 billion, which accounts for over 11% 
of the GDP. Major restructuring occurred in Germany after unification, with a boom 
in the construction industry. However, after this initial unification boom the 
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construction industry has entered a state of decline. Construction investment in 
Germany has fallen by 13% since 1994 (Madine, 2002). Overall German economic 
activity has slowed in the past six years. 
As in the other countries surveyed, the German construction industry consists of a 
few large companies and a greater number of medium and small companies. The 
industry is dominated by a few giant contractors. In the past couple of decades Philip 
Holzmann and Hochtief have dominated the domestic market and have also been 
major players on the international scene. However, due to the recent crisis in the 
domestic market, Philip Holzmann is just a fraction of its original size. The recession 
in Germany has also led the top contractors to seek international contracts, with 
Hochtief registering 80% of its total revenue in work abroad. The total value of 
international contracts gained by German contractors in 2001 stands at E20billion. 
The German construction market is highly regulated. Procedures and planning are 
established and regulated by government. The country is organised into autonomous 
entities called Lander. Planning law comes from both the Federal government and the 
Lander (Federal states) and procedures are based on a system of statutory 
development plans (Spons, 1994). The construction process in Germany is 
traditionally dominated by the client and its agent- the architect. Construction 
companies are rarely involved in the main decision-making. However, the major 
contractors have initiated changes to take over the leading role in the construction 
process. 
6.4.2 Construction Output 
Although the German construction industry is going through a serious crisis, it still 
remains the largest domestic market and also the largest construction sector in Europe 
and the third largest in the world. The German construction sector accounts for 28% 
of the European construction market. After almost five decades of irrepressible 
growth the powerhouse of Germany's building industry is expected to contract again 
this year (Madine, 2002). The sector has been shrinking steadily since the 
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reunification building boom in the early 1990's, and the economic downturn has taken 
its toll. 
In the past two years construction investment has again registered a decline. Table 6.8 
shows the output and value added of the construction industry. Overall GDP has 
actually increased in Germany by 12 percentage points between 1994 and 2001, 
however construction investment has fallen by 13% (FIEC, 2001). The consolidation 
process in the construction industry that set in since the mid 1990s has acted as brake 
on aggregate economic growth (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2002). However, there 
is still a large volume of work taking place in a sector that is worth over aI I% of the 
country's GDP. 
2000 2001 
GDP 2,026 2,066 
Construction Market 241 229 
Proportion to GDP % 11.9 
Gross value added 95.92 90.96 
Table 6.8 Construction Market (billions of euro) (FIEC, 2001) 
The German construction sector has been continually decreasing in output over the 
last five to six years. However, there are certain sectors beginning to show 
improvements. The civil engineering sector is displaying increases in construction 
output with individual areas in civil engineering displaying positive results for 2001. 
A positive change also is taking place in the commercial and industrial building 
sectors with an increase in the issue of permits (FIEC, 2001). 
The housebuilding sector is still experiencing a continuing downward trend. Table 6.9 
shows the development in the individual sectors in the German construction sector. 
Investment in commercial and industrial buildings fell by over 15% during the last 
few years (FIEC, 2001). There was also a noticeable decline in the construction of 
public buildings in the same period. Local authorities have reduced construction 
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spending by more than one third in the last eight years, due mainly to the increase in 
unemployment (FIEC, 2001). 
The construction of office and administrative buildings holds promise for potential 
growth. There is a slight increase in renovation in this sector due to many public 
buildings having been greatly neglected in recent years. However, due to the lack of 
funds at local authority level no major investment in this sector is expected. 
Fiscal Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Residential 125.50 125.77 121.23 121.10 121.20 
Construction 
New residential 72.91 71.81 67.00 66.60 66.27 
Construction 
Residential Renovation 52.59 53.96 54.23 54.50 54.94 
Non-Residential 64.43 61.10 58.27 57.10 57.47 
Construction 
New Non-residential 46.56 43.68 41.27 40.20 40.40 
Construction 
Non-residential 17.87 17.42 16.98 16.90 17.07 
Renovation 
Civil Engineering 33.69 33.54 32.31 33.50 34.00 
New Civil Engineering 25.47 25.22 24.16 25.10 25.48 
Civil Engineering 8.22 8.32 8.16 8.40 8.53 
Repair and Maintenance 
Construction Sector 223.62 220.41 211.80 211.70 212.68 
Output 
Table 6.9 Germany Construction investment (C bill)(Euroconstruct, 2001) 
The civil engineering section has remained stable with federal expenditure on road 
construction and infrastructure increasing. More than half of this went to the new 
lander (The East). However, potential growth in this area is not expected until 2002- 
2003 in view of the financial weakness of the public sector. Major new projects will 
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be implemented in co-operation with private sector partners and the European 
regional development fund. 
In 2000, the construction of only 312,000 new dwellings was approved, half of the 
1994 figure. In 2001, this figure has dropped to 262,148, the output in turn as 
dropped. The number of permits for housing is also dropping, with 437,084 permits 
in 1999 compared to 291,084 permits in 2001. Because of the strong housing 
construction in the early 1990's when there was special tax and depreciation 
allowances, the demand for housing has dropped dramatically. In Eastern Germany 
over one million apartments are standing empty (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2002). 
The construction of new dwellings is not required on a large scale. 
Investment in housing construction accounts for the biggest share of investment in 
construction at just under 60%. Therefore, the housing sector generally supports the 
overall aggregate of the construction industry. However, the renovation and repair 
sector has seen an increase in its output over the previous years. Because of the 
amount of empty dwellings and lack of new dwellings, it is currently more attractive 
for investors to acquire used buildings and have renovation carried out on them. The 
federal government is also taking steps to improve inner city areas and the 
unavoidable demolition of housing. 
As a result of the crisis in the domestic market, contractors have become increasingly 
involved in international activities. For several years now, activities abroad have been 
increasing. In 2000, the value of contracts received from abroad by the German 
construction industry reached a new record level of E20 billion. The acquisitions of 
major contractors in the USA have ensured this increase (FIEC, 200 1). The volume of 
new international contracts has increased from $6,437million in 1992, to 
$18,692million in 2000. 
6.4.3 Characteristics and structure of the Industry 
As in most countries the German construction industry is comprised along familiar 
lines, with a few large and many small companies. The construction markets in 
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Germany are state or local markets. Firms normally work inside an area which makes 
daily return from site possible to avoid extra payment for accommodation and travel 
(Syben, 2000). Only the largest contractors operate outside their own region or 
locality, with the majority of construction activity being made up of local businesses, 
the construction industry is essentially local and traditional. However, the medium to 
large firms still have greater weight in the industry in terms of employment and 
turnover (Syben, 2000). 
The construction industry consists of about 100,000 enterprises, however this figure 
may vary considerably. The FIEC estimate the total number of active construction 
enterprises to be in the region of 80,000 in 2001. Exact statistical data is available 
only for the main trades registered with the various contractor federations. The 
overwhelming number of very small firms of the finishing trades make exact data 
difficult to obtain. The Federal Statistical office in Germany estimate a number of 
over 300,000, based on enterprises that are liable for tax on a turnover of more than 
E16,617. 
Due to the intense competition in the German market and the poor performance of the 
German economy, projects have dried up and housing has slumped (Madine 2002). 
With so many firms competing for limited work and pushing down prices there has 
been an increase in insolvencies and a decrease in registrations of construction 
enterprises in Germany. 
1999 2000 2001 
Business Registration 67,288 64,337 59,939 
Business Deregistration 62,742 62,473 61,405 
Insolvencies 7,762 8,103 9,200 
Table 6.10 Failures in the German Construction Industry (Federal Statistical 
Office, Germany) 
Since the Second World War, the German construction industry has been dominated 
by a few giants (Building, 2002). Hochtief and Philip Holzmann have been the 
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dominant contractors in Germany and two of the top contractors internationally for 
the past couple of decades. However, due to the company's difficulties and the poor 
performance of the German market, Holzmann's turnover is just a fraction of what it 
used to be. The top 10 contractors in Germany ranked according to turnover are 
shown in Table 6.11. 
Contractors Total Revenue 
EON'S 
Change in 
Turnover 
No. Of 
Employees 
I. Hochtief 7,937,435 54.6 41,004 
2. Philipp Holzmann 3,896,504 3.50 23,659 
3. Bilfinger + Berger 2,703,908 -3.25 38,973 
4. Walter Bau 2,445,522 -8.19 16,502 
5. Strabag 1,883,046 -8.01 10,255 
6. Ed Zublin 1,210,878 -8.26 9,120 
7. Dywidag 1,201,737 -2.71 7,363 
8. Rheinhold & Mahla 442,668 7.34 8,739 
9. Heitkamp 381,484 14.36 4,950 
10. Bauer Spezialtiefbau 362,776 17.42 3,800 
Table 6.11 Top German Contractors (Building, 2002) 
The expansion of German contractors in the early to mid 1990's has now begun to 
decline. In 1992, there were thirty five German contractors listed in Building's list of 
top 300 European contractors and there were only twenty five contractors listed in the 
top 300 in 2000. Examining the performance of the top 10 contractors in Table 6.11 
shows half of the contractors displaying a negative change in turnover from the 
previous year. 
Philip Holzmann is struggling to recover after a government bailout. It shed about 
6,000 staff in 2001 to try and rebuild finances. The largest German contractor, 
Hochtief recorded a 50% increase in turnover from the previous year. However the 
majority of this can be attributed to a major merger that it was involved in during 
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2000. It seems that the majority of large German contractors are suffering from the 
poor performance of the home market. This has led contractors to increase 
intemational activity. 
In 2000, Hochtief was ranked number one in ENR top 225 international contractors, 
gaining nearly 80% of its revenue from international contracts. Holzmann's 
international activity for 2000 accounted for 60% of total activity and will continue to 
rise to about 75% (ENR, 2001). The number of German contractors listed in the top 
100 international contractors is seven. The majority of international revenue is gained 
from the US and European markets, with revenue from Asia accounting for 20% of 
total revenue. 
Since 1995, the total level of employment in construction has progressively declined. 
The figures in 1995 stood at over 3.2 million. In 2001 there were just over 2.5 million 
people employed in the construction industry. The continuing recession in the 
industry, allied with the strong foreign competition in the market, is resulting in the 
reduction of the workforce (FIEC, 2001). Within a period of six years as many as one 
third of the workforce have lost their jobs. Current employment in construction 
accounts for nearly 7% of the total employment in Germany compared to the early 
1990's when construction employment was 10% of the total. However, construction 
still remains the country's largest single employer (Madine, 2002). 
6.4.4 Construction Outlook and Investment in Germany 
For several years now, Germany has experienced a recession in the construction 
industry. Since the massive boom after unification the construction sector especially 
the housebuilding sector has dramatically decreased as a result of bad initiatives by 
the government and the excessively large East German construction industry. East 
Germany still remains under developed in terms of urban renewal, transport and 
housing. 
The Federal Commissioner for Foreign Investment in Germany states that more than 
half the federal funds invested in transportation between 1999 and 2002 went to East 
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Germany. The main focus of transportation investment by the government are the 17 
German unity projects worth around E35billion. Germany is also receiving a 
European regional development fund in excess of E1.548 billion for the federal 
transport programme 2000-2006, the total value for this programme is in the region of 
E3.16billion. There is also further investment in the old Germany Reich railways of 
around Elbillion a year until 2007. 
A new programme for urban renewal in East Germany, Urban Renewal East, has 
been set up, for which the federal government has earmarked around E1.1 billion 
between 2002 and 2009. There is also a tax incentive scheme for the renovation and 
modernisation of rented housing in old urban buildings. The federal government has 
increased urban planning investment, with the statutory level at E578million for 1992. 
The East will receive E 410 million of these funds. 
6.5 The French Construction Industry 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The French construction market is one of the largest in the world and in terms of 
output is ranked second in Europe. The gross value of construction output is E115 
billion, which accounts for nearly 7% of the GDP. Despite its progressive decline 
over the last 15 years or so, the construction industry in France still remains one of 
the economy's major fields of activity and also a major employer (Henry, 2000). The 
construction market at the moment is however buoyant with increased construction 
costs and construction output. 
France is home to the largest contractor in the world, Vinci, and also caters for a 
number of extremely large firms. In France, contractors evolve in a highly 
competitive market where the very small firms carry out the local work, while a 
number of the large companies compete for the larger projects. French contractors 
earn a significant volume of their revenue from work carried out in external markets. 
In terms of the volume of international contracts, the French are the leading 
exponents in the European union. 
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France, like most countries, has various written laws and decrees. The laws and 
decrees relating to building and civil engineering are similar and many of the 
regulations governing the building and civil engineering professionals are the same. 
The laws and decrees governing the choice of contract is determined by the Code des 
Marches Publics. The role of the contractor may vary depending on the choice of 
contract or if it is public or private sector. Many projects are dealt with by lots 
separes (Trade contractors) with co-ordination of the project left to the Maitre 
d'ouevre who is usually an architect or engineer. Sub-contracting is less common than 
in the UK. 
6.5.2 Construction Output 
Although the French construction industry has gone through something of a decline 
in output in the late 1980's and early 1990's it has begun to show signs of recovery in 
the last four years or so. France has a well developed construction industry which can 
compete directly with that of the UK. Second only to Germany in terms of 
construction output it also accounts for over 13% of the European market in terms of 
total construction, on a par with the UK (FIEC, 2001). The level of GDP in 
construction has increased over the past few years and in 2001 represented nearly 
8.0% of the total GDP in France. 
2000 2001 
GDP 1,405 1,451 
Construction Market 110 115 
ProPortion to GDP % 7.9 7.9 
Growth rate % 4.1 4.5 
Table 6.12 Construction Market (Cbillions) (FIEC) 
As a whole, the demand for construction in France has increased over the last four 
years, brisk demand for new residential construction, as well as for office and 
industrial structures, has created a favourable climate for investment (Euroconstruct, 
2001). Table 6.13 shows the development in the individual sectors in the French 
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construction sector. Excluding housing, construction has registered an increase in the 
number of permits issued (FIEC, 2001). 
Growth in non-residential building has continued to increase over the previous three 
years despite the continuing decline in the volume of education building. This 
increase in levels is mainly due to the largest sector, industrial construction which 
accounts for a 45% share of the non-residential construction and has continued to 
expand. Also the office building sector has also shown an increase in starts and 
permits. Positive growth in the renovation and modemisation sector is forecast, due to 
the continued work on hospitals, asbestos removal and the increasing demand in the 
office sector (Euroconstruct, 2001). 
Fiscal Years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Residential 48.30 48.09 49.44 53.15 55.45 
Construction 
New residential 21.87 21.38 22.26 25.29 25.92 
Construction 
Residential Renovation 26.44 26.70 27.19 27.87 29.54 
Non-Residential 33.53 32.51 33.22 35.68 38.00 
Construction 
New Non-residential 16.12 15.15 15.56 17.59 19.19 
Construction 
Non-residential 17.41 17.36 17.65 18.10 18.82 
Renovation 
Civil Engineering 20.39 20.69 20.59 21.09 21.92 
New Civil Engineering 13.06 13.55 13.48 13.89 14.50 
Civil Engineering 7.32 7.14 7.11 7.21 7.43 
Repair and Maintenance 
Construction Sector 102.22 101.29 103.24 109.92 115.38 
Output 
Table 6.13 Annual value of construction put in place in France (Cbillions) 
(FIEC, 2001) 
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The level of civil engineering output has also risen steadily with a general increase in 
new civil engineering. The growth of the public works sector has led to this increase 
with a 7.8 % increase in 2000. This increase is linked to the buoyancy in local 
authority orders which accounted for 42.1 % of total activity in the sector. The upturn 
in the financial situation of local authorities was due mainly to the economic upturn. 
Also higher tax revenues and municipal elections in 2001 have contributed to this 
increase. Projects are continuing for the expansion and restructuring of the rail and 
public transport. However, it is expected that the civil engineering sector will stabilise 
as the general economic outlook is uncertain. 
In the private housing sector, 2000 marked the third consecutive year of growth. This 
was mainly due to the increase in 1+2 family dwellings starts with over 190 thousand 
started in 2000. Over the same period there has been a noticeable decrease in 
apartment starts. Social rental housing has also experienced a decline over the 
previous three years, with a 10.5% decrease in 2000. These figures are due to the 
difficulties of integrating the new arrangements resulting from the social housing 
reform. However, the renovation and repair sector has seen an increase in its output 
over the previous years, due mainly from the storms in 1999 and the reduced VAT 
rate in 1999. 
The value of work activity abroad increased dramatically in 2000 for French firms. 
Turnover relating to public works executed in external markets has constantly 
increased over the past seven years. In 2000, activity registered an unprecedented 
increase of 13.3%, E13,763.2 million in 2000 (FIEC, 2001). Road works continue to 
be the main sector of growth in exports, accounting for 37.4% of public works 
activity abroad. In term of volume of international contracts, France continues to lead 
the way in Europe. 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
France 
UK 
15,560 
7,512 
1 
14,340 
6,586 
16,500 
7,086 
15,700 
5,976 
19,053 
6,024 
Table 6.14 International Contracts (millions of euro) (FIEC) 
135 
Table 6.14 shows the volume of new international contracts for the UK and France 
over a five year period. 
6.5.3 Characteristics and structure of the Industry 
In terms of size of firms, the French contracting industry is similar to that in the UK 
with a large number of small firms and a few large firms. A large number of very 
small firms carry out local work, while a number of extremely large firms such as 
Vinci carry out the larger projects. There are some instances where small firms 
known as petites et moyennes enterprises have grouped together to form entities large 
enough to undertake complete projects. 
Contractors in France are broadly divided into those undertaking second oeuvre, gros 
ouevre and Travaux publics. The second ouevre contractors are the specialist or trade 
contractors, the gros ouevre are the general contractors which build the structures of 
medium sized projects and Travaux publics are the contractors involved in public 
works projects. 
No. of Employees Second oeuvre, Gros ouevre Travaux publics Total 
-I 0-9 188,436 61,866 13,613 263,915 
11-49 12,491 6,262 2,856 21,609 
50-199 703 463 584 1,750 
200+ 103 61 159 323 
Total 201,733 68,652 17,212 287,597 
Table 6.15 Structure of the Construction Industry (Ministere de I'Equipment) 
Table 6.15 shows the structure of the construction industry in France for 1999. The 
total number of enterprises in 1999 was 287,597 and this has risen to 294,000 in 
2000. However, the volume of enterprises in 2000 is less than the volume displayed 
in the early 1990's when numbers were well over the 300,000 mark. Large French 
contractors have a Latin or family-controlled corporate governance system (Miozzo 
& Dewick, 2002). Ownership concentration tends to be high and cross-shareholdings. 
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Government control and family control are important and banks too are often major 
shareholders. The top 10 contractors in France ranked according to turnover are 
shown in Table 6.16. 
Contractors Total Revenue 
S1000's 
Changein 
Turnover 
No. Of 
Employees 
1. Vinci 10,561,694 10.22 122,070 
2. Bouygues 8,133,052 19.50 85,435 
3. Vinci Construction 4,242,854 19.50 45,794 
4. Colas 4,068,755 24.20 48,000 
5. Eiffage 3,805,703 9.06 40,141 
6. Eurovia 3,269,858 - 38,307 
7. Eiffage Construction 2,102,063 19.59 18,000 
8. Sogea Construction 2,009,702 15.03 24,393 
9. GTIE 1,886,946 - 25,385 
IO. SPIE 1,700,416 16.44 24,702 
Table 6.16 Top French Contractors (Building) 
The French construction industry is home to some of the largest international 
contractors. Their biggest construction contractors are involved in a variety of 
activities and most, but not all, are construction related (Lampi, 2002). The world's 
biggest construction firm, Vinci, operates in more than one hundred countries in 
various sectors including construction. France accounted for twenty nine of the top 
100 European contractors in 2000 according to Building's 'Top 300 contractors'. This 
amount is second to none. French contractors earn a significant proportion of their 
turnover internationally and operate across Europe and overseas. 
Both Vinci and Bouygues are ranked in the Engineering News Record 'top five 
international contractors' determined by their international revenue which accounts 
for 40% and 50% of their total revenue respectively. The Federation Francaise A 
Batiment(FFB) and Federation Nationale des Travaux Publics(FNTP) represent the 
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building and civil engineering contractors. Building contractors both French and 
foreign can be officially registered under a scheme run by the industry in order to 
obtain insurance cover. The Organisme Professional de Qualification et de 
Classification du Batiment (OPQCB) grades contractors on a six point scale which 
determines the size of the project they may undertake and their insurance limit and 
excess. 
The level of employment in construction increased in 2000 to 1.49million from 
1.44million in 1999. The past four years have seen an increase in construction 
employment after the sharp decline in the early 1990's. Employment in construction 
accounts for nearly 10% of the total employment in France. Over 5 0% of construction 
workers work in firms with less than nine employees. 
6.6 The Italian Construction Industry 
6.6.1 Introduction 
The Italian construction industry is one of the major construction sectors in Europe 
and globally. The gross value of construction output is E98 billion, which accounts 
for over 8% of the GDP. The construction market output has been on the increase for 
several years, benefiting from European investment and the general recovery of the 
economy. The majority of construction companies in Italy are small and medium size 
enterprises mostly family owned firms. The construction sector is a fragmented one 
with a low level of concentration. 
A major division in Italy is that between North and South. No discussion of 
performance in Italy can proceed without first putting into context the North-South 
divide in the country. The south of Italy has a lower per capita income and higher 
unemployment compared to the north, it is also has a poor infrastructure and regional 
development compared to the north. Another significant division is that between the 
public and private sectors. The Italian construction industry was rocked by the 
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scandals involving the procurement and inefficiencies in the public sector. The 
private sector is noted for its flair and efficiency. 
In common with other European countries, there is a great deal of regulation, both 
formal and informal of the construction industry in Italy. In the public sector 
contracts are usually let by open or selective tender. In the private sector some 
contracts may be negotiated. There are no widely used standard conditions of 
construction contract and parties tend to draw up their own clauses. 
6.6.2 Construction Output 
For the first time since the late eighties, growth in Italy's construction industry has 
embarked on a dynamic upturn, attributable above all to a boom in renovation, 
demand for new residential construction and infrastructure, (Euroconstruct, 2001). In 
Italy, the construction sector accounts for around 12% of the European market, 
(FIEC, 2001). The level of GDP in construction has increased over the past few years 
and in 2001 represented 8.1% of the total GDP in Italy. 
2000 2001 
GDP 
Construction Market 
ProPortion to GDP % 
Growth rate % 
1166 1215 
93 98 
8.0 8.1 
4.1 5.4 
Table 6.17 Construction Market (Billions of euro's)(FIEC) 
As a whole, total construction volume for Italy has increased over the previous 5 
years. Table 6.18 shows the development in the individual sectors in the Italian 
construction sector. Growth in non-residential building has continued to expand over 
the five year period. As a result of a number of measures that provide tax incentives 
for new investment, growth in this area for 2001 and 2002 is expected to be 
maintained (FIEC, 2001). The level of civil engineering output has risen steadily with 
a high increase in 1999. Projects are continuing for the expansion, modernisation, 
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restructuring and safety of the national road network, especially in the southern 
works. 
Over 50% of the total amount allocated to transport will be involved in the road 
sector. Additionally water and energy infrastructures are expected to profit from a 
new community support framework. This plan, which runs until 2006, has a volume 
of E46 billion with a large amount going to works in the southern region 
(Euroconstruct, 2001). However, it is expected that the civil engineering sector will 
stabilise as the revolution in the public contracting system will slowdown the market 
for some time to allow for adjustment. 
Fiscal Year 1 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Residential Construction 49.15 48.23 48.45 51.13 52.63 
New residential 20.41 18.80 17.67 17.88 18.26 
Construction 
Residential Renovation 28.74 29.43 30.78 33.24 34.37 
Non-Residential Construction 32.07 32.48 33.27 34.40 35.26 
New Non-residential 15.48 15.68 15.78 16.41 16.83 
Construction 
Non-residential 16.58 16.80 17.49 18.00 18.43 
Renovation 
Civil Engineering 19.39 20.56 22.38 24.08 24.56 
New Civil Engineering 8.36 8.99 9.63 10.53 10.64 
Civil Engineering 11.03 11.57 12.75 13.55 13.92 
Repair and Maintenance 
Construction Sector Output 100.61 101.27 104.10 109.62 112.45 
Table 6.18 Building investment in Italy (CBillions)(Euroconstruct) 
2000 marked the second successive year of growth in the largest construction sector 
by far, housing construction. The recovery of the demand for owner occupied housing 
seems to be concentrated only in the central and northern regions. Although housing 
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starts have fallen from 214,000 in 1996 to 178,000 in 2000, the number has increased 
gradually from 1998. Approximately 60 percent of the new completions are flats with 
an increase in medium sized buildings. As of 2000 a tax reduction for housing 
renovation and modernisation will influence the huge market for residential 
renovation that has already increased over the previous five years (Euroconstruct, 
2001). 
6.6.3 Construction Industry Characteristics 
The industry has several large general contractors, but the majority of construction 
companies are small and medium size mostly family owned firms. The construction 
sector is a fragmented one with a low level of concentration. Approximately 70% of 
construction, is by firms with less than 20 employees (Pietroforte and Tangerini, 
1999). 
Firms according to Employees 
Up to 5 81.4% 
6 to 9 7.8% 
10 to 49 10.0% 
> 49 employees 0.8% 
Table 6.19 Firms listed according to employees (ANCE, 1999). 
Employment in corporate enterprises account for less than 20% of construction 
employment according to the ANCE (Associazione Nazionale Constructtori Edili). 
The levels of employment for firms are shown in Table 6.19. The level of 
employment in construction has been on the rise in the past few years. 
In 1996 the total employed in building construction was 1.55 million and this has 
increased to nearly 1.707 million in 2001. This accounted for nearly 8% of all 
employment in Italy. As expected, the majority of construction employment is in the 
northern regions of the country. There are over 330,000 construction enterprises 
active in Italy (FIEC 2001). The biggest Italian contractors areImpregilo, which has a 
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tumover of f. 1.3billion and 29,610 employees, and Astaldi, which has a tumover of 
f. 500million and 6,638 employees. 
The top ten Italian contractors ranked according to turnover in 2000 are shown in 
Table 6.20. The volume of large Italian contractors has decreased over the past 
decade. In 1992, they accounted for 51 out of the 300 contractors listed in Building 
Magazine's 'Top 300 European contractors', of whom six were in the top 100. In 
2000, they accounted for 22 of the top 300, of whom only Astaldi and Impregilo are 
listed in the top 100. 
Contractors Total Revenue 
V000's 
% International 
Revenue 
No. Of 
Employees 
I. Impregilo 1,299,322 50.00 29,160 
2. Astaldi 507,076 39.00 6,638 
3. Condotte D'acqua 297,274 34.00 2,378 
4. CMC 207,249 39.00 5,857 
5. Trevi 192,743 83.00 2,475 
6. Coopsette 186,673 5.00 918 
7. Coopcostruttori 178,117 8.00 1,977 
8. Pizzarotti 156791 - 2,126 
9. CMB 151,084 - 648 
IO. Bonatti 132,564 26.00 974 
Table 6.20 Top Italian Contractors (Building, 2002) 
In terms of operations overseas, Italian contractors' presence internationally has 
decreased. In 1992,23 Italian contractors were listed in Engineering news record 'Top 
225 international contractors', more than any other European country. In 2000 there 
were only 10 contractors listed. However, as can be seen from Table 6.20, the top 
Italian contractors still obtained a vast proportion of their revenue from international 
contracts. 
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The Traditional contracting approach is to use a general contractor. Trade contracting 
is used, but it is not customary. The Albo Nazionale dei Costruttori maintains a 
registration system for public works. Registered contractors are classified for type of 
work and construction value. The register is reviewed every five years and at this 
review it is possible for a contractor to be downgraded or upgraded, if the volume and 
type of work completed in the intervening period has significantly changed. However, 
in executing public works this registration system is becoming outdated. 
The standards of products, processes, services and systems employed are now 
beginning to be subject to certification in accordance with European standards 
(Bologna & Del Nord, 2000). The Associazione Nazionale Constructtori Edili 
(ANCE) is the national association of private construction contractors, active in 
public works, residential and industrial buildings. 
6.6.4 PFI in Italy 
Because of the current boom in the Italian construction sector the government is 
beginning to implement a public spending programme based on the British PFI 
scheme, (Broughton, 2002). PFI in Italy is governed by the Merloni law, which 
requires any promoter interested in supporting and carrying out a public project to 
submit, by 30th June in any year, full details of their proposals to the relevant 
awarding authority, (Harrison, 2002). Proposed schemes from the three year plans, 
which are appended by the authorities on either the 31 December or 28 February of 
each year, are identified by prospective promoters. The promoter's proposal must 
include an environmental appraisal, a preliminary design feasibility study and an 
economical financial plan. 
By the end of each year the authorities must issue a request for competitive tenders on 
the proposal with the highest priority and interest. The authority enters into 
negotiations with the original promoter and the two best tenders received. 
Compensation is made to the promoter if he is unsuccessful in the negotiation stage. 
To financially support the schemes, up to 50% of the capital cost can be recovered 
after construction is completed. The first major PFI scheme in Italy, which has 
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recently been announced, is the Messina bridge that will link Sicily with the Italian 
mainland (Broughton, 2002). 
6.6.5 European Funding 
Historically, Italy has been a major recipient of financial assistance from the 
European Union's regional structural funds (EIB, 2001). Italy is one of the largest 
recipients of the European Investment Bank (EIB) loans. The EIB has outstanding 
loans amounting to almost E200 billion, 20% of which is in Italy (EIB). The EIB's 
primary goal of regional development has involved providing constant funding to 
underdeveloped regions in the European union, which in Italy is the Mezzogiorno. 
During the 1990's the EIB has committed resources totalling over E20 billion towards 
the Mezzogiorno region. In 2001, the EIB provided loans totalling some E36,8 
billion, of which E5,4 billion went to Italy (EIB). In Italy, the EIB has actively 
participated in all major infrastructure schemes implemented in the past 40 years. Key 
objectives of the funding have ranged from improved communications to agriculture 
and rural development. However with the ascension of environmental issues, EIB 
investments have included the environment and urban renewal. EIB operations range 
from water management to waste disposal, from erosion prevention to conversion of 
industrial plant and efficient energy use. 
Investment in the urban environment has also assumed particular prominence. Areas 
include cultural heritage, urban transport infrastructure, restoration and upgrading of 
buildings, construction of tramlines, car parks etc. The European investment bank 
lends to both public and private sectors. Loans are for capital investment in industry, 
infrastructure and energy which helps to further a European community objective. 
6.7 Conclusions 
The emerging global economy has encouraged construction firms and clients to 
consider the performance of construction at an international level. This has led to the 
competitiveness of national construction industries being brought to the fore. This 
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chapter explored the perfonnance of the construction industries in Japan, USA, 
Gen-nany, France and Italy. 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
% 
Figure 6.1 Proportion of Construction market to total GDP 
Figure 6.1 shows the construction output of the countries studied as a percentage of 
the total GDP of each country. The Japanese construction market is one of the largest 
markets in the world and certainly one of the largest domestic markets. Although the 
US construction market has the lowest percentage value compared to the other 
countries its construction industry is the still the second largest industry in the US. 
The Japanese construction market is extremely large, with investment in construction 
greater than any other country. The Japanese market is dominated by a group of five 
very large contractors. The percentage of work undertaken by these firms in the 
international market is small in comparison to their overall scale of revenue, 
approximately 8%. Japan's domestic market is so large that the big firms can become 
one of the major global players simply by operating in their own market. 
The Japanese government is instrumental in the success of the construction industry. 
The Ministry of Construction plays a major role in most policies and strategies related 
to the industry. It also promotes and encourages the role of R&D in construction, 
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Japan us Germany France Italy 
Countries 
looking favourably on companies that invest in R&D. All the major Japanese 
contractors have research and development centres, spending money on applied and 
basic research. Investment in R&D by the private sector is close to 98% of all 
investment. 
The Japanese construction industry has experienced a downturn in fortunes over the 
past two to three years. This has resulted in the Japanese contractor involvement in 
international markets decreasing with a view to consolidating their domestic market 
share and long term commitment to the domestic market. Competition in the domestic 
market is certainly as fierce as ever. Foreign penetration to the Japanese market is still 
limited. Client loyalty, culture and language, government regulation, R&D and 
competition are all major barriers to entry for foreign contractors. If a contractor is to 
enter the Japanese market successfully, it must play a significantly different role from 
its home environment. 
The US construction market is the second largest industry sector in the USA and the 
largest construction market in the world. Over 20% of international revenue gained 
by international contractors was achieved in the US market. The construction sector 
accounts for between 4-5% of the gross domestic product. Nearly 7 million people 
are employed in construction, 5.2% of the total employment in the USA. Due to the 
size of the country there are many local markets resulting in a very fragmented 
market. America is home to some of the major world players, but few span the entire 
country. 
The composition of industry in terms of size of contractors follows the traditional 
pattern of other industries with a very large number of small to medium-sized 
contractors and a small number of very large contractors. Private sector funding 
accounts for nearly 80% of construction. Building work accounts for nearly half of all 
construction work, with residential being the main factor. Public sector work is 
booming, thanks to federal transportation funding and increasing public support for 
infrastructure projects. The cleaning, removal and disposal of hazardous materials has 
created a lucrative market. 
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The German construction market is clearly the largest construction market in Europe 
and the third largest in the world. The construction market accounts for nearly 12% of 
the GDP and is the largest employer in Germany. However, after an initial period of 
post reunification prosperity in the early part of the decade, the German construction 
market is currently shrinking. Investment in the construction sector has fallen 
significantly since 1994. The forecast for the industry is gloomy, it is predicted that 
employment in the construction industry will dip below one million for the first time 
since the Second World war. The German construction sector has continued to 
decline and the demand for housing has dropped dramatically since the early 1990's. 
Due to the size of the housing sector the overall aggregate of the construction 
industry is affected by the decline of this sector. However, there are certain sectors in 
the industry showing signs of improvement. 
The construction industry in France accounts for 7-8% of the GDP. Output is El 15 
billion and France is one of the major construction markets in the world. The 
construction sector in France still remains one of the major fields of activity and 
employment. France has a well developed construction industry which can compete 
directly with other major markets. In terms of output, France is second to Germany in 
the European market. The demand for construction in France has increased over the 
previous four years with an increase in residential construction and civil engineering. 
The industry is comprised of a large number of very small firms carrying out local 
work, while a number of extremely large firms carry out the larger projects. 
France is home to some of the largest contractors in the world, such as the giants 
Bouygues and Vinci. These large corporations are involved in all types of activities, 
not all construction related. The large French contractors earn a significant proportion 
of their revenue internationally. The construction groups have benefited from 
extensive experience in many parts of the world. Construction employment has been 
on the increase in the last four years accounting for nearly 10% of the total 
employment in France. 
Italy is a major economic force, with a gross domestic product of E1,215 billion 
which is one of the largest in the world. The most notable feature of the Italian 
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economy is the regional disparity between the rich north and the south. The north has 
a purchasing power parity in line with France and Germany, while the Mezzogiorno 
(the south) comprises of low average wealth and high unemployment. Another major 
division is that between the private and public sector. The state plays a very dominant 
role in most industries including the construction industry. The public sector is noted 
for its inefficiency and collusion. 
The private sector on the other hand has a reputation for flair and efficiency. The 
recorded output of the Italian construction industry has increased over the previous 
five years. The construction industry is highly fragmented, comprising a handful of 
large contractors and thousands of small to medium sized firms. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION MARKETS 
7.1 Introduction 
Following on from the country analysis in the previous chapter, this chapter examines 
and compares the corporate financial profitability performance of the largest 
contractors from the UK and the countries reviewed earlier. The comparative analysis 
is carried out over a five year period, 1997 - 2001. The chapter also analyses the 
relationship between the performance of the top contractors and the degree of 
internationalisation of the firms' operations. 
When conducting international studies, due consideration must be given to the 
comparability of the data. This chapter also examines the effects of the differences in 
national accounting standards on the ratios used in the measurement of the firm's 
performance. 
7.2 International Performance 
International comparisons of contractor performance allow contractors in different 
countries to assess their own strengths and weakness and improve their 
competitiveness accordingly, (Xiao & Proverbs, 2002). Global strategy implies that 
the world is perceived as a single operating market for contractors. International 
business researchers have argued that in the presence of global markets there are 
similar environmental and competitive forces affecting firms from all countries, 
(Krishnan & Moyer, 1997). 
Blaine (1994) states that the creation of global markets and industries cause similar 
firms in all nations to face identical environmental threats and opportunities. In the 
global market place, contractors must compete for the same contracts and investment 
regardless of their nationality. In such a global environment companies achieving 
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above average returns could not be able to sustain their advantage due to the 
attraction of the market and therefore the increase in foreign competitors which 
eventually would lead to an equality of returns between countries. The above 
argument assumes that profitability performance is not a consistent function of the 
country of origin. The argument also assumes that most firms and industries are 
global in nature. 
This study examines the corporate perfon-nance of the largest construction firms from 
the top six construction markets in the world. It compares and assesses the 
profitability of the top ten contractors from each market. The contractors chosen were 
the largest in their respective nations construction industry. The firms' level of 
internationalisation is shown in Table 7A. International diversification may be defined 
as expansion across the borders of global regions and countries into different 
geographic locations or markets. 
Thus a firm's level of international diversification is reflected by the number of 
different markets in which it operates and their importance to the firm (Hitt et al, 
1997). The most common method of measuring multi-nationality or 
intemationalisation is by using the ratio of a firm's foreign sales to its total sales 
(Belkaoui, 1996), (Belkaoui, 1998), (Qian & Li, 2002). The average ratio of the ten 
firms studied in each country are shown in Table 7.1. 
Japan USA France Germany Italy UK 
2001 6.36 23.3 20.0 
2000 6.29 23.5 30.5 40.8 36.0 28.5 
1999 7.10 27.7 24.8 33.6 41.5 17.8 
1998 8.79 26.1 24.1 31.1 38.6 20.7 
1997 36.1 34.6 25.0 16.8 
Table 7.1. Average Value of Foreign Turnover/overall Turnover (annual 
reports) Note: all figures in %, * data not given 
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The Japanese contractors display the lowest values of foreign sales to total sales, with 
international revenue falling over the four years studied. Although, the ratios are 
small for Japanese contractors, due to the size of these contractors the international 
revenue recorded is still extremely large. The study also includes an evaluation of the 
effect of intemationalisation on the level of performance. 
When conducting international comparison studies, due consideration must be given 
to the comparability and representativeness of the data. The effects on the differences 
of national accounting standards on the ratios used in the measurement of the firm's 
performance should be given due consideration. The methods used to account for 
various factors, may not reflect a national difference in performance but rather a 
difference in national accounting standards or business practices. In the second part of 
this chapter, the major differences in business and accounting practices in the 
countries studied are identified and their effectiveness evaluated. 
7.3 Performance Measures 
Three different measures of corporate performance and one measure of leverage are 
used in the study: (i) the return on assets (ROA), (ii) pre-tax operating profit margin, 
(iii) the return on equity (ROE) and, (iv) the ratio of long-term debt to value of 
equity. The three performance ratios are widely used measures of firm profitability, 
Foster (1978), Blaine (1994), Krishnan & Moyer, (1997). 
The first measure is operating profit margin which is expressed as a profit percentage 
of turnover before the effects of taxes and interest earnings. Blaine (1994) states that 
this indicator often provides a more meaningful measure of a firm's underlying 
strength than either ROA and ROE. Sinkey (1983) argues that the best measures of a 
firm's overall performance are the profitability ratios ROA (return on assets) and 
ROE (return on equity). 
Return on assets is the ratio of net income after taxes to total assets, and provides an 
indication of how efficiently a firm employs its assets. The return on assets ratio is 
used as an altemative measure of profitability. 
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The final performance ratio used in the analysis is a return of equity. This is a 
measure of the net income that a firm is able to earn as a percentage of stockholders 
investment. Many analysts consider ROE as the single most important financial ratio 
applying to stockholders and the best measure of performance by firms' management. 
Return on equity is calculated by dividing net income after taxes by owner equity. 
The debt to equity ratio focuses on the protective cushion owners' equity provides for 
creditors. Long term debt is used in the ratio, since long term debt is issued more 
infrequently. It may measure a longer run relationship and be more insensitive to 
unexpected financial crises than total debt (Krishnan & Moyer, 1997). 
7.4 Source of Data 
The data for this study were obtained from the Japan Financials database, the Fame 
database, individual firms' annual financial profit and loss accounts, the Datastream 
database and HYDRA database, which includes financial information similar to Extel 
cards. The firms chosen from each country were chosen on the basis of their rank in 
the 2002 issue of ENR's top 225 global contractors and Building's (2002) top 300 
European contractors. 
Ten of the top companies from the UK, Japan, USA, Italy, Germany and France 
giving a total of 60 companies were examined. The financial performance of these 
companies are given in appendix C. In general, these contractors represented the 
largest companies in each country and consequently tend to generate a large amount 
of their turnover from foreign activities. The study was conducted over the five year 
period 1997-2001 to avoid problems of short term measurement instability and bias. 
The statistical analysis used in the study included analysis of variance 'tests 
(ANOVA). Analysis of variance was undertaken to test the null hypothesis that mean 
values of the variables are equal for all groups. This enables the clarification of 
whether or not the performance ratios were the same for the various countries. The 
tables in the next section present the results of the analysis. The mean squares values, 
which examine the variance, and the F statistics which test the null hypothesis that 
all groups have the same mean are shown. The tables also display the probability 
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value (p) and F values for a significance level of 0.05, indicating the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis. 
7.5 Results of the Analysis 
Table 7.2 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 
Total Japan Italy USA Genn France U. K 
Vari. M. S. D M. S. D M. S. D M. S. D M. S. D M. S. D M. S. D 
ROA 2.67 3.97 -0.5 2.70 2.09 2.37 4.75 4.54 2.27 4.76 2.37 2.06 5.02 3.56 
ROE 8.90 23.9 -7.3 24.7 7.54 9.85 12.4 13.2 1.07 29.2 15.9 10.1 21.4 35.7 
Ltd/E 41.8 50.9 67.5 70.9 32.4 34.7 35.9 50.1 26.9 51.1 57.9 50.4 32.2 23.4 
Profit 3.97 4.45 2.78 1.40 4.01 4.50 4.41 3.73 3.04 6.40 3.06 2.36 6.14 5.30 
Turn. 4130.0 7014.2 764.7 5593.6 3054.0 5302.3 3054.0 
Table 7.2 Summary Statistics for Total sample and by Country (5 year average). 
Note: ROA= Return on Assets, ROE= Return on Equity, LtD/E= Long-tenn 
Debt/equity, Turn. = Average Turnover for 2001 given in $millions. 
The average turnover of finns for each country and total average for 2001 are also 
displayed in the table. The statistics, mean and standard deviation are given 
separately for each country and as a total. The size of the top firms vary from country 
to country. Italy reports the lowest average turnover for 2001. The top 10 Japanese 
firms have average turnover just over $7,000 million. The Japanese average is high 
due to the presence of the Big Five, a group of five of the largest global contractors. 
The French and American contractors also display a high average turnover. However, 
the French construction industry is dominated by two extremely large diversified 
multinationals. 
On further examination of the mean turnover, the French and the US displayed the 
largest deviations with the UK and Italy displaying the lowest deviations. The 
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average performance measures for the whole five year period are shown in Table 7.2. 
The UK and the US appear to outperform the rest of the countries examined, with 
both countries displaying high levels of profit margins and Return on equity margins. 
Japan's large general contractors appear to be suffering the most, with the majority of 
the Japanese firrns reporting losses in the past few years and only two of the big five 
managing small net profits. There is also evidence of clear national differences 
between the average debt/equity ratios. The Japanese contractors also report the 
highest leverage of all the countries closely followed by the French. The deviations of 
the debt to equity ratio is also extremely high for Japan with some of the biggest 
contractors owing billions. 
7.5.1 Net Profit margin 
The mean profit margins for each country from 1997-2001 are presented in Table 7.3 
and Figure 7.1 
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Figure 7.1 Mean profit margins by country 
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1997 1998 2001 1999 2000 
The figures indicates that the UK firms displayed the highest average profit margins 
over the five year period. Profit margins for the Japanese firms have fallen over the 
past five years and are the lowest. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
UK 5.86 5.81 4.87 7.22 6.92 
Japan 2.82 2.62 2.58 3.35 2.56 
USA 4.45 4.67 4.51 4.72 3.71 
Italy 4.70 5.35 4.28 2.27 3.77 
Gennany 4.89 3.93 4.12 0.89 1.55 
France 1.97 2.75 3.22 3.42 3.42 
Table 7.3 Average profit margin by Country 
An analysis of variance was carried out to test the difference in means across the 
groups. The results are presented in Table 7.4. 
Source of Variance Sum of Degrees of Mean F p 
Squares Freedom Square Value Value 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
390.04 5 78.01 4.15 0.0011 
5245.36 279 18.8 
Table 7.4 Analysis of Variance of Firms' average profit rates, 1997-2001 
The variance between groups is greater than within groups and the F-ratio at 4.15 is 
significant. These results confirm that there were differences in the means across the 
nationalities for profit margins. Similar analysis of variance was carried out for each 
individual year to support the findings. The F-values are: 
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Years 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
F-values 0.81 1.02 0.39 1.53 2.64 
Table 7.5 F-values for profit margins 
The F-ratio for 2001 is significant at the 5 per cent level. The value for 2000 is nearly 
significant at the ten percent level. The ratios for the remaining three years are not 
significant. For three of these years (1998,2000 and 2001) the variance is greater 
between groups than within groups. A I-way ANOVA was carried out to gain an 
insight into whether the time period had an effect on the profit margins. There was no 
significant difference found between the average profit margins over each year of the 
five year period, with an F-value of 0.23. 
7.5.2 Return on Equity 
The average return on equity for the six countries over the five years is shown in 
Table 7.6. Table 7.6 provides a summary of the differences in means across countries 
for this performance measure. Again there seems to be some variability among the 
contractors from the six countries. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
UK 17.81 10.20 15.67 35.92 27.39 
Japan 3.23 -1.45 -28.87 -5.10 -2.67 
USA 15.48 11.55 10.20 14.45 9.92 
Italy 6.9 8.99 7.94 8.33 10.72 
Gennany 8.99 -3.36 8.65 7.20 -13.95 
France 7.94 13.09 16.50 15.46 14.45 
Table 7.6 Average Return on Equity by Country 
The results indicate high ROE values for the UK, US and France with the Japanese 
contractors again perfonning the poorest. An analysis of variance test was carried out 
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to detennine whether national origin of the firm had an effect on Return on Equity. 
The results are reported in Table 7-7. 
Source of Variance Sum of Degrees of Mean FP 
Squares Freedom Square Value Value 
Between Groups 24594.3 5 4918.9 10.5 3.32E-09 
Within Groups 13134.5 279 470.76 
Table 7.7 Analysis of Variance of Firms' mean ROE, 1997-2001 
This analysis confirms that national origin of the firm had an effect on the return on 
equity ratios, the F-value is highly significant and the variance between groups is 
greater than the variance within groups. This finding was further supported by testing 
the ROE for individual years. The F-values are: 
Years 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
F-values 1.23 1.07 4.78 3.08 3.9 
Table 7.8 F-values for Return on Equity 
The results for the first two years, 1997 and 1998, are not significant. However, the 
last three years show highly significant results with national origin of the firm a 
significant factor in the determination of its mean return of equity. An analysis of 
variance test was also carried out to determine the effect of time on the mean return 
on equity. There was no significant difference found between the average return on 
equity over each year of the five year period, with an F-value of 0.99. 
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7.5.3 Return on Assets 
The mean return on assets for the firms for each of the six countries over the period 
studied is presented in Table 7.9. No single country, with possibly the exception of 
the UK, appears to have consistently achieved higher averages of return on assets 
than another. However, yet again the country that would seem to perform the worst is 
Japan, with negative values of return on assets in the last three years. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
UK 4.88 4.02 4.96 5.65 5.59 
Japan 0.85 0.28 -2.39 -0.53 -0.63 
USA 6.29 4.51 4.84 5.22 2.89 
Italy 2.14 2.28 1.90 1.50 2.66 
Gennany 3.36 2.53 3.01 2.60 -0.16 
France 2.27 2.55 2.45 2.33 2.25 
Table 7.9 Return on Assets by Country 
Nevertheless, an analysis of variance test was perfonned to detennine the effect of 
national origin of the finn on the return of assets. The results are given in Table 7.10. 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean FP 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Value Value 
Between 1000.9 5 200.2 16.02 6.9813-14 
Groups 
Within 3485.6 279 12.5 
Groups 
Table 7.10. Analysis of Variance of Firms' mean ROA, 1997-2001 
After adjusting for degrees of freedom, the variance between groups is greater than 
that within groups, with a highly significant F-ratio of 16.02. Thus, there is evidence 
that national origin of the firm is a significant factor in the determination of its mean 
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return on assets. Analysis was carried out for each individual year. The F-values for 
each year are: 
Years 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
F-values 2.36 1.61 5.96 6.68 2.88 
Table 7.11. F-values for Return on Assets 
The ratios for 1999 and 2000 are highly significant, that for 2001 is significant at a5 
per cent level of significance, 1997 is significant at a 10 per cent level. A final 
analysis was carried out to determine if the time period affected the average return on 
assets. The mean return on assets ratios were not found to vary over time with an F- 
ratio of 0.82 not significant. 
7.5.4 Leverage 
The last measure was the measure of leverage. The ratio of long term debt to the 
value of equity was used as the leverage measure. The mean debt to equity ratio for 
each country is presented graphically in Figure 7.2. 
There appears to be little or no variability between four of the six countries studied. 
However, the debt to equity for Japan and France have remained very high over the 
past five years compared to the other countries. As with the previously discussed 
performance measures, an analysis of variance was performed to see whether 
nationality had an effect on the final results. 
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Figure 7.2 Debt to Equity ratios 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean FP 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Value Value 
Between 63998.7 5 12799 5.32 0.00011 
Groups 
Within 670782 279 2404.2 
Groups 
Table 7.12 Analysis of Variance of Firms' mean Debt/Equity, 1997-2001 
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Table 7.12 shows the analysis of variance of the debt to equity ratios across the 
countries surveyed. The variance is greater between groups than within groups and 
the F-value at 5.32 is highly significant. The analysis was also carried out for each 
individual year. The F-values are: 
Years 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
F-values 1.97 0.54 1.53 2.4 1.06 
Table 7.13 F-values for gearing 
The F-ratio for 2000 is significant at a5 per cent level of significance, 1997 is 
significant at the 10 per cent level. However, the other values are not statistically 
significant, although for the 1999 and 2001 analysis the variance is greater between 
groups than within groups. The final analysis carried out involved examining the 
impact of the time period, determining whether debt to equity ratios have increased or 
decreased over the five years. The F-value of 0.05 was found not to be significant. 
7.6 Discussion of results 
In summary, there are significant differences in company profitability performance in 
the construction sector for the six countries surveyed. Over the five year period from 
1997 to 2001 significant differences were identified in the average operating profit 
margins. The top UK contractors reported above average profit margins with the 
Japanese contractors performing the poorest. The profit margins reported by the top 
Japanese contractors in the past five years have been extremely low. In the last five 
years eight of the ten contractors have reported losses on more than one occasion. 
Another financial feature of the Japanese performance is the very low levels of return 
on asset values and return on equity values. In Japan, ownership of companies is 
predominately held in institutions that seek long-term appreciation and do not often 
trade shares, (Abdul-Aziz, 1994). Their philosophy is towards planning for long-term 
growth even at the expense of immediate profits. This is perhaps one of the reasons 
for the poor or low corporate profitability. Perhaps the more substantive reason for 
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the poor profitability performance is the poor macroeconomic performance in Japan 
over the last few years leading to low investment in gross fixed capital formation both 
by the public and private sector. 
Another country also experiencing poor corporate profitability performance results is 
Germany. The financial performance of the top German contractors is in line with the 
current state of low investment in the German construction industry. The sector has 
been shrinking steadily since the reunification building boom in the early 1990's, and 
the economic downturn has taken its toll. 
The profit margins for the top German contractors are generally low with most of the 
contractors examined reporting losses. For a number of the years examined, the return 
on asset values and return on equity values are also considerably below average. Two 
of the leading companies in the German industry have suffered severely in the past 
three or more years. 
Although, the examination of the mean profitability ratios showed statistically 
significant differences in the five year averages, there was contrasting results when 
the average of the three performance measures were examined yearly. It was 
generally found that for the first three years, 1997 to 1999, there was no statistically 
significant differences between the country means for the three performance ratios. 
The last two years of the study, 2000 to 2001 showed a significant difference in the 
mean values. These results could be explained by the current recession in both Japan 
and Germany. 
In the past two years construction investment in Germany has again registered a 
decline in real terms (FIEC, 2001). Another factor is the increase in the average profit 
margins for the UK construction industry over the past six years, (Delaney & 
Wamuziri, 2002). The US and Italian contractors have also shown marked 
improvement in corporate profitability. 
Examining the average debt to equity ratio, both French and Japanese firms have the 
largest long-term debt to equity over the five years. Japan's top contractors are in the 
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majority heavily geared and with huge debts. In 2000, banks waived $5.13 billion 
owed by just four publicly traded contractors, (Normille, 2001). Because of the 
involvement of Japanese contractors in the Keiretsu (Industrial groupings), the 
affiliated banks to these groupings allow preferential funding. The majority of the top 
French contractors are also highly geared. Banks are often major shareholders of the 
large French construction groups. This provides financial stability for the firm and 
enables the implementation of long term corporate plans. 
Another reason for the high levels of debt to equity ratio values for the Japanese and 
French contractors is due to the size of the contractors. Measured by turnover the 
average size of the Japanese contractors in 2001 (Table 7.2) was nearly ten times the 
average size for the Italian contractors. Japanese and French contractors studied 
reported two of the highest turnovers of the countries studied. Marsh (1982) suggests 
that larger firms tend to choose long term debt, whereas smaller firms use more 
short-term debt. 
Overall profit margins have risen from 1997 to 2000, with only one major contractor 
reporting a loss in those four years. The other performance ratios have also seen an 
increase with the average return on equity for US contractors ranging from 12-15%. 
For the past five to six years the US construction sector has been buoyant for general 
contractors. However, 2001 has seen a general decline in the market. This is due to 
the cooling of the US market and the global downturn in construction spending. In 
Citron & Walton's (2002) study on international comparisons of company 
profitability they found that the UK companies generated the highest profitability of 
the six countries. This study was conducted using companies from all industries. The 
data also shows a decrease in the profitability of Japanese firms over the last ten 
years. 
7.7 The Effects of Internationalisation on firm performance 
The field of strategic management has come to the realisation. that often and 
increasingly, competitive advantage can be won only from a global view of 
competition, (Schendel, 1991). Contractors have been engaged in efforts to diversify 
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into different geographical markets for years. However, with the ascendancy of the 
top Japanese firms in the 1980's and an increase in European multinational 
contractors the academic interest in global strategies for contractors has increased. 
The internationalisation of British contractors has also increased over the previous 
decades (Table 1.1). The aim of some of the larger UK contractors has been to 
increase their overseas activities in an attempt to counteract some of the problems 
associated with the domestic market, (Crosthwaite, 1998). 
The overseas activity of British firms has almost doubled in the past ten years. 
International diversification seeks to use internal resources and capabilities to exploit 
global market imperfections. The motivation is there for contractors with a 
competitive advantage and greater profitability in domestic markets to apply the same 
competence to international markets to further increase profitability. The expansion 
of foreign activities has been linked with yielding competitive advantages. 
Potential benefits of international expansion include volume economies, intelligence 
gathering, product improvement and tax arbitrage, (Belkaoui, 1998). Grant (1987) 
suggests that multinational firms have opportunities to gain greater returns to 
intangible resources, to use market power, to spread their market risks, and to seek 
less expensive inputs and less price sensitive markets. Crosthwaite, (1998) carried out 
a survey on UK contractors examining the top priorities for operating overseas. The 
most important reasons gathered from the study were to increase long-term 
profitability and to maintain shareholders returns. 
Aziz (1994) in a study of Japanese and US contractors also states that the prime 
concern for global activity was to increase long-term profitability. As an increasing 
number of contractors have pursued global diversification, the corporate profit 
performance impact of intemationalisation has become an important issue. 
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7.7.1 Internationalisation and Performance. 
The degree of intemationalisation was calculated as in section 7.2, with the figures 
given in Table 7.1. All of the firms were included over a four year period, with the 
three performance ratios from section 7.3 being applied. The analysis involved a 
simple test of correlation between the performance indicators and the degree of 
intemationalisation. The correlation values for each country and variable are given in 
Table 7.15. 
Countries Operating profit Return on Equity Return on Assets 
Germany -0.57 -0.15 -0.51 
UK 0.001 -0.26 -0.18 
France -0.13 0.23 0.11 
Italy -0.13 -0.01 -0.26 
USA -0.18 -0.48 -0.49 
Japan -0.29 -0.22 -0.25 
Table 7.15 Correlation factors. 
Use of a multi-year mean was supported by previous findings that significant 
performance effects arising from diversification strategies were only apparent over 
time, not in cross-sectional analysis (Geringer et al, 1989). The values display no 
significant correlation between the performance indicators and the measurement of 
multinationality of some of the countries examined. For most of the countries the 
correlation was slightly negative, although the values are too low to have any real 
significance. However, there is a high negative degree of correlation between 
multinationality and performance for German and US firms. Both the operating profit 
margins and ROA values for German contractors are negatively correlated to 
multinationality. For the US firms, the ROE values and ROA values are negatively 
correlated with geographical scale. 
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7.7.2 Discussion 
There are various arguments and motives for realising or increasing foreign 
operations in the belief that it will increase a firm's performance. Several studies have 
shown that foreign activity increases performance, (Qian, 1997, Dunning 1995, 
Buhner 1987). However, other tests of this simple relationship have shown no linear 
relationship between international diversification and performance, (Geringer, 1989, 
Collins, 1990). The results above showed no linear relationship between international 
diversification and performance for four of the six countries. American companies 
display a negative relationship between foreign activity and performance. 
Historically, the US companies have suffered a major handicap as they expanded 
internationally. They were located in the world's largest, richest and most 
sophisticated market. This led managers in a large number of US multinationals to 
regard their international operations somewhere between attractive side-bet and 
distractive nuisance, (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1991). This can be applied to the 
construction sector, the largest construction sector in the world. Due to the size of the 
country there are many local markets resulting in a very fragmented market. America 
is home to some of the major world players, but few span the entire country. Thus 
most contractors have a very low level of foreign activity and can diversify into many 
different sectors in the US construction industry. 
The German firms also display a negative relationship between foreign operations 
and performance. The German contractors also display the highest average foreign 
turnover of the six countries as shown in Table 7.1, with some of the firms studied, 
recording a 60 to 80% degree of foreign turnover. Hitt et al (1997) propose, and 
results suggest, that there is a curvilinear relationship between international 
diversification and firm performance that begins positive but eventually becomes 
negative with increasing international diversification. Belkaoui (1998) concludes that 
there is a negative relationship between a firm's performance and degree of 
internationalisation at a lower or higher range, and a positive relationship for a middle 
range. Geringer et al, (1989) also found a non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship 
between international diversification and performance. 
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Several factors may lead to little relationship or negative relationship on the 
profitability of a firm. Most importantly is the risk involved particularly in developing 
countries. The firm has to deal with new political factors, unknown cultures, legal and 
economic factors. These factors lead contractors in developed countries to primarily 
base their foreign operations in other developed countries. Developed countries 
markets provided a secure environment in which to evaluate risks, financial security 
and also less corruption, (Crosthwaite, 1998). Over 40 percent of foreign work carried 
out by British contractors last year took place in the US, with a further 15 per cent 
based in the European Union (DoE, 2002). 
Another major factor is the transaction costs as firms experience increasing 
transaction costs with greater international diversification. The possible influence of 
regional differences and increased costs of geographic co-ordination may reduce the 
potential benefits associated with increased scope of foreign operations, (Qian & Li, 
2002). Differing government regulations and trade laws and currency fluctuations 
across countries also create significant barriers to the co-ordination process. 
7.8 Effects of Accounting Practices in the Different Countries 
When comparing the performance of corporations across countries and testing for 
differences in performance that can be traced to the country of origin, one problem 
does warrant discussion: namely the effects of accounting standards. The existence 
of, the reasons for and the problems caused by differing 'generally agreed accounting 
principles and practices' (GAAPs) has been well documented in previous studies. 
Whittington (2000) examined differences in international accounting by studying 
companies from the UK and French steel industry. Lainez & Callao (2000) analysed 
the existence of diversity in accounting principles by comparing the Spanish system 
to other countries. 
There are certain environmental influences on accounting which make accounting 
systems differ from country to country. The following factors are highlighted as being 
of the greatest significance in previous research: 
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9 The political system 
* The economic system 
4, Legal system 
e Tax system 
o Financing system 
* Accounting profession 
9 Social cultures 
* Extemal factors 
Apparent national differences in performance may reflect more fundamental 
differences in the business practice and accounting standards of the countries 
involved. Blaine (1994) defines three principal factors other than the performance 
affecting the measured profitability of the firm. They are: 1) the tax rate, 2) the 
accepted method of accounting for depreciation, R&D spending, goodwill and 
currency translations, 3) the effect of using debt versus equity to finance the firm's 
activities. 
Naturally, corporate income tax rates differ across the six countries. The corporation 
tax rates and tax system for the European Union countries for 2000/2001 are shown 
in Table 7.16. The tax rate for Japan in 2000 was 40.87% and a similar rate in the US 
of 40.75%. The imputation tax system is a system in which some relief is offered to 
shareholders to ensure that dividends are not subject to both income tax and 
corporation tax. 
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Country System Corporation tax % 
France Imputation 36.66 
United Kingdom Imputation 30.00 
Germany Imputation 40.00 
Italy Imputation 50.00 
Table 7.16 Corporation tax rates 
The classical system (used in the USA and the Netherlands) allows a deduction for 
interest payments, but charges tax on all other profits, whether distributed as 
dividends or not. As a result of the differences in the tax rates, the ROA's and ROE's 
will be biased. Italian companies will report lower income after tax than the other 
countries and hence lower ROE values and ROA values. 
For most countries the corporation tax a company has to pay will depend on the profit 
figure it reports, (Carson, 1991). However, in countries like the US and the UK where 
companies depend more heavily on equity investment, there is every incentive to 
maximise profit to attract investors. In countries like Germany, France, Italy and 
Japan, where banks and government institutions have traditionally been the main 
source of company finance, there is an incentive to minimise declared profits and 
therefore their tax liabilities. The operating rather than net income is not affected by 
taxes, interest and dividend payments, or extraordinary gains and losses, (Blaine, 
1994). This makes operating profit margins a more objective measure of comparative 
performance of companies in different countries. 
Accounting for depreciation is another area for concern in the influence of tax rules 
(Nobes, 1994). The method used to account for depreciation affects all three 
performance indicators. Straight-line and acceleration depreciation are the two main 
forms of calculation in the developed countries. Straight line depreciation is based on 
the premise that depreciation is a function of time. 
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Accelerated depreciation allows a firm to deduct the cost of a capital investment over 
a shorter period of time (Blaine, 1994). This method shortens the depreciable lives of 
many assets meaning bigger earlier tax deductions hence lower tax obligations. The 
Japanese companies typically choose accelerated or mixed depreciation methods, 
while the majority of companies in the other countries use the straight line method, 
(Murphy, 2000). 
In the US, 75% of companies use the straight line method, however other methods 
like the sum of the years' digits, declining balance, and units of production are 
becoming more popular (Management Accounting, 1996). All of the contractors from 
Italy, Germany, USA, France and the UK, analysed in the study used the straight line 
depreciation method. Eight of the contractors from Japan have changed their 
depreciation method from accelerated depreciation to straight line depreciation in the 
last five years. 
As the phenomenon of globalisation has increased, companies are becoming less 
reliant on their home countries for funding and investment. This has brought to the 
fore the need for a global set of accounting standards. The International Accounting 
Standards Committee (ISAC) was set up to formalize global standards. Their 
objective is the improvement and harmonization of regulations, accounting standards 
and procedures relating to the presentation of financial statements, (Murphy, 2000). 
The belief is that with the adoption of international accounting standards the quality 
of financial information will improve and there will be an increasing degree of 
comparability. 
Italy passed a law in 1998 allowing companies whose securities are publicly traded in 
the EU or non-EU countries to prepare their consolidated financial statements, for 
domestic reporting, using international accounting standards (IASs). Germany also 
allows publicly traded companies to prepare their consolidated financial statements 
using international accounting standards. Listed French companies are allowed to 
elect to follow IASC standards in their consolidated financial statements for domestic 
reporting. 
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In Japan, despite the codified legal and tax-driven accounting system, leading 
companies have increasingly adopted Anglo-Saxon consolidated accounting (Carson, 
1991). Japanese rules changed extensively in the late 1990's to reduce the differences 
from US and IAS practice (Nobes & Parker, 2002). In most cases, for the US and UK 
reporting, compliance with the relevant IAS is achieved automatically due to the 
relative similarities between the accounting procedures. The US accounting standards 
are considered the most comprehensive and developed in the world and the most 
transparent Popper (2002), Shrives(l 998). 
Differences between national and international standards make comparisons a 
difficult task. The use of financial analysis, based on published accounts, is both 
commonplace and fraught with danger (Whittington, 2000). Multinational 
corporations (MNC) face a variety of international accounting and reporting 
requirements besides those of their respective home countries (Meek et al, 1995). 
Investors in multinational firms and lenders to them need to become experts in 
financial reporting system of more than one country (Nobes & Parker, 2002). 
Voluntary disclosures are one way in which MNC's cope with international diversity 
in accounting principles (Choi & Levich, 1990). Some MNC's restate their accounts 
from domestic to another set of accounting principles. There are additional 
differences of accounting standards between countries, valuation of goodwill, 
provisions and reserves, foreign currency translation, pension expenses and deferred 
tax. However, it is the belief that as globalisation becomes more widespread so the 
harmonisation of accounting standards will increase. This remains a desirable but 
perhaps an elusive goal. 
7.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the performance of the top contractors from the leading 
nations in construction. The study of 60 contractors from Italy, France, Germany, 
USA, Japan and the UK reveals that both profitability and leverage are influenced by 
the country of origin of the firm. Based on the results, operating margins in the 
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countries averaged between 3-6% with construction firms from Japan and Germany 
showing the lowest profitability. Statistically significant differences were observed in 
all three performance indicators, with high significant levels in the last two to three 
years. These differences stem from the poor macroeconomic performance and low 
investment in both the Japanese and German construction markets. 
As an increasing number of contractors have pursued attractive global markets, the 
corporate profit performance impact of intemationalisation has become an important 
issue. Previous research on international market diversification has found differing 
results with the majority finding a positive relationship between the intensity of 
international market operations and profitability. Results of the analysis suggest that 
the corporate profit performance impact of intemationalisation may vary contingent 
upon the extent of a firm's international market diversification. 
The influence of different methods of accounting in each country and the extent of 
these findings is examined. Methods and rates of depreciation were similar in the 
countries studied. The corporation tax rates varied slightly among different countries. 
However, this did not affect the operating margins. Further analysis on pre-tax ROA 
and pre-tax ROE displayed similar results to the original findings. International 
differences in financial reporting are many. However, as Blaine (1994) argues the 
effects of some of these differences counterbalance each other. Another major factor 
on the findings is the influence of business practices and government regulation. 
A proposed grouping of countries into two types is to divide them into capital market 
systems or credit based government and financial systems. Nobes & Parker, (2002) 
suggest that the differentiation between credit and equity is the key cause of 
international differences in financial reporting. In cases such as the United Kingdom 
and the United States, where companies rely on millions of Private investors for 
finance, the maximisation of profits will attract investor attention. While in credit 
based systems, where banks or the state own a majority of the shares, the influence on 
the financial reporting and regulations can affect the disclosure of information. 
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The reliance of debt in the credit based system is displayed in the leverage results. 
Both French and Japanese contractors are very reliant on debt in financing their 
operations. One final note of relevance is the performance of the Japanese 
construction firms. The Japanese contractors studied recorded the lowest degree of 
foreign turnover with a huge dependence on their home market, which has been in 
decline (Normille, 2001). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE EFFICIENCY OF MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
8.1 Introduction 
Merger and acquisition activity in the UK has grown rapidly since the recession in the 
early 1990s. In today's consolidating markets, firms can create significant shareholder 
value by using mergers and acquisitions to cut costs and grow profits. Mergers may be 
justified by the extent to which they add value. Adding value requires some synergy 
that may be obtained by winning access to complementary assets or deriving 
economies of scale or scope related to the core business. 
There is a significant incentive for a company to grow if the costs of production 
decrease as the scale of the operations increase. The first section of this chapter 
provides an assessment of the benefits of size, by analysing the relation between 
measures of costs and firm size. The data was selected from over one hundred 
companies in the contracting and house building sector, materials sector and plant hire 
sector for each of the past five years. The study also contains an analysis of a small 
sample of construction companies that were involved in mergers and acquisitions. 
This analysis is carried out using various financial efficiency ratios. 
Strategic decisions including mergers and acquisitions are made with the objective of 
maximising the wealth of the company's shareholders. A key feature of the 
construction sector for the past five years has been the rise of corporate mergers and 
acquisitions. These mergers and acquisitions are seemingly justified by the 
contribution they add to the shareholder value. 
The second part of this chapter investigates the financial performance of construction 
companies which have been involved in the acquisition process. The study examines 
the alleged benefits of corporate take-overs by performing an event study analysis of 
46 acquiring firms and 33 target companies drawn from the UK construction industry. 
The chapter examines the literature on merger performance, describes the data and the 
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methodology involved. An event study analysis is then carried out on the share prices 
obtained. 
8.2 Mergers and Acquisitions in Construction 
The topic of corporate growth, through mergers and acquisitions is topical among 
researchers, managers and journalists alike, (Kreitl et al, 2002). Rapid corporate 
growth is achievable through the acquisition of or merger with another company, as 
opposed to organic growth which can be a slow process. In today's consolidating 
markets, firms can create significant shareholder value by using mergers to increase 
revenues and profits and to cut costs. 
As explained earlier in Chapter 2 there are various reasons often cited for launching 
take-over bids. They include obtaining synergy to enter new markets or acquiring 
market power. Another reason is to exploit scale economies as firm size may also 
bring financial economies by improving access to capital markets and reducing cost of 
capital. Finns in the construction industry also need critical mass to compete for large 
projects. 
Overall merger activity has increased dramatically over the past decade. The latest 
figures from the national statistics office as shown in Table 1.1 reinforce this 
viewpoint. Expenditure on acquisitions of companies by UK companies increased 
from f. 13 billion in 1992 to a record level of f. 285 billion in 2000. The level of 
expenditure on acquisitions in the UK by overseas companies has also increased 
dramatically. 
A feature of the construction industry in the past five years has been the increase in 
corporate activity. This activity is leading to consolidation within the industry. The 
acceleration of the industry's consolidation continued in 2001. The total turnover of 
the top 100 companies in the contracting and housebuilding sector was 35 per cent 
greater than in 1996 (Construction News, 2001). The industry's output also rose 20 
per cent over that period and it would seem therefore that the big firms are taking an 
even bigger slice of the cake. Profits in the contracting sector grew by 22 per cent last 
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year and have also increased 88 per cent in cash tenns in 2001 than five years earlier 
(Construction News, 2001). 
'Aggregates and building firms have been experiencing unprecedented consolidation 
as multinationals go in search of geographical presence and economies of scale' 
(Construction News, 2000). The motives behind this wave of consolidation, is the fact 
that financial institutions want to deal with larger companies, because of the belief that 
the larger the firm the greater the efficiency. 
As stated earlier, there are several potential reasons why firms follow a strategy of 
acquisition or merger. This study focuses primarily on the economic motives. One 
important economic motive for a corporate acquisition is to establish economies of 
scale. Economies of scale are a measure of the extent to which the costs fall as output 
expands. Furthermore, firm size appears to be viewed as a principal source of 
competitive advantage. There would be a significant incentive for companies to grow 
if the costs of production were to decrease as the scale of the operations increased. 
Mergers have emerged as one method of striving for operating efficiencies, mainly 
focused on the cost side (Avkiran 1999). Importantly, efficiency gains are made by 
changing input or output quantities in ways that reduce costs, increase revenues or 
income, and/or reduce risks to increase value for a given set of prices, (Berger et al, 
1999). Therefore if revenue was to increase while cost remained stable, cost 
efficiencies would be realised. 
Porter (1987) argued that related acquisitions involve the consolidation of both human 
and physical assets and, because of opportunities to generate economies of scale and 
scope through resource sharing and transfer and reduce overall operating costs, 
superior performance may be achieved. The study on efficiencies and performance of 
mergers and acquisitions was conducted in three parts. 
Part one provides an analysis of the benefits of size by assessing the relationships, if 
any, between a measure of costs and a measure of size. Financial data on the largest 
companies from the contracting and house building sector, materials sector and plant 
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hire sector was used in the analysis. In principle, much depends on whether wealth is 
created or merely redistributed during merging, (Bondt & Thompson, 1992). 
The second part examines the subsequent performance and efficiency of mergers by 
analysing four mergers that have taken place in the construction industry. In the work, 
the tenns merger, acquisition and take-over are used inter-changeably. Part three 
examines the impact of mergers and acquisitions on shareholder value. 
8.3 Effect of Company Size on Efficiency 
8.3.1 Economies of scale 
The existence and importance of economies of scale has proved a controversial 
empirical issue with diverse results being reported for different samples, time periods 
and functional specifications, (Haynes & Thompson, 1999). To date, most of the 
available knowledge on mergers and acquisitions has come from the scrutiny of the 
financial services and technology industries. Much of the literature has focused on the 
benefits and impact of bank mergers, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Becher (2000), 
Berger (1999). There has been little research examining the benefits of mergers in the 
construction industry. Siehler (1998) briefly examines the role of mergers in 
globalisation in construction. Ball et al (2000) examine efficiency and competition as 
a scale effect. 
The motives cited for launching take-over bids usually reflect the anticipated benefits 
that a merger or acquisition is expected to generate and one such benefit is to exploit 
scale economies. Exploitation of scale economies can occur in any of three major 
ways. First, a merger could improve cost efficiency by reducing the costs per unit of 
output. For example where plant and equipment is of an expensive nature, costs may 
be reduced by combined use. 
Second, mergers may exploit economies through improvements in profit efficiency. 
Profit efficiency takes into account the cost and the income or revenue effects. Thus, 
profit efficiency can improve after a merger without the actual cost efficiency 
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improving if, for example, the merger increases revenue without increasing or 
decreasing costs. The third way, in which mergers or acquisition may be expected to 
yield scale economies, is through access to capital markets on more favourable terms. 
An increase in market concentration or share may allow the consolidated company to 
raise the rates for the goods or services provided by the company. 
8.3.2 Sample Selection 
The first contribution of this chapter is to examine the issue of the existence of scale 
economies. The sample used for the analysis was taken from the three main sectors in 
the construction industry. The problem faced when selecting the sample sizes is as 
explained in chapter three the distribution of firms. 
Approximately sixty of the largest UX companies from the contracting and house 
building sector were selected for the purpose of the following analysis. The size of the 
sample from the materials and plant hire sectors was restricted to approximately thirty 
companies. The companies' reports and financial details were taken from the FAME 
(FAME, 2002) database. 
8.3.3 Analysis of Scale Economics 
The purpose of this analysis is to measure the benefits of size in terms of cost 
efficiency. To achieve this aim the financial data on the largest UX companies from 
the three main sectors in the construction industry were selected for the purposes of 
this analysis over a period of five years. The analysis measures the benefits of size by 
estimating the relation between a measure of costs and a measure of size. A measure 
of costs was taken as the cost/income ratio where cost is defined as expenses and 
income defined as operating profit (Lynch, 1996). The measure of operating profit 
was used to examine the profit efficiency, to show that costs were not decreasing at 
the expense of profits. The measure of size was taken as the total assets of the 
respective companies. The results are shown in Figures 8.1-8.6 and Figures D. 1 to 
D. 12 (Appendix D. 1). Total assets in the graphs are given in terms of the log value of 
the assets. The reason for the use of log values, is due to the size of the total assets. 
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Regression analysis was used to assess the relation between scale and cost efficiency, 
by finding the line of best fit through the plot of data points. Initial testing was carried 
out examining models that would give the best fit line; linear, logarithmic and 
polynomial regression were all tested. The model that represents the best-fit line is the 
quadratic model. This model presents the highest coefficient of deten-nination, RI 
values, for each of the analysis. The charts summarise the results of the regressions. 
On each chart the quadratic relation and the value of the regression R2 are shown. 
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Figures 8.1-2 show results from the analysis from the contracting sector. Figures 8.3-4 
show typical results from the analysis of the materials sector and Figures 8.5-6 shows 
the plant hire sector. 
8.3.4 Summary and comment on Results 
There is some evidence of scale economies from the figures above, although it is not 
clear-cut in some instances. From the graphs, the estimated optimum size of assets for 
each year in the different sectors were identified and are given in Table 8.1. 
This optimum size is calculated by determining the lowest point on the U-shaped 
curves. The graph from contracting in 1999 displays aU shaped cost curve, thus 
enabling the lowest point of the curve to be calculated giving the most efficient size in 
tenns of cost efficiency. This U-shaped curve is evident over the six years of the 
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contractors examined and the graph from 1999 is similar to other years, except for the 
1996 analysis. 
Year Construction (f'000) Materials (000) 
1995 328,000 (17'h) 247,707* 
1996 1,264,263* 597,195* 
1997 540,365(13 1) 540,365(15 th) 
1998 597,197(14 th) 660,000(15 th) 
1999 540,365(17 th) 412,510(17 th) 
2000 555,497(16 th) 523,467(15 th) 
Table 8.1 Optimum size of assets for Construction & Materials. 
The graph for 1996 shows that as contractors grew in terms of assets the cost to 
income ratio appeared to edge slightly downwards, suggesting that larger contractors 
experience slight economies of scale. However, these results are less significant due to 
the low R2value. For the remaining years, the size at which the cost efficiency rises 
again is usually around the 15 th largest company for the five years. The rank of 
company with the total assets nearest to the value of the estimated optimal size is 
given in the brackets in Table 8.1. The R2 for each of the years in contracting, 
materials and plant hire sector are shown in Table 8.2. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Contracting 0.82 0.48 0.68 0.75 0.818 0.69 
Materials 0.28 0.15 0.39 0.54 0.71 0.65 
Plant Hire 0.29 0.35 0.25 0.42 0.39 0.35 
Table 8.2 112values 1995 - 2000 
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For the materials sector, graphs for four of the most recent years all show aU shaped 
cost curve, as shown in the 1999 materials sector. However, the graphs from 1996 and 
1995 display inverted U shaped figures as shown in Figure 8.4. This would indicate 
that smaller companies display cost efficiencies. If the company grows then it would 
not realise scale of economies until it reaches a certain size. The results from the 
analysis are quite promising. However, they are not as statistically significant as those 
of the contracting sector. 
A possible explanation of the difference in the figures from the materials sector for 
1995 and 1996 with that of other years could be due to an increase in company size 
from 1995 to 2000. The average size of the 33 largest companies in the materials 
sector, in terms of total assets, has risen from E721 million in 1995 to over E1,040 
million in 2000. Another factor for the difference could be due to the size of the 
sample. 
The low R2values for the materials sector could also be explained by the size of the 
sample. However, to increase the size of the materials sample would mean a large 
decrease in the average size of the companies. The size at which the cost efficiency for 
materials rises again is usually around the 15 th largest company for the previous three 
years. Interestingly, for 1995 and 1996 the years in which the graphs are inverted, the 
size at which companies experience the least amount of cost efficiencies is generally 
around the 15 1h largest company. The studies by Berger (1999) and Lynch (1996), 
although related to the financial industry, also display scale efficiency gains for the 
smaller companies. 
The results from the plant hire sector display completely the opposite in terms of scale 
efficiencies. All the graphs are of an inverted U-shape, meaning that the small and 
very large companies can gain scale efficiencies. Due to the small number of firms 
examined from the plant hire sector an examination of performance between large and 
small firms was deemed unsuitable. The reasons for the differences in results may be 
due to a number of factors. 
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One of the main reasons could be the size of asset base for a plant hire company is 
considerably smaller than that of a contracting or materials company. Comparing the 
average size in 2000 of the 33 largest companies from the plant hire sector with that of 
the 33 largest materials firms shows the plant hire average is E100 million compared 
with E1,040 million from materials. A possible reason for this difference in assets 
could be due to the extent of diversification of the large contracting and materials 
firms compared to the plant hire firms. The results for the plant hire sector are less 
significant than that of the contracting sector due to the low levels of R2 values as 
shown in Table 8.2. However, further testing on the correlation of assets and cost 
ratios displayed negative correlation values of between -0.5 to -0.7 for the six years 
examined, indicating that as assets increase, cost ratios decrease. 
8.4 Assessing the evidence on efficiency gains 
The second part of this chapter examines the long term efficiency and performance of 
a sample of bidding firms in mergers and tender offers. Different researchers use 
various measures of profitability, efficiency, liquidity, turnover and growth to study 
the characteristics of merging and acquiring firms. In the following analysis three 
efficiency ratios and three profitability ratios are used to assess the performance and 
efficiency of mergers and there effectiveness as a motive for merging. 
The first efficiency ratio examined is the cost/income ratio, which was the main focus 
of the first section of the paper. The cost/income ratio of the case studies is compared 
with the average of the sector samples from section 8.3. The second ratio used was the 
ratio of expenses to total assets. Examining expenses relative to assets would 
eliminate any confusion between cost reductions with efficiency gains. That is, a cost 
reduction would not display any efficiency gains if assets were being reduced relative 
to cost reductions, this would simply mean the firm is shrinking. The final efficiency 
ratio cost to operating revenue is an alternative to the expenses to asset ratio. Using 
revenue in the expense ratio reflects the ability of the firm to generate revenue from its 
expenditure. 
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The importance of profitability and growth during mergers is confirmed in a number 
of studies. Sorensen (2000), found that profitability is the overall significant identifier 
during acquisition. Three profitability ratios were analysed in the study. The first ratio 
is expressed as a percentage ratio of operating profit to turnover. The profit margins of 
the case studies are compared to sector averages. 'The best measures of a firm's 
overall performance are the profitability ratios ROA (return on assets) and ROE 
(return on equity) (Sinkey, 1983). 
The return on assets ratio is used as an alternative measure of profitability. The final 
performance ratio used in the analysis is a return of equity. This is a measure of the 
net income that a firm is able to earn as a percent of stockholders investment. Return 
on equity is calculated by dividing net income after taxes by owner equity. 
8.4.1 Sample 
The sample consists of three large construction acquisitions and one large merger 
announced during the period 1996-1998. The initial sample consisting of 76 mergers 
was drawn from the business park review of mergers and acquisitions during the 
three-year period. The target firm was generally required to be at least half as large as 
the acquiring firm (Rhoades, 1998) or the value of the acquisition to be greater than 
E10 million (Houston et al, 1998). So that the target would be of sufficient size that 
any efficiency or performance effect would be reflected in data for the combined firm. 
Also the firms had to be involved in the UK construction industry. Due to these 
factors the sample size fell dramatically, the final sample involved four mergers. 
Although the terms mergers and acquisitions are used interchangeably in research, in 
practice, one firm usually tends to be more powerful than the other and gradually 
assumes control of the consolidated organisation, (Weston et al, 1998). Example C is 
a merger between two companies of almost equal size. Example A, B and D are 
acquisitions involving a larger construction firm taking control of a smaller contractor. 
However for clarity the examples are referred to in this section as mergers. 
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Another factor in the decrease in selection size was that the mergers selected for the 
study were ones relatively likely to yield efficiency gains as the study examines 
efficiency as a motive of merging. Three of the four companies examined stated that 
their motives for acquiring were to enable significant cost savings. Two of the 
companies predicted cost savings of E5 million and ElO million. The fourth company 
cited an increase in market presence as the main driving force behind merging. The 
three acquisitions and one merger were large horizontal integrations that are thought 
to be the kind of consolidation that is most likely to yield efficiency gains. 
All ratios were analysed for three years prior to the year of the merger and three years 
after the merger (Appendix D. 2). The three year time period after the merger was used 
because about half of any efficiency gains should be apparent after one year and all 
gains should be realised within three years, (Rhoades, 1998) (Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998) (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Rhoades (1998) found that almost all of the experts 
interviewed in his study agreed on the motives been realised after three years. The 
pre-merger period of three years was also examined. Also, a large number of 
contractors examined were involved in acquisition programs and were acquiring firms 
continuously so the benefits of a merger could not be examined over longer periods. 
The ratios for both the acquirer and the target were examined to gain an indication of 
the performance and efficiency of the acquirer and target. For the post merger period 
the focus of the analysis was on the comparison of the acquirer's pre-merger data and 
the post-merger data to determine what changes occurred in performance, efficiency 
and other non-financial details. A control group consisting of ten companies from the 
construction industry was examined as a comparison of the efficiency and 
performance to the merger. These control firms were similar in terms of size and 
location. 
8.4.2 Results 
The first ratio examined was the cost/income ratio of each company. 
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Merger 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 
A 23.9 26.3 28.5 34.8* 41.1 30.98 33.6 
B 45.0 49.3 49.3 * 56.6 60.1 59.8 68.5 
c 68.6 69.4 71.1 78.3* 66.8 63.9 68.9 
D 27.0 23.5 20.9 21.2* 25.6 28.2 33.5 
Table 8.3 Cost/Income ratio for Mergers. (* denotes year of merger) 
Results are shown in Table 8.3. For case A the cost/income ratio was found to 
decrease after three years. Initially during the first two years the cost income ratio was 
unchanged, however cost efficiencies are being realised after three years. The acquiree 
in case A had a higher cost/income ratio than the acquirer the three years before 
merger. The ratio for case B was also found to decrease after acquisition; efficiencies 
were realised in the first post merger year and for the following two years. The 
acquiree in this instance was found to have a slightly lower cost/income ratio than the 
acquirer. 
Case C involved the merger between two materials companies of almost equal size. 
Comparing the cost/income ratio of the merged company with that of the hypothetical 
combined pre-merged company the ratio is found to decrease. The final case indicates 
a slight decrease after the first year. However, after three years the cost/income ratio 
has increased. The acquiree in this case had larger cost income ratio. 
The final two efficiency ratios examined were expenses to assets ratio and expenses to 
operating revenue. Case A shows no change in expenses to assets with the acquiree 
displaying a lower average than the acquirer does. The expenses to revenue indicate a 
decrease in the three years after acquisition. Case B records lower expenses to assets 
ratios and also a lower expenses to turnover ratio for the three years after the 
acquisition period. In both examples the acquiree was found to have lower averages. 
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The analysis of the merger in case C indicates no change in expenses to total assets of 
the combined post-merger firm from that of the hypothetical combined pre-merger 
firm. The expenses to revenue ratio for the merged company have decreased in the 
three years following the merger. Again case D displays contrasting results in terms of 
improving efficiency. The expenses to assets ratio is found to decrease post-merger 
but the cost/turnover ratio increases in the following three years. 
The profit margin for case A is seen to increase for the three years after the merger as 
shown in Table 8.4. The acquiree had a very low profit margin compared to that of the 
acquirer's. The results also show an increase in both return on assets and a return on 
equity post acquisition. Case B and case C display similar improvements in 
performance with case A. However case B involved the acquisition of a company with 
higher profit margins than that of the acquirers. 
The final case has led to decrease in the acquirer's profit margins and also a decrease 
in return on assets and a slight decrease in return on equity. The acquiree in this 
example however was out-performing the acquirer prior to the acquisition. The 
acquiree had greater profit margins and a better return on assets than the acquirer. 
Merger 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 
A 12.8 10.5 9.1 6.9* 5.3 8.8 9.3 
B 11.25 10.2 10.1* 7.9 5.9 7.5 5.5 
c 9.5 10.4 9.1 7.5* 7.6 7.1 5.8 
D 15.9 16.7 17.5 19.2* 17.5 20.2 16.0 
Table 8.4 Profit margin ratio for Mergers. (* denotes year of merger) 
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8.4.3 Explanation of Results 
Based on the results from the previous section it would seem that three out of the four 
mergers were successful in improving efficiency. However when comparing these 
results to that of the control group or sector averages it would seem that the results are 
somewhat distorted. 
In the first two cases (A and B) which both involve firms from the construction sector, 
it was found that the cost/income decreased each year for the three years after 
acquisition. These ratios were compared to the simple average of the construction 
firms in section 8.3 for each year to provide a basis for comparing the efficiencies of 
the parties. It was found that the average cost/income from the construction sector was 
found to decrease each year over the last six years. It would seem that the acquiring 
firms' efficiency is in line with the construction sector based on cost to income. The 
merger involving the materials firms was also compared to the average of the 
materials firms used in section 8.3 in terms of cost/income. The ratio for the 
succeeding three years after merging is in line with the materials sector average. 
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The final merger (case D) showed an increase in cost/income this increase does not 
compare favourably to that of the average in the plant hire sector over the three years. 
It shows a slight decrease in the cost/income ratio over that period. Three of the four 
mergers were more efficient than the control group after acquisition based on 
expenses to assets and cost to revenue ratios. Case D displays a better measure of 
expenses to total assets than the peer group. 
In terms of efficiency between the acquiring firm and the target firm, the acquiring 
firms were generally found to be more efficient. The motive for firms acquiring less 
efficient firms may be the belief that work force reduction in the acquired firm may 
reduce inefficiencies in the target firm. An important scale economy often involves 
the elimination of redundancies by having the employees of one firm assuming the 
responsibilities of the other, (Krishnan & Park, 2002). However, a measure of the 
employees in the acquired firm and acquiring firm was examined pre-merger and post- 
merger. It was found that there were no significant layoffs by the acquiring firm. In 
three of the cases it was found that the company increased in terms of employees. 
Interpreting the performance results of the mergers shows an increase in profit 
margins in three out of the four mergers. In the first two examples involving firms 
from the construction sector the profit margins have increased each year after the 
acquisition period. Comparing this increase to the performance of the construction 
sector (shown in Table 8.5) over the same period of time shows the profit margins are 
in line with the increase in the construction sector's average profit margins. 
Case 3 also displays a marked improvement each year in profits post-merger. During 
the same period the materials sector average profit margins indicates no remarkable 
signs of improvement. The performance results for the first three cases also show a 
significant increase in terms of return on assets and return on equity. In these three 
cases the merged firm out performs the peer group based on return of assets and return 
of equity. 
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Profit Margin Contracting & Housebuilding(%) Materials (%) Plant hire(%) 
2000 5.01 6.36 13.14 
1999 5.10 6.72 12.07 
1998 4.62 6.83 10.91 
1997 3.36 6.09 10.61 
1996 2.50 5.63 12.04 
Table 8.5 Average profit margins for the Construction sector 
Case D displays relatively poor performance results after merging. It does not show 
any signs of improvement in performance over the three years after merging. The first 
three cases examined have given cost efficiency as their motivation for merging while 
the last case defined their willingness to increase geographical and market presence as 
the original motive for acquisition. 
It would seem that the three mergers defining cost efficiency as a motive have to a 
certain extent achieved a decrease in cost. However, its unclear as to whether the 
mergers have created this decline due to the decrease of cost amongst non-merging 
companies in the same sectors. Case D, which defines geographical and market 
presence as its original motive, would seem to have sacrificed high short-term 
profitability for the long-term goal. 
8.5 Shareholder Performance during Merger and Acquisition 
8.5.1 Introduction 
This section examines the impact of merger announcements on acquiring firms and 
target firms stock performance in the UK construction industry. Abnormal share 
returns are examined throughout a period surrounding the announcement of both 
successful and unsuccessful acquisition and merger bids. 
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One of the primary motivations behind any strategic corporate decision is to maximise 
shareholder value. Sudarsanam (1995) states that all firm decisions including mergers 
and acquisitions are made with the objective of maximising the wealth of the 
company's shareholders. Whatever the motives of mergers and acquisitions the aim of 
this section is to examine their effect on the financial performance of the companies 
involved in the process. 
Most of the available literature to date on mergers and acquisitions comes from the 
scrutiny of the financial sectors in the US and UK. The UK construction industry has 
attracted little or no interest. However, a feature of the UK construction industry in 
recent times has been the increase in take-over activity. The present study examines 
the performance of UK construction companies involved in take-over bids in the 
period January 1996 to December 2001. 
This study investigates two basic issues; bidders performance during the acquisition 
period and the targets' performance during the process. These issues are important 
because the hypothesis that take-overs increase the wealth of bidder and target 
shareholders is based on the results of numerous studies that find returns to bidders to 
be small. 
It is well documented that target firms' shareholders earn significant abnormal returns 
around take-over announcements, (Ghosh & Lee, 2000). There is a considerable 
volume of literature of research on the wealth effects of corporate take-overs, (Draper 
& Paudyal, 1999). However the majority of these studies are not industry specific and 
are not always involved in related acquisitions as the companies analysed appear to be 
chosen randomly from a range of industries. The aim of this study is to assess from 
the UK construction perspective the financial effects on bidding and target firms 
during the take-over process. The final part reports the event study analysis and the 
results, including a summary and implications of the findings. 
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8.5.2 Research Background 
Numerous studies estimate the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the financial 
performance and stock prices of the firms involved in the process. Much of the 
literature to date, has come from the US with a special focus on the banking and 
finance sectors, Becher (2000), Houston et al (2001), Bliss & Rosen (2001). Ottone & 
Murgia (2000), explore shareholder wealth in European banking and find contrasting 
results to the US studies. Interest in the UK has expanded considerably over the past 
twenty years. 
There is a considerable volume of research on the wealth effects of take-overs and 
mergers in the UK. Draper & Paudyal (1999), Kennedy & Limmack (1996), 
Sudarsanarn et al (1996), Dickerson et al (1997), all explore the financial effects of 
take-over activity. The majority of studies undertaken estimate the effect of stock 
price changes around the announcement period of a merger as a measure of the 
economic effects of the take-over. 
The literature on the financial effects of mergers and acquisition has drawn on two 
principal sources of statistical evidence: stock market returns and accounting rates of 
return (Chattedee & Meeks, 1996). The traditional studies on domestic mergers and 
acquisitions in the UK indicate that large returns accrue to target company 
shareholders with little or no positive gains for the bidder company shareholders. 
Amongst others, Draper & Paudyal (1999) infer that the shareholders of the target 
companies benefit from the announcement of take-over bids over the period 
surrounding the announcement. 
In contrast, the shareholders of the bidding firm suffer a loss. However, the loss 
suffered is just under one percent. Kennedy and Limmack (1996), report large excess 
returns for target companies but no significant excess returns either positive or 
negative to the shareholders of the bidding firms. The results of studies undertaken in 
the US are similar to that of the UK. 
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Jensen and Ruback (1983) indicate significant positive gains for the target 
shareholders and that bidding firm shareholders simply do not lose. Their study 
involved a synthesis of previous studies undertaken in the US. They found that target 
firms displayed significant abnormal stock price changes of 20% in mergers and 30% 
in tender offers. 
Bidding firms realise gains of 4% in tender offers and zero in mergers. Chang (1998) 
reports that in stock offers, bidders experience a positive abnormal return for those 
acquiring a privately held target. In cash offers, bidders experience no abnormal 
returns. The companies chosen for the above studies were chosen randomly from a 
range of industries in the UK and US. To date, there have been no major studies 
examining the financial performance of mergers and acquisitions in the construction 
industry. 
8.5.3 Sample selection 
The data used in the analyses include stock price performance, announcement dates, 
acquisition sizes and market indices. All take-overs, where both the target and bidding 
firm were involved in the construction industry and listed on the London stock 
exchange during the sample period were taken as the population. 
The sample period comprises firms that were involved in the acquisition process 
during the 1996 to 2001 period. Companies that were included in the initial sample 
had to be quoted for a minimum period of two years before the announcement of the 
take-over bid. The initial sample consisted of III bidding firms and 97 target firms. 
Certain criteria were then used to screen the data. The criteria used was the value of 
the acquisition, news announcements during the take-over process and availability of 
data. 
The analysis is based on firms where the acquisition value was greater than ; ElO 
million so that the target would be of sufficient size that any performance effects 
would be reflected in the data. Also, larger transactions are more likely to draw 
analyst and press attention and are therefore more likely to have detailed disclosures 
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associated with them, (Houston et al, 2001). Another screening factor involved major 
news announcements regarding the firms in the three days surrounding the 
announcement date, (Chang, 1998). Due to the availability of data the final sample 
consisted of 46 bidding firms and 33 target firms. 
The required data was collected from the UK business park review, Construction 
News, the Financial Times and Acquisitions monthly. The share price data and market 
indices were obtained from the Datastrearn database, the FT prices CD Rom and 
HYDRA database, which includes financial information similar to Extel cards. The 
average value of the deals involved in the sample was just under El 00 million. 
8.5.4 Methodology 
Measuring merger performance has been the most onerous problem confronting 
researchers. Most of the literature on merger performance have used one of two 
standard financial measures: accounting based or market based. The first method of 
measurement considers the determinants of company performance using accounting 
data. Company performance is usually defined in terms of a profitability measure, as 
measured by return of assets or return on equity. However, it is believed that 
companies can use creative accounting techniques which may imply that their 
published accounts may not be a true and fair reflection of the company's financial 
position. 
Accounting measures are subject to potential bias and tend to reflect the short term 
performance of the firm over discrete time intervals, (Kennedy & Limmack, 1996). 
By contrast, market prices will reflect all available information on the basis of the 
efficient market hypothesis. Accounting measures cannot measure the performance 
benefits of target firms following the announcement period of the take-over. They can 
be used to measure the financial performance of the resulting entity in the succeeding 
years after acquisition. However, a number of the acquisitions involved in the study 
are related to construction companies who are pursuing an acquisition program, hence 
this creates problems in accounting for resultant acquisitions. 
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Brouthers et al (1998) suggest a new methodology for evaluating the success or failure 
of mergers. They believe that the performance should be measured against the goals 
and objectives set by management, not against financial results. However, these 
objectives may be distorted in some sectors, as very few managers will freely admit to 
managerial prestige or job security as the main motive for merging or acquiring. The 
second common method of performance measurement consists of evaluating share 
prices. A company's share price is a function of two components namely fundamental 
business performance and investor expectations (Stelter & Joiner, 2001). Share price 
would seem therefore to provide a more reliable indication of the financial 
performance of a company in the periods surrounding the take-over activity. Also, the 
use of market based performance measures allow the date information surrounding a 
pending take-over to be precisely identified. 
To measure abnormal stock market returns, a standard event study methodology is 
applied. The abnormal return for firm i at day t is defined as: 
ARit = Rit - E(Rit) (1) 
where Rit is the stocks realised return for day t and E(Rit) is its expected return in the 
absence of an acquisition. 
The event study period used in this analysis is a 41 working day event window. 
Abnormal returns are estimated over an observation period of Day -20 to Day 20 
around each initial announcement day. The twenty days before and after the 
announcement date are taken as working days which accounts for approximately 2 
months prior to and after the event day. Many event studies use a shorter window 
period. However, the take-over process in the UK suggests that bidders may start 
building up their stake well before the announcement of bids and hence a wider event 
window is more appropriate (Draper & Paudyal, 1999). Also, once a formal offer is 
made to the board of a target company, the offer must normally remain open for at 
least 14 days. Consequently, the takeover event period may last for several days 
before and for more than two weeks after the announcement date. 
197 
However, there is concern for using a longer event window in calculating bidder firm 
returns as there is less public rumination for a bidder getting ready to make a bid. The 
use of a longer event window to study the financial performance of the resulting entity 
may also be questionable due to the acquisition programs large construction firms 
embark on and the continuing consolidation in the UK construction industry. Excess 
returns are calculated using the following two procedures as adopted from Brown and 
Warner (1985), 
Ai, t Rit - T, 
where Rit is the observed arithmetic return for firm i at day t. k, is defined as: 
-21 
Ri Rij 
220-240 
where k, is the simple average of security i daily returns in the estimation period. 
The estimation period in the analysis starts at day -240 and ends at day -21 around its 
respective announcement day, which is defined as day 0. 
The second procedure used is the market adjusted return: 
Ai, t Rit - Rrnt 
where Rmt is the market return measured as the first difference of the log of the market 
index (Draper & Paudyal, 1999). 
The market index was taken for each firms' respective construction sector from 
Datastream's sector index. This second procedure allows for a comparison of the 
observed returns of the acquiring or acquiree firms to that of UK construction firms in 
general during the period of announcement. This market index provides a yardstick in 
which construction firms from different markets can measure their performance. 
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Cumulative abnormal returns were also calculated using a simple process of summing 
the abnormal returns over different time series studies (Becher, 2000). 
8.5.5 Performance of Mergers- Results 
This section shows the results from the analysis of the returns available to the 
shareholders of target and bidding firms. In the event study the standard market model 
and the mean adjusted return model, as defined in Brown and Warner (1985), was 
used to calculate the abnormal returns. Brown and Warner (1985) also found that the 
non-normality of daily returns has no obvious impact on event study methodologies. 
Although, daily excess returns are also non-normal the evidence suggests that the 
mean excess return in a cross section of securities converges to normality as the 
sample increases. For sample sizes of approximately 50 the mean excess return is 
close to normal. The average share prices for the companies sampled are also listed in 
the following tables as an indication of the activity surrounding the take-over. Due to 
the similar size of the target firms used in the sample the share price value is also 
similar. The announcement day (day 0) is the day of the first announcement of the 
acquisition. Results of analysis of the reaction of the share price to the announcement 
is shown in the following two parts. 
(1) Target Firms 
The average abnormal returns measured for the event study window are shown in 
Table 8.6. Both raw return and market adjusted returns are calculated. Also shown in 
the table are the mean returns for the companies analysed. Consistent with the 
literature reviewed in this paper, the results provide evidence of excess returns to 
construction companies before and around the period of announcement. Looking 
firstly at the average share price, there is a considerable rise in share prices around the 
period of announcement. This is also reflected in the models that are used to calculate 
the abnormal returns. Examining the mean adjusted model, it displays no significant 
increases or decreases in the twenty to five days pre-announcement. 
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However, the days leading to the announcement and after indicate a noticeable 
increase in returns. The largest one day excess return available to shareholders of 
target companies occurs on the day of announcement, with a value of 8.6 percent for 
the mean adjusted model and 9.3% for the market model. The average abnormal 
returns from the mean model greatly reflect the average share price. The use of the 
market model allows comparison of the target firms share price with that of their 
competitors in the sector. The table reveals similar findings for the market model to 
that of the mean adjusted model. The abnormal returns to shareholder post- 
announcement date are minimal in all three columns. 
Days Relative to the 
announcement date. 
Mean share 
price 
Mean adjusted 
Abnormal Returns 
Market Adjusted 
abnormal Returns 
-20 114.7 0.18 0.01 
-15 115.5 0.57 0.46 
-10 113.9 0.30 0.06 
-5 117.9 1.52 0.94 
-4 118.8 0.75 0.24 
-3 119.3 0.40 0.56 
-2 120.5 1.05 1.44 
-1 129.6 7.00 6.77 
0 141.7 8.61 9.30 
1 142.0 0.16 0.80 
2 142.1 -0.03 0.24 
3 142.0 0.35 -0.09 
4 142.5 -0.08 0.26 
5 142.4 -0.18 0.34 
10 142.0 -0.15 0.18 
15 142.8 -0.07 0.34 
20 142.4 -0.11 -0.31 
Table 8.6 Returns from Target firms during the Event period. 
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(2) Bidder Firms 
The average abnormal returns for bidder firms measured for the event study window 
are shown in Table 8.7. Also shown in the table are the mean returns for the 
companies analysed. The average share prices of bidding firms display no real 
variation over the event study period. The stock data show no real positive or negative 
changes in the firms prices. The mean adjusted model displays negative results during 
the four days before the announcement date. 
Days Relative to the Mean share Mean adjusted Market Adjusted 
announcement date. price Abnormal Returns abnormal Returns 
-20 301.10 -1.47 -2.24 
-15 298.90 0.59 0.09 
-10 300.92 2.30 1.63 
-5 301.87 1.42 0.26 
-4 301.20 -0.68 -0.32 
-3 301.10 -0.12 -0.55 
-2 300.97 -0.11 0.25 
-1 299.60 -1.37 -0.29 
0 300.57 0.97 1.45 
1 300.94 0.37 0.68 
2 300.60 -0.34 0.85 
3 300.90 0.29 0.68 
4 301.00 0.12 -0.14 
5 302.40 1.37 0.65 
10 305.10 0.50 -0.33 
15 302.25 -0.81 -0.53 
20 309.27 0.48 0.27 
Table 8.7 Returns from Bidder firms during the Event period. 
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The section covered in the pre-press date for the mean model consisted of the average 
between -240 days until day -21 before the press date. The shares of the bidding firm 
do not display any significant excess returns around the announcement period. The 
figure on the day of announcement reveals a slight increase in the returns of the 
shareholders of bidding firms. In contrast to the experience of target companies the 
excess return is very small, +0.97 percent. 
Market adjusted returns also display similar results to that of the mean adjusted 
results. The market model would seem more appropriate for estimation of returns to 
bidders firms than to target firms. The size of the acquiring firm is usually greater than 
that of the acquiree. Therefore, the bidding firm would be more prone to market 
fluctuations. The results show no real signs of variation, especially within the 
announcement date. 
The figure on the day of announcement reveals a slight increase in the returns of the 
shareholders of bidding firms. The figure is slightly higher than the mean adjusted 
model. The four days succeeding the event date show positive abnormal returns for 
the bidding firms. However, these abnormal returns are small compared to those of the 
target firms. The results provide evidence that bidding firms do not appear to gain 
significant returns nor do they lose. 
8.5.6 Discussion of Results 
The volume of literature examined to date, suggests that shareholders of the target 
companies gained from the acquisition process while the bidding firms show no signs 
of improvement. The results of the studies on construction companies in this paper 
seem to concur with previous studies. The returns for target firms increase noticeably 
three to four days before the announcement of a bid. 
All the targets studied for the event period report a significant increase in their trading 
volume and their share price prior to the announcement of a take-over bid. These rises 
could be due to a number of reasons and leakage of information is a possibility. 
Draper and Paudyol, (1999) give three possible explanations for the pre- 
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announcement increase in the price of target firms: market anticipation, stake building 
by a potential bidder, or insider dealings. 
In the case of insider dealing, there are various regulatory constraints and market 
surveillance which suggest on average large increases in the volume of trade would be 
detected. However, market anticipation and stake building are both legal and normal 
practices. Market anticipation implies that the market is efficient in identifying and 
anticipating potential acquisitions. Stake building may also be expected to generate an 
increase in returns for target firms as bidding firms seek to acquire the maximum 
holdings permitted before a full scale bid must be launched. In the UK, investors 
buying or holding over 3 percent of the company's capital or over 15 percent of the 
total voting rights are required to disclose their interest in the company. Stake building 
activities by a potential bidder cannot legally go undetected prior to a bid 
announcement (Draper & Paudyol, 1999). 
As expected, the biggest increase on returns for target shareholders occurs on the day 
of announcement of the bid. After the announcement, the returns stabilise with no 
significant changes, positive or negative, in the 20 days after. The results for the 
bidding firms show a slight positive increase around the time of announcement, this is 
contrary to earlier results in different sectors. Becher's (2000) study on bank mergers 
found a negative effect on bidder firms returns. Berkovitch and Narayan (1993) report 
a significant loss in the share price of bidding firms. Both models used in the analysis 
display similar abnormal returns. 
Previous studies have shown that bidders tend to be larger companies than their 
targets (Krishnan and Park, 2002), (Kennedy & Limmack, 1996), (Haspeslagh and 
Jernison, 1991). The use of a market index as a representative control for bidders may 
seem less appropriate than was the case for targets. As is the case in the UK 
construction industry there are few very large companies in each sector. Any changes, 
positive or negative, on the stock price of these large companies could have a similar 
effect on the market the company operates in. However, comparison of the results for 
bidding firms using the two models show that in general the results are very similar. In 
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Table 8.8, cumulative abnormal returns are provided over four different event 
windows 
The cumulative abnormal returns for the target firm confirm that targets do gain from 
take-over activity. From Table 8.8 the majority of this gain is achieved in the five days 
before and after the announcement date. However, the cumulative abnormal returns 
for the bidder firms show a gain in returns over the 40 day period. 
Days Acquiringfirm Targetfirm 
Mean return Market return Mean return Market return 
-20-+20 8.19 6.17 20.9 23.3 
-15-+15 6.38 6.90 21.1 22.6 
-10-+10 3.92 3.60 21.7 22.8 
-5-+5 1.92 2.50 19.7 20.1 
Table 8.8 Target and Bidder firm cumulative abnormal returns by time period 
The returns for bidder firms around the period of announcement are not significantly 
effected. It is the longer period surrounding the announcement that seem to give the 
greater returns. A possible explanation for this movement, could be to the realisation 
of the expected benefits which might only appear as the details of the merger are 
released over time. 
8.6 Conclusions 
Over the last five to six years acquisitions and mergers of UK construction companies 
particularly in the materials sector, rose to new heights. Mergers and acquisitions is 
understandably one of the topical strategies of corporate management in construction 
as firms pursue growth. Nonetheless research in this area especially in the 
construction industry is limited. There is a limited body of knowledge about the 
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functioning and perfon-nance of this important strategic corporate process. Established 
boundaries are breaking down, and advancing technology and mergers is extending 
companies' ability to realise greater efficiencies and scale. 
It would seem that from the analysis that scale can now be achieved not only by large 
competitors but also by midsize and even smaller players with the aid of increasing 
revenue and acquisitions. In fact, the very large competitors reaching a certain size 
begin to experience slight diseconornies of scale. The reasons for these diseconornies 
could be due to the difficulties of organising effectively an increasingly large and 
possibly increasingly diversified business. 
The findings from the contracting and materials analysis suggests that increasing 
company size, either by merger or acquisition can lead to scale economies. However, 
the evidence suggests that beyond a certain size the cost benefits appear to become 
exhausted. This is particularly so for the previous three years in the construction sector 
and the materials sector. A firm can therefore take advantage of economies of scale up 
to a certain level of output, but if it continues to expand beyond that level with the 
same number of employees, same size of offices and the same equipment then 
diseconornies of scale will be incurred. 
Large companies have to re-examine scale to ensure that they are employing it to their 
company's greater advantage. The plant hire sector suggests that there are certain cost 
benefits for large companies, the results are stable from year to year. The goal for 
building scale economies no matter what industry, remains the same as ever to achieve 
lower unit costs for a given level of capacity by capitalising on the size of operation. 
Focusing on the efficiency of individual mergers revealed that significant 
improvements in efficiency and performance were achieved in three out of the four 
case studies. It should be noted that the mergers were chosen on the basis of their 
stated commitment to efficiency gains. In all cases the acquirer was more efficient 
than the target (by at least two efficiency measures). In general the more efficient 
firms were acquiring less efficient firms in the hope of realising efficiencies. 
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Three companies also yielded improvements in performance in terms of profitability. 
The fourth merger however yielded no improvements in efficiency or profitability. It 
would seem that the fourth company's belief that in acquiring a less efficient company 
it could weed out the inefficiencies which would lead to greater cost benefits for the 
company which appear not to have materialised. 
Based on the four case studies it does not appear possible to specify with any 
generality which factor or factors are most likely to result in efficiency gains. 
However a strong commitment to cutting costs and a relatively efficient acquirer 
should enhance efficiency. Some companies underestimate the complexity of 
integrating two companies, which can be a complex process. Therefore the key 
objective to a favourable effect on efficiency during integration is to have a strong 
commitment to cost cutting and maintain profitability and the stability of the business. 
The study on shareholder performance also attempts to contribute to the debate and 
analyse the financial performance of the bidder and target companies in the UK 
construction industry. The results are consistent with the results documented in studies 
of other markets and industrial sectors. 
The results indicate that in construction, take-overs generate significant positive gains 
for the target firm shareholders. However, the marketplace appears to generally 
question the gains from mergers for the bidding firm as reflected in the effect of a 
merger announcement on acquirers stock price. The market tends to be pessimistic 
about the managerial capacities of bidding firms. Over a 10-day event window period 
(-5 day to +5 day) surrounding the announcement the cumulative abnormal returns for 
target shareholders increased significantly and bidding firms did not change 
significantly. However, over larger event windows the results show that there is a 
small value added to shareholders of the bidding firm. These increases could be due to 
additional information surrounding the merger being announced. 
However, the announcement of an acquisition program is an area of controversy 
surrounding the measurement of bidding firms returns. If such a program is 
announced then the expected benefits of a bidder's acquisition program would be 
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incorporated into the share price when it is announced. The gain to bidding firms 
would then be measured by the initial value change at the announcement of the 
acquisition program and the incremental effect of each acquisition. Of the bidding 
finns, 17 construction firms were involved in an overall acquisition program. 
Overall the wealth effects from construction mergers are positive over the period 
studied. However, many controversial issues surrounding the market for corporate 
control have yet to be settled and many new issues have yet to be studied. These 
issues include the use of golden parachutes (compensation or contractual employment 
in the event of control changes), managerial actions to oppose take-overs, and the 
management of bidding firms over pricing the take-over bid. Management in target 
firms may attempt to lengthen the time of the merger process to possibly seek out new 
bidders that offer better opportunities for themselves and their shareholders. Also, 
detailed knowledge of the corporate control market should provide insights into 
divestitures and the role of joint ventures in the construction industry, why joint 
ventures are used in some cases and not in others? 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has developed original work previously used in research in other 
industries and applied and developed it to important issues that construction firms 
must address to compete and survive in national and international markets. 
A number of conclusions have been reached and stated at various stages in this work. 
This chapter presents the specific principal conclusions arising from each strand of 
research examined. 
This chapter also provides recommendations for future research in the field of 
corporate performance, particularly in the area of failure prediction and the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
9.2 Corporate Financial performance 
The use of accounting information for management purposes is now firmly 
established and this thesis takes account of this valuable accounting information to 
examine and assess certain areas of corporate strategy. The principal conclusions 
relating to the measurement of the corporate performance in the construction industry 
are these: 
1. The UK construction industry is one of the largest industries in the economy. It is 
characterised by high failure rates, intense competition and low profit levels. In 
the early 1990's the construction industry was affected by a severe economic 
recession. However, over the past eight years the industry has seen investment 
and output steadily increase. The ma or firms in the construction industry have j 
also seen turnover increase significantly. 
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2. The profit levels for the UK construction industry has consistently provided very 
low levels of profitability compared with other industries. 
3. The profit margins of the contracting and housebuilding sector was found to be 
4% compared to 5-6% for the construction materials sector and that for 
construction plant hire averaged around I I%. 
4. It was also found that the larger the contractor in terms of turnover the greater the 
stability and the higher the profitability. 
5. The UK construction industry has the highest failure rate in the economy. 
However, the number of company failures have been decreasing over the past ten 
years, due to the upturn in the economy. 
6. Profitability measures were found to be a useful indicator for assessing a 
company's risk of failure. There was a significant difference between the 
profitability of failed construction groups and solvent construction groups. The 
levels of profitability in the failed group were shown to dramatically decrease in 
the five years before failure. Profitability is shown to have a positive impact on a 
company's survival. 
7. Failed construction companies were found to be very highly geared with large 
amounts of borrowing. There were significant differences between the gearing of 
the failed and solvent construction group. 
8. The liquidity of the groups shows inconclusive results. Two of the liquidity ratios 
used in previous failure prediction models display no significant differences 
between the failed construction group and the non-failed group. The working 
capital ratio shows significant differences between the groups. There were no 
significant differences found in the efficiency characteristics of the two groups. 
9. Testing previously developed failure prediction models, it was found that Taffler's 
model displayed the most promising results for predicting the risk of failure of a 
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firm in the UK construction industry. The Mason and Harris model based on the 
construction industry did not predict failure to any great accuracy. 
10. Because of the diverse nature of the construction industry, it would be necessary 
to develop predictive models for each sector within the industry. However, 
although these models aid the examination of performance they are not totally 
accurate in the prediction of construction insolvency. 
11. Z scores alone cannot accurately predict failure. A combination of traditional 
financial ratios and Z-scores indicate the potential of possible failure. However, 
there are companies that would be misclassified. Accurate prediction of corporate 
financial failure would appear to be impossible since this depends partly on poor 
historical financial information and partly on external environmental factors. 
12. The leading nations' construction industries are characterised by intense 
competition and high fragmentation. The sectors consist of a few major global 
construction firms and large numbers of small to medium firms. 
13. Both the Japanese and German construction markets are currently suffering from 
a recession with a decrease in public and private spending. The demand for 
construction in France, Italy and the US has increased in the past four to five 
years. However, last year has seen a decrease in global construction spending due 
to the downturn in the global economy. 
14. The profitability of the major global contractors have average operating margins 
between three to six percent. The UK, US and Italian contractors display the 
highest measures of profitability performance. Construction firms from Germany 
and Japan displayed the poorest profitability performance over the periods 
examined. 
15. Construction firms from France and Japan are very heavily geared, with Japanese 
finns reporting high levels of debt. 
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16. The corporate financial performance varies depending on the extent of a firm's 
international market diversification. There is a high negative correlation between 
profit performance and internationalisation for German and US contractors. 
17. The influences of accounting methods varies from each country. However certain 
factors may counterbalance each other. Due to the increase in globalisation there 
has been an increase in the harmonisation of accounting standards. 
9.3 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Investigating the benefits and effects of mergers and acquisitions is one of the busiest 
areas in contemporary financial research. However, research into the performance 
measurement of mergers and acquisitions involving the construction industry has this 
far been limited. Over the last five to six years this type of corporate activity has 
increased dramatically as the different sectors look towards consolidation. 
There are two main ways of attempting to assess the economic impact of mergers and 
acquisitions. The first is based on examining the key accounting and financial 
characteristics of both acquiring and acquired firms before the take-over to study 
whether they are more or less profitable and whether it improves after the merger 
process. The second is based on examining the impact of the take-over on the share 
prices of both acquired and acquiring firms. This process assesses the extent to which 
expected benefits from mergers are impounded in share prices and how these are 
shared between the two sets of shareholders. The principal conclusions relating to 
mergers and acquisitions in the construction industry are these: 
1. The results showed that increasing company size in the contracting and materials 
sectors can lead to scale economies. However, for an increase in company size 
beyond a certain level (E500 million) appear to exhaust the benefits. 
2. By increasing company size in the plant hire sector the results suggest that there 
are cost benefits for the larger competitors. 
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3. The acquiring firm tended to be more efficient than the acquiree, thus concurring 
to the motive that firms are acquired due to managerial inefficiency. 
4. The key objective to a favourable effect on efficiency during integration is to have 
a strong commitment to cost cutting and maintain profitability and the stability of 
the business. 
5. The results support earlier conclusions that indicate significant gains for the 
shareholders of the target firm during the merger process. In contrast, the bidding 
firm displayed little or no positive gains from the merger or acquisition. Overall, 
the wealth effects from the period studied are positive for mergers of construction 
firms. 
6. The majority of the gains to target firms are achieved the five days before and the 
five days after the announcement of the merger. There is slight positive gains for 
bidding firms over a longer period surrounding the announcement of the merger. 
7. The poor response by the market to announcements of acquisitions by bidding 
firms seems to indicate that the market is not very optimistic and questions the 
potential gains from mergers in construction. 
All construction firms are faced with the need to manage strategies, some developing 
from a position of strength some needing to avoid failure. In general, with the 
increase in global competition and global opportunities in the construction sector 
there is a greater emphasis on the need for UK firms to adopt competitive strategies to 
cope with an ever changing environment. The search for an appropriate competitive 
strategy involves examining the company's capabilities and distinctiveness and the 
potential within the market for corporate growth and profitability. The work in this 
thesis has examined the corporate financial performance of UK construction 
companies and assessed and compared the nature of competition and profitability in a 
range of international construction markets. It also set out to examine the motives of 
mergers and acquisitions and has done so by analysing the financial performance of 
UK construction firms that have been involved in this strategic alternative. 
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9.4 Recommendations for Further work 
In this research, several areas have emerged which need further investigation: 
1. While exploring the data on failed UK construction companies, a certain trend 
became apparent. Most of the companies experiencing insolvency were of a 
certain age, usually between five and ten years old. Further research should 
examine the probability of failure depending on the age of the company. It should 
look closely at age-dependent business failure concept in the UK construction 
industry. Previous research in the US has found that the risk of failure increases 
initially with increasing age, reaches a peak point and then decreases thereafter. 
2. The construction sector in this research is taken to refer to the contracting and 
house building sector. Future work which includes a separation of direct 
contractors and housebuilders could lead to more informed choices of strategic 
alternatives as far as these two areas are concerned. 
3. Globalisation and the opening of world markets have stimulated construction 
companies to expand their business abroad. The mature markets of Europe, Japan 
and the US, although still very large markets, will be growing much more slowly 
over the following decades. There are new emerging markets with major 
construction potential. Therefore future research could include an evaluation of 
the relative attractiveness and viability into a number of developing countries. 
4. Although this research attempts to examine the impact of intemationalisation on 
the corporate performance of a construction firm, future research could examine 
the impact of global diversification strategy on corporate performance. This 
research would examine the impact of diversification and internationalisation. 
5. The analysis of international operations of a company could be at the top of the 
list for acquiring construction firms as they search for targets. Therefore, using 
financial information related to international or foreign sales in merger studies 
may be more important than domestic information. 
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6. With the increase in internationalisation and globalisation, the use of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions are becoming more common. The effects and potential 
financial gains of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in construction should be 
examined. 
7. The development of prediction models to analyse mergers and acquisitions in the 
UK construction activity. This would involve identifying whether the financial 
characteristics of take-over targets provide a useful criterion for identifying those 
construction firms with a high probability of being acquired. This examination 
may also bring about a recognition of the motives of take-over activity. 
8. Future research could look at those finns which were subject to an acquisition but 
where the acquisition was subsequently abandoned. In particular, the work could 
look at the financial profile of those firms and reasons for acquiring and 
comparing with companies that were acquired to discover the reason for the 
collapse of the take-over. 
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APPENDIX A: DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS 
Appendix A. l: Distribution of Profit Margins for Section 4.5 
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Appendix A. 2 Goodness of Fit tests for the probability distribution of 
Construction profits 
2001 1 Chi-Square Test Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test Value 7.600 0.1732 
Critical Value @ 0.15 6.745 0.1502 
Critical Value @ 0.10 7.779 0.1587 
Critical Value @ 0.05 9.487 0.1734 
Critical Value @ 0.025 11.14 0.1928 
Critical Value @ 0.010 13.27 0.2006 
Table A. 1 Goodness of fit tests for materials profit margins in 2001 for 
section 4.5.2 
2000 1 Chi-Square Test Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test Value 3.200 0.1343 
Critical Value @ 0.15 6.745 0.1502 
Critical Value @ 0.10 7.779 0.1587 
Critical Value @ 0.05 9.487 0.1734 
Critical Value @ 0.025 11.14 0.1928 
Critical Value @ 0.010 13.27 0.2006 
Table A. 2 Goodness of fit tests for materials profit margins in 2000 for 
section 4.5.2 
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1999 Chi-Square Test Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test Value 6.400 0.1784 
Critical Value @ 0.15 6.745 0.1502 
Critical Value @ 0.10 7.779 0.1587 
Critical Value @ 0.05 9.487 0.1734 
Critical Value @ 0.025 11.14 0.1928 
Critical Value @ 0.0 10 13.27 0.2006 
Table A. 3 Goodness of fit tests for Materials profit margins in 1999 for 
section 4.5.2 
1998 Chi-Square Test Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test Value 7.200 0.1689 
Critical Value @ 0.15 6.745 0.1502 
Critical Value @ 0.10 7.779 0.1587 
Critical Value @ 0.05 9.487 0.1734 
Critical Value @ 0.025 11.14 0.1928 
Critical Value @ 0.0 10 13.27 0.2006 
Table A. 4 Goodness of fit tests for Mate rials profit margins in 1998 for 
section 4. 5.2 
1997 Chi-Square Test Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test Value 6.480 0.1694 
Critical Value @ 0.15 6.745 0.1502 
Critical Value @ 0.10 7.779 0.1587 
Critical Value @ 0.05 9.487 0.1734 
Critical Value @ 0.025 11.14 0.1928 
Critical Value @ 0.010 13.27 0.2006 
Table A. 5 Goodness of fit tests for Materials profit margins in 1997 for 
section 4.5.2 
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1996 1 Chi-Square Test Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test Value 10.25 0.1918 
Critical Value @ 0.15 6.745 0.1502 
Critical Value @ 0.10 7.779 0.1587 
Critical Value @ 0.05 9.487 0.1734 
Critical Value @ 0.025 11.14 0.1928 
Critical Value @ 0.0 10 13.27 0.2006 
Table A. 6 Goodness of fit tests for Materials profit margins in 1996 for 
section 4.5.2 
Construction 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Test Value 0.093 0.1023 0.1542 0.1785 0.185 0.179 
Critical Value @ 0.05 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 
Critical Value @ 0.025 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 
Critical Value @ 0.010 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.163 
Table A. 7 Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the distribution of 
Construction profits for section 4.5.2. 
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APPENDIX B 
RESULTS OF FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Appendix B. 1 List of failed Group and Non Failed group for section 5.4 
Company Date of last Reasons for conclusion as 
Published Failed 
Accounts 
Alandale Construction 18-04-02 Liquidation 
Barrett Construction 30-04-97 Dissolved 
BB & EA 30-09-00 Receivership 
Bennet Bros (Contractors) 31-03-99 Liquidation 
Bewes Construction 14-06-02 Liquidation 
Broadband Services International 31-12-00 Receivership 
Carkeek 30-06-00 Liquidation 
Charnleigh. 31-12-99 Liquidation 
Christiani & Nielsen 31-12-98 Liquidation 
Cliffe Construction 31-12-97 Liquidation 
Cox Bros 30-06-00 Liquidation 
D. J Construction 31-03-00 Receivership 
DMD Holdings 30-09-98 Receivership 
Eade Pipelines 31-12-97 Liquidation 
Fearnley Construction 30-09-98 Liquidation 
Featherstone, Builders 14-01-02 Liquidation 
Fisher & Townsend (Builders) ltd 31-08-97 Liquidation 
G. F Sharp 30-06-01 Receivership 
Gleave Construction 30-04-97 Dissolved 
Great Oak 31-10-96 Dissolved 
Griffin Construction 30-06-97 Liquidation 
Henry Brook & co 21-08-02 Liquidation 
Holmes Building 30-11-00 Receivership 
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Company Date of last 
Published 
Accounts 
Reasons for conclusion as 
Failed 
Horrocks 31-10-99 Receivership 
J. E Churchill Construction 28-02-02 Liquidation 
James Longley 31-12-98 Liquidation 
Ledwood Construction 30-06-99 Liquidation 
Lowther Construction 31-12-98 Liquidation 
Mcdonald Engineering 31-12-99 Receivership 
Mcloughlin 31-12-99 Receivership 
Nationwide site services 31-01-01 Liquidation 
North Timbers 31-12-97 Receivership 
Pagehurst 31-03-98 Receivership 
PDC Construction 31-05-97 Dissolved 
Regency International 28-02-97 Liquidation 
Ruddy Construction 31-12-97 Liquidation 
S&J Chatteris 31-12-99 Receivership 
Scholes windows 30-06-00 Receivership 
Star construction 30-04-97 Liquidation 
Swallow Construction 31-12-01 Liquidation 
Swift Structures 31-03-98 Liquidation 
Telling (UK) Limited 31-03-00 Receivership 
Warwick Construction 31-03-00 Liquidation 
(Thos) Weatherald Construction 31-03-98 Liquidation 
Zealley Ltd 31-12-00 Receivership 
TableB. 1 Companies in the 'Failed Group' from Example 5.4 
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Company Company 
AB Hamilton Ltd 
BDLPLC 
Ben Bailey PLC 
Barnwood Construction Limited 
Bethell Construction Limited 
Brett Construction 
Byrne Bros (Formwork) Limited 
Chartdale Homes Ltd 
Climate Services Ltd 
(WT) Cuffe builders Ltd 
Gee Group Ltd 
Gleeson MCL Ltd 
HBS Ltd 
Harper Group construction Ltd 
S. Harrison Group Ltd 
Jelson Ltd 
(Thos) Johnstone Ltd 
Jones Bros Ruthin Co Limited 
Loach Construction & Development Ltd 
(Michael) Lonsdale Ltd 
Linford Group Ltd 
Martin Grant Homes Ltd 
Mcnicholas Construction Company Ltd 
HM Plant Limited 
Millwood Homes (Devon) Co. 
(Thos) Mitchell Homes Ltd 
Muir Homes Ltd 
Noble Denton Holdings Limited 
PrinceBuild Ltd 
R&S PLC 
Ringway Roadmarking Ltd 
Rowlinson Construction 
(F. G) Skerrit Ltd 
T. J Evers Ltd 
Thomas Armstrong (Construction) Ltd 
Thurston Group Ltd 
Wedge Group PLC 
Wescol Ltd 
Wessex Construction & Plant Hire Co. 
Castleoak Construction Ltd 
Sykes & Son Ltd 
PJ Carey (Contractors) 
Ogilvie Construction Limited 
Banner Homes Group Plc 
Bernard Brogan Limited 
Table B. 2 Companies in the 'Non-Failed Group' for Example 5.4. 
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Appendix B. 2 Analysis of Variance Testing for Section 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F-Palue P-Palue F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 184.26 1 184.26 0.470 0.493 3.871 
Groups 
Between 633.98 4 158.49 0.404 0.805 2.399 
Years 
Table B. 3 Analysis of variance of Debtors Turnover ratios for Example 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value P-Value F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 52.215 1 17153 0.066 0.796 3.872 
Groups 
Between 1355.5 4 80.966 0.432 0.785 2.399 
Years 
Table BA Analysis of variance of Debtor Days ratios for Example 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F-Value P-Malue F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 17153 1 17153.3 56.107 4.85E-13 3.866 
Groups 
Between 323.83 4 80.962 0.264 0.900 2.395 
Years 
Table B. 5 Analysis of variance of Working capital/Total Assets ratios for 
Example 5.5 
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Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value F-Value P* 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 
Groups 
Between 
Years 
0.486 1 0.486 2.676 0.103 3.865 
0.119 4 0.030 0.164 0.956 2.395 
Table B. 6 Analysis of variance of Debtors Liquidity ratios for Example 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value P-Palue F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 11.176 1 11.175 35.41 5.85E-09 3.865 
Groups 
Between 0.402 4 0.100 0.312 0.866 2.394 
Years 
Table B. 7 Analysis of variance of Current ratios for Example 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value P-Palue F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 86861.7 1 86861.8 18.89 1.8E-05 3.867 
Groups 
Between 23054.4 4 5763.61 1.253 0.288 2.396 
Years 
Table B. 8 Analysis of variance of Return on Capital Employed ratios for 
Example 5.5 
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Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value P-Malue F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 1747.37 1 1747.38 63.908 1.79E-14 3.867 
Groups 
Between 24.180 4 6.045 0.221 0.926 2.396 
Years 
Table B. 9 Analysis of variance of Profit margin ratios for Example 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F-Value P-Malue F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 9.736 1 9.736 8.165 0.0045 3.867 
Groups 
Between 0.729 4 0.182 0.153 0.9620 2.396 
Years 
Table B. 10 Analysis of variance of Sales/Total Assets ratios for Example 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F-Value P-Palue F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 837773 1 837773 30.22 7.7313-08 3.869 
Groups 
Between 107199 4 26799.7 0.967 0.426 2.399 
Years 
Table B. 11 Analysis of variance of Gearing ratios for Example 5.5 
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Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value P-VaIue P 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 1616.1 1 1616.1 8.481 0.004 3.867 
Groups 
Between 207.05 4 51.76 0.271 0.896 2.397 
Years 
Table B. 12 Analysis of variance of Sales/Net Assets ratios for Example 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value P-Value F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Cril 
Between 134534.3 1 134534 30.201 8.33E-08 3.873 
Groups 
Between 10302.7 4 2575.69 0.578 0.678 2.402 
Years 
Table B. 13 Analysis of variance of Debt/Equity ratios for Example 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F-Value P-Malue F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 15565.9 1 15565.9 8.049 0.005 3.871 
Groups 
Between 512.967 4 128.242 0.066 0.992 2.400 
Years 
Table B. 14 Analysis of variance of Interest cover ratios for Example 5.5 
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Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value P-Value P, 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 
Groups 
Between 
Years 
8012.2 1 8012.2 60.777 6.2E-14 3.866 
35.474 4 8.8691 0.0673 0.992 2.395 
Table B. 15 Analysis of variance of Return on Assets ratios for Example 5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value F-Value F 
Variance Squares Freedom Square Crit 
Between 
GrouPs 
Between 
Years 
25339.8 1 25339.8 55.97 5.16E-13 3.866 
463.710 4 115.93 0.256 0.906 2.395 
Table B. 16 Analysis of variance of Profit/Current liabilities ratios for Example 
5.5 
Source of Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Value P-Malue F 
Variance Squares Freedoni Square Crit 
Between 25116.9 1 25116.9 64.91 1.0213-14 3.866 
Groups 
Between 504.63 4 126.16 0.326 0.862 2.395 
Years 
Table B. 17 Analysis of variance of solvency ratios for Example 5.5 
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Appendix B. 3 Financial performance of companies for Section 5.8 (All the 
figures are taken from the annual reports of each company) 
Case 1. Company 
9 all figures are in thousand DM 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sales 10583588 11274667 11406258 13039931 9687571 
Working capital 1421907 292397 169553 475654 908037 
Total Assets 10544569 11944321 12554232 10440133 8977965 
Retained earnings 309967 1038 15 0 0 
Pbit 277270 -383280 130471 -603029 104295 
Shareholders funds 2140956 1645458 1581118 733243 1033572 
Total Liabilities 8396065 10298863 10973114 9706890 7944393 
Pbt 276782 -385078 25262 -686469 240 
Cost of Materials 6861370 7526826 8140361 8319317 6759672 
Expenses 4008733 4616775 4526266 5015603 3551022 
Liquid assets 1608624 1144971 2373127 1383017 991573 
Depreciation 367919 378681 467686 581776 213481 
Current assets 8028907 8737798 9182748 8131984 6746851 
Current Liabilities 6607000 8445000 9014000 7656000 5838000 
Net Assets 2148504 1645458 1581118 733243 1033572 
Debtors 3787906 4025149 3602762 3857530 3452146 
Creditors 1432764 1603418 2035087 2070888 1423578 
Capital Employed 2148504 1645458 1581118 733243 1033572 
Table B. 18 Figures from Profit and loss account and balance sheet of 
company A for Example 5.8 
Pbit = Profit before tax and interest. 
" Pbt = Profit before tax. 
" Capital employed = Opening Capital employed. 
" Net Assets = Opening net assets. 
" Creditors = Trade Creditors. 
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Case 2. Compariv B 
o all figures are in Em 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sales 1143.1 974.2 842.4 744.5 571.4 381.9 
Working capital 126.1 64.6 -39.2 5.9 55.3 34.6 
Total Assets 772.8 668.3 475.1 381.3 288.1 218.9 
Retained earnings -45.3 -193 -62.4 -121.8 -133.9 -134.5 
Pbit 90.8 -169.1 -131.2 -53 -5.9 -2 
Shareholders fund 99.3 101.7 -30.8 -16 19.7 18.9 
Total Liabilities 544.9 566.6 505.9 397.3 268.4 200 
Pbt 67.1 -180.4 -142.6 -62.3 -7.4 0.5 
Liquid Assets 91.5 63 58.7 46.4 74.6 47.1 
Cost of sales 1084.8 1105.3 843.6 752.9 551.6 362 
Expenses 32.9 32.4 33.3 31.4 25.8 21.8 
Depreciation 43.3 38.3 36.7 15.8 4 1.9 
Net Assets 227.9 101.7 -30.8 -16 19.7 18.9 
Debtors 306 295.6 257.6 218.5 199.7 158.7 
Creditors 163.3 112.5 94.2 78.8 47.2 
Capital Employed 227.9 101.7 -30.8 -16 19.7 18.9 
Current assets 443.4 401.3 351 281.9 277.3 207.5 
Current Liabilities 317.3 336.7 390.2 276 222 172.9 
Table B. 19 Figures from Profit and loss account and balance sheet of 
company B for Example 5.8 
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Case 3. Company C 
(figures in Em) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Sales 1962.4 2451.3 2768.5 2774.3 2721.9 2427.5 
Working capital 276.5 228.3 172.6 189.8 235.6 243.8 
Total Assets 1062.2 1220.7 1171.8 1187.7 1337.6 1258.8 
Retained earnings 15.2 12.5 12.5 -8.4 -1.9 34.7 
Pbit 25.5 24 34.7 73.5 70.2 74.8 
Shareholders funds 233.4 219.3 218.2 194.8 202.2 258.8 
Total Liabilities 828.8 1001.4 953.6 992.9 1135.4 966 
Pbt 20 15.9 27.2 68.4 69.2 80 
Cost of Materials 1818.5 2292.5 2627.2 2601.9 2522.5 2239.6 
Expenses 115.3 135.5 132.2 131 142.5 129.7 
Liquid assets 124.5 163.7 167.3 188 192.5 189.5 
Net interest -5.5 -8.1 -7.5 -5.1 -1 5.2 
Current assets 902.4 1069.6 1034.1 1072 1207.1 1114.3 
Current Liabilities 625.9 841.3 861.5 882.2 971.5 870.5 
Depreciation 25.1 23 22.1 16.3 15.9 20.1 
Net Assets 233.4 219.3 218.2 194.8 202.2 258.8 
Debtors 597 714.7 685.5 683.6 805.4 855.5 
Creditors 461.9 599.3 620.7 663.5 746.5 631.7 
Capital Employed 233.4 219.3 218.2 194.8 202.2 258.8 
Table B. 20 Figures from Profit and loss account and balance sheet of 
company C for Example 5.8 
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APPENDIX C 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES FOR SECTION 7.4 
Appendix C. 1 Profitability of Leading Japanese Contractors (All figures in Y: 
million) 
Taisei 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,982,165 1,830,600 1,772,971 1,681,307 1,750,392 
Cost of Sales 1,813,811 1,643,673 1,592,760 1,480,357 1,547,466 
Gross profit margin % 8.54 10.21 10.16 11.95 11.59 
Net Income Before 14,990 46,950 41,413 43,640 66,747 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 0.76 2.56 2.34 2.60 3.81 
Shareholders Equity 391,416 295,289 282,852 185,748 230,265 
Return on Equity % 1.48 (22.68) (2.00) (28.43) 3.64 
Total Assets 3,010,185 2,898,024 2,746,000 2,285,929 2,189,350 
Return on Assets % 0.19 (2.31) (0.21) (2.31) 0.38 
Long Tenn Debt 539,600 494,704 433,329 333,452 361,851 
Debt/Equity % 137.85 167.53 153.20 179.52 157.15 
Table C. 1 Financial performance of Taisci Corporation for Section 7.4 
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Kajima 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 2,100,701 1,938,933 1,658,884 1,727,871 1,909,948 
Cost of Sales 1,926,792 1,778,719 1,511,117 1,561,888 1,748,741 
Gross profit margin % 8.28 8.26 8.91 9.61 8.44 
Net Income Before 31,920 23,381 33,188 51,610 51,577 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 1.52 1.21 2.00 2.99 2.70 
Shareholders Equity 383,102 366,445 174,595 176,058 235,192 
Return on Equity % 1.92 (2.08) (113.72) 5.12 3.94 
Total Assets 2,418,751 2,264,296 2,027,805 2,017,756 1,998,802 
Return on Assets % 0.30 (0.34) (9.79) 0.45 0.46 
Long Term Debt 448,754 506,565 450,057 407,694 343,878 
Debt/Equity % 117.14 138.24 257.8 23.157 146.21 
Table C. 2 Financial performance of Kajima Corporation for Section 7.4 
Shimizu 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,718,039 1,756,893 1,599,297 1,564,726 1,711,983 
Cost of Sales 1,553,967 1,606,882 1,458,789 1,419,561 1,559,665 
Gross profit margin % 9.55 8.54 8.79 9.28 8.90 
Net Income Before 47,326 35,645 31,557 44,324 57,628 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 2.75 2.03 1.97 2.83 3.37 
Shareholders Equity 352,085 300,045 178,222 241,601 223,187 
Return on Equity % 1.51 (15.03) (71.34) 4.08 (28.87) 
Total Assets 2,428,830 2,316,833 2,189,671 2,204,426 2,075,668 
Return on Assets % 0.22 (1.95) (5.81) 0.45 (3.10) 
Long Tenn Debt 302,994 219,980 326,040 332,801 220,234 
Debt/Equity % 86.06 73.32 182.94 137.75 98.68 
Table C. 3 Financial performance of Shimizu Corporation for Section 7.4 
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Obayashi 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,541,485 1,487,495 1,379,840 1,132,028 1,313,348 
Cost of Sales 1,379,891 1,345,920 1,246,493 1,013,774 1,189,235 
Gross profit margin % 10.48 9.52 9.66 10.45 9.45 
Net Income Before 43,835 39,796 35,721 28,802 35,314 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 2.84 2.68 2.59 2.54 2.69 
Shareholders Equity 301,557 307,009 309,670 329,431 405,322 
Return on Equity % 4.52 3.82 2.87 1.73 (1.60) 
Total Assets 2,430,025 2,267,861 2,070,469 2,060,935 2,197,081 
Return on Assets % 0.56 0.52 0.43 0.28 (0.29) 
Long Term Debt 194,725 201,564 241,569 260,609 228,570 
Debt/Equity % 64.57 65.65 78.01 79.11 56.39 
Table CA Financial performance of Obayashi Corporation for Section 7.4 
Kandenko 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 519,825 555,934 547,993 513,478 500,489 
Cost of Sales 468,537 503,128 499,905 468,677 461,812 
Gross profit margin % 9.87 9.50 8.78 8.73 7.73 
Net Income Before 16,408 17,543 15,844 12,680 7,923 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 3.16 3.16 2.89 2.47 1.58 
Shareholders Equity 161,396 168,325 174,224 180,360 188,787 
Return on Equity % 4.46 5.49 4.65 (9.13) 2.06 
Total Assets 452,893 443,087 402,091 449,374 448,436 
Return on Assets % 1.59 2.08 2.01 (3.66) 0.87 
Long Tenn Debt 852 485 985 740 207 
Debt/Equity % 0.53 0.29 0.57 0.41 0.11 
Table C. 5 Financial performance of Kandenko Corporation for Section 7.4 
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Toda 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 689,397 664,960 630,618 617,402 648,839 
Cost of Sales 625,524 606,393 547,572 557,293 592,239 
Gross profit margin % 9.27 8.81 8.89 9.74 8.72 
Net Income Before 28,274 24,327 28,058 30,190 26,860 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 4.10 3.66 4.45 4.89 4.14 
Shareholders Equity 168,099 171,065 172,223 189,526 213,309 
Return on Equity % 4.07 3.24 2.47 2.02 0.43 
Total Assets 781,740 736,561 699,757 742,835 785,312 
Return on Assets % 0.88 0.75 0.61 0.51 0.12 
Long Tenn Debt 10,104 9,431 9,194 10,416 8,317 
Debt/Equity % 6.01 5.51 5.34 5.50 3.90 
Table C. 6 Financial performance of Toda Corporation for Section 7.4 
Kinden 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 566,056 585,310 560,752 528,793 489,693 
Cost of Sales 490,297 510,967 491,754 464,612 448,153 
Gross profit margin % 13.38 12.70 12.30 12.14 8.48 
Net Income Before 35,297 33,903 32,307 27,276 5,017 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 6.24 5.79 5.76 5.16 1.02 
Shareholders Equity 275,521 289,019 300,397 324,989 305,779 
Return on Equity % 6.54 5.72 4.80 4.11 (9.16) 
Total Assets 623,410 636,139 578,270 539,770 574,475 
Return on Assets % 2.89 2.60 2.49 2.47 (4.87) 
Long Tenn Debt 1,574 1,524 1,408 1,505 1,595 
Debt/Equity % 0.57 0.53 0.47 0.46 0.52 
Table C. 7 Financial performance of Kinden Corporation for Section 7.4 
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Maeda 
Sales 
Cost of Sales 
Gross profit margin % 
Net Income Before 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 
Shareholders Equity 
Return on Equity % 
Total Assets 
Return on Assets % 
Long Tenn Debt 
Debt/Equity % 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
493,517 505,281 
449,664 464,811 
8.89 8.01 
8,645 8,004 
470,801 479,761 464,340 
435,208 429,909 416,479 
7.56 10.39 10.31 
8,487 27,276 5,017 
1.75 1.58 1.80 
166,909 167,092 130,829 
1.24 1.19 (26.35) 
649,434 670,090 567,305 
0.32 0.30 (6.08) 
19,303 35,791 39,764 
11.56 21.42 30.39 
5.69 1.08 
160,975 175,293 
(3.50) 0.70 
652,672 645,757 
(0.86) 0.19 
35,532 31,422 
22.07 17.93 
Table C. 8 Financial performance of Maeda Corporation for Section 7.4 
Penta Ocean 
Sales 
Cost of Sales 
Gross profit margin % 
Net Income Before 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 
Shareholders Equity 
Return on Equity % 
Total Assets 
Return on Assets % 
Long Tenn Debt 
Debt/Equity % 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
550,695 567,176 508,925 434,811 419,382 
496,566 516,244 467,737 389,234 374,747 
9.83 8.98 8.09 10.48 10.64 
12,517 11,683 3,173 11,305 10,917 
2.27 2.06 0.62 2.60 2.60 
88,616 88,978 44,606 51,634 55,167 
4.30 3.61 (92.68) (29.10) 4.85 
533,785 583,978 503,272 474,959 465,121 
0.71 0.55 (8.21) (3.16) 0.57 
44,288 52,159 60,284 56,983 67,281 
49.98 58.62 135.15 110.36 121.96 
Table C. 9 Financial performance of Penta Ocean for Section 7.4 
261 
Takenaka 1 1998 $m 1999 $m 2000 Sm 
Sales 11,801 10,796 10,743 
Cost of Sales 10,694 9,643 9,695 
Gross profit margin % 9.38 10.68 9.75 
Net Income Before 170 148 184 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 1.44 1.37 1.72 
Shareholders Equity 3,206 3,156 2,846 
Return on Equity % 2.23 2.64 2.13 
Total Assets 11,995 11,932 11,101 
Return on Assets % 0.60 0.70 0.55 
Long Term Debt 159.6 186.4 264.1 
Debt/Equity % 4.98 5.91 9.28 
Table C. 10 Financial performance of Takenaka Corporation for Section 7.4 
Appendix C. 2 Profitability of Leading US contractors ($'000's or stated) 
Centex 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 3,823,755 4,022,392 5,200,666 6,008,136 6,710,735 
Cost of Sales 3,577,443 3,695,654 4,706,566 5,427,658 6,105,996 
Gross profit margin % 6.44 8.12 9.50 9.66 9.01 
Net Income Before 163,743 213,634 373,294 416,861 436,331 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 4.28 5.76 7.18 6.94 6.50 
Shareholders Equity 835,777 991,172 1,197,639 1,419,349 1,714,064 
Return on Equity % 12.75 14.61 19.37 18.12 16.45 
Total Assets 2,579,992 3,333,382 4,267,909 3,987,903 6,649,043 
Return on Assets % 4.13 4.34 5.44 6.45 4.24 
Long Tenn Debt 236,769 237,715 284,299 751,160 3,040,861 
Debt/Equity % 28.33 23.98 23.74 52.92 177.41 
Table C. 11 Financial performance of Centex Corporation for Section 7.4 
262 
Fluor 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 14,299 13,505 11,334 9,970 8,972 
Cost of Sales 14,023 13,095 10,472 9,163 8,619 
Gross profit margin % 1.93 3.03 7.62 8.10 3.94 
Net Income Before 242 340 315 443 186 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 1.69 2.52 2.78 4.45 2.08 
Shareholders Equity 1,741 1,525 1,581 1,609 223 
Return on Equity % 8.40 15.43 6.59 7.70 8.70 
Total Assets 4,685 5,019 4,886 3,653 2,076 
Return on Assets % 3.12 4.69 2.13 3.39 0.94 
Long Term Debt 301 300.4 317.6 17.6 17.5 
Debt/Equity % 17.26 19.69 20.08 1.09 2.23 
Table C. 12 Financial performance of Flour Corporation for Section 7.4 ($mill) 
Halliburton 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 13,948 14,504 12,313 11,944 13,046 
Cost of Sales 12,666 13,980 11,608 11,218 11,575 
Gross profit margin % 9.19 3.61 5.73 6.08 11.28 
Net Income Before 1,178 170 401 462 1,084 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 8.45 1.17 3.26 3.87 8.31 
Shareholders Equity 4,317 4,061 4,287 3,928 4,752 
Return on Equity % 17.88 (0.37) 10.22 12.75 17.02 
Total Assets 9,657 10,072 9,639 10,192 10,966 
Return on Assets % 7.99 (0.15) 4.54 4.92 7.38 
Long Terin Debt 1,303 1,426 1,364 1,057 1,484 
Debt/Equity % 30.18 35.11 31.82 26.91 31.23 
Table C. 13 Financial performance of Halliburton for Section 7.4 ($millions) 
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Bovis Lend Lease 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 2,143 3,422 4,119 12,997 11,454 
Cost of Sales 1,754 2,987 3,456 12,013 10,998 
Gross profit margin % 18.15 12.71 16.10 7.57 3.99 
Net Income Before 359 413 516 756 241 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 16.75 12.07 12.53 5.82 2.10 
Shareholders Equity 2,919 3,237 3,469 5,307 3,667 
Return on Equity % 11.03 11.24 12.11 8.14 4.12 
Total Assets 4,674 6,471 7,291 10,942 9,127 
Return on Assets % 6.89 5.63 5.76 3.95 1.65 
Long Term Debt 643 1,544 1,210 1,046 1,081 
Debt/Equity % 22.03 47.70 34.88 19.71 29.48 
Table C. 14 Financial performance of Bovis Lend Lease for Section 7.4 ($mill) 
Skanska 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 49,577 62,435 79,128 108,022 164,937 
Cost of Sales 44,698 56,598 71,305 98,502 155,541 
Gross profit margin % 9.84 9.35 9.89 8.81 5.70 
Net Income Before 796 4,376 6,901 7,190 2,293 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 1.61 7.01 8.72 6.66 1.39 
Shareholders Equity 11,817 13,519 17,373 18,937 17,871 
Return on Equity % 60.30 20.58 24.64 29.31 0.12 
Total Assets 38,890 44,883 55,908 83,303 93,084 
Return on Assets % 18.32 6.20 7.66 6.66 0.02 
Long Term Debt 442 1,978 615 3,678 6,812 
Debt/Equity % 3.74 14.63 3.54 19.42 38.11 
Table C. 15 Financial performance of Skanska for Section 7.4 (Sek millions) 
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The Turner Group 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 2,838,052 3,170,744 3,698,994 5,702,890 6,090,140 
Cost of Sales 2,765,901 3,084,236 3,600,311 5,525,540 5,882,822 
Gross profit margin % 2.54 2.73 2.67 3.11 3.40 
Net Income Before 5,304 18,185 31,174 60,521 64,550 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 0.19 0.57 0.84 1.06 1.06 
Shareholders Equity 60,130 76,136 88,766 339,641 354,740 
Return on Equity % (2.82) 7.74 22.12 5.61 8.33 
Total Assets 954,269 972,687 1,129,063 2,088,307 2,361086 
Return on Assets % (0.18) 0.61 1.74 0.91 1.25 
Long Tenn Debt 20,907 21,719 18,891 17,161 16,659 
Debt/Equity % 27.20 24.47 21.28 5.05 4.70 
Table C. 16 Financial performance of The Turner Group Corporation for 
Section 7.4 
Peter Kiewilt 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 2,742 3,379 4,013 4,463 3,871 
Cost of Sales 2,408 3,095 3,655 4,138 3,444 
Gross profit margin % 12.18 8.40 8.92 7.28 11.03 
Net Income Before 186 142 214 172 263 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 6.78 4.20 5.33 3.85 6.79 
Shareholders Equity 652 691 837 696 835 
Return on Equity % 23.77 19.68 19.71 25.72 20.96 
Total Assets 1,342 1,379 1,599 1,401 1,594 
Return on Assets % 11.55 9.86 10.32 12.78 10.98 
Long Tenn Debt 22 13 18 12 26 
Debt/Equity % 3.37 1.88 2.15 1.72 3.11 
Table C. 17 Financial performance of The Peter Kiewett Group for Section 7.4 
(S millions) 
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Jacobs 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,780,616 2,101,145 2,875,007 3,418,942 3,956,993 
Cost of Sales 1,554,234 1,830,618 2,477,678 2,983,247 3,452,320 
Gross profit margin % 12.71 12.88 13.82 12.74 12.75 
Net Income Before 78,634 86,484 108,295 124,613 143,852 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 4.42 4.12 3.77 3.64 3.64 
Shareholders Equity 324,308 371,405 448,717 495,543 591,801 
Return on Equity % 14.46 16.77 17.62 11.36 17.71 
Total Assets 737,643 807,489 1,220,186 1,384,376 1,557,040 
Return on Assets % 6.36 7.37 8.10 4.18 6.34 
Long Tenn Debt 54,095 26,221 135,371 146,820 164,308 
Debt/Equity % 16.68 7.06 30.17 29.63 27.76 
Table C. 18 Financial performance of Jacobs Construction for Section 7.4 
Foster Wheeler 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 4,060 4,537 3,867 3,891 3,315 
Cost of Sales 3,755 4,105 3,509 3,507 3,231 
Gross profit margin % 7.51 9.52 9.26 9.87 2.53 
Net Income Before (138) 165 (220) 179 37 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % (3.40) 3.64 (5.69) 4.60 1.12 
Shareholders Equity 619 572 376 364 8 
Return on Equity % (1.78) (5.59) (46.54) 10.99 (N\A) 
Total Assets 3,366 3,495 3,438 3,478 3,316 
Return on Assets % (0.33) (0.92) (5.09) 1.15 (9.32) 
Long Term Debt 856 991 812 672 138 
Debt/Equity % 138.29 173.25 215.96 184.62 1725 
Table C. 19 Financial performance of Foster Wheeler Corporation for Section 
7.4 ($ millions) 
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Granite 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,028,205 1,226,100 1,328,774 1,348,325 1,547,994 
Cost of Sales 916,475 1,073,008 1,149,573 1,157,707 1,346,378 
Gross profit margin % 10.87 12.49 13.49 14.14 11.86 
Net Income Before 38,137 69,258 84,262 85,575 64,334 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 3.71 5.65 6.34 6.35 4.16 
Shareholders Equity 257,434 301,282 327,732 377,764 418,502 
Return on Equity % 10.81 15.44 16.15 14.78 12.07 
Total Assets 551,809 626,571 679,572 711,142 929,684 
Return on Assets % 5.04 7.42 7.79 7.85 5.43 
Long Tenn Debt 58,396 69,137 64,853 63,891 131,391 
Debt/Equity % 22.68 22.95 19.79 16.91 31.40 
Table C. 20 Financial performance of Granite Construction for Section 7.4 
Appendix C. 3 Profitability of Leading German Contractors (VOOO or otherwise) 
Strabag 1 1997* 1998* 1999* 2000 2001 
Sales 17,146 31,654 31,279 2,625,000 2,433,000 
Cost of Sales 12,778 25,129 29,289 2,362,000 2,216,000 
Gross profit margin % 25.48 20.61 6.36 10.02 8.92 
Net Income Before 556 341 1,032 87,000 96,000 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 3.30 1.08 3.30 3.31 3.95 
Shareholders Equity 4,752 5,351 5,896 461,100 519,000 
Return on Equity % 5.45 4.50 12.35 13.45 10.21 
Total Assets 14,741 24,792 24,283 1,830,200 1,814,300 
Return on Assets % 1.76 0.97 3.00 3.39 2.92 
Long Term Debt 2,130 2,018 1,038 64,215 60,210 
Debt/Equity % 44.82 37.71 17.61 13.88 11.56 
Table C. 21 Financial performance of Strabag group for Section 7.4 (*ATS mill) 
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Holzmann 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 5,831,926 6,667,207 4,953,176 4,556,090 5,837,359 
Cost of Sales 4,859,810 5,718,285 4,370,561 4,433,439 5,617,176 
Gross profit % 16.67 14.23 11.76 2.69 3.77 
Net Income Before 41,957 (301,277) (16,812) (1,235,164) (81,943) 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin 0.72 (4.52) (0.34) (27.11) (1.40) 
Shareholder Equity 808,380 374,901 528,457 0 126,190 
Return on Equity (0.12) (107.79) (3.02) 0 (64.94) 
Total Assets 6,418,875 5,337,953 4,589,950 3,930,257 3,851,601 
Return on Assets (0.02) (7.57) (0.35) (35.24) (2.13) 
Long Tenn Debt 587,198 696,795 798,228 672,373 351,865 
Debt/Equity % 72.64 185.86 151.05 198.00 278.84 
Table C. 22 Financial performance of Holzmann group for Section 7.4 
Kampa Haus 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 215,052 246,381 242,277 199,441 142,563 
Cost of Sales 187,658 219,786 217,605 190,714 138,412 
Gross profit margin % 12.74 10.79 10.18 4.38 2.91 
Net Income Before 28,806 27,033 24,998 9,647 (9,669) 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 13.39 10.97 10.32 4.84 (6.78) 
Shareholders Equity 85,688 89,691 91,959 88,668 70,751 
Return on Equity % 16.50 15.38 15.27 7.81 (12.60) 
Total Assets 143,346 163,744 156,752 132,259 111,875 
Return on Assets % 9.86 8.43 8.96 5.24 (7.97) 
Long Tenn Debt 0 5,191 3,377 2,628 2,455 
Debt/Equity % 0 5.79 3.67 2.96 3.47 
Table C. 23 Financial performance of Kampa Hans for Section 7.4 (0000's) 
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Lindner 11998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 319,970 354,816 396,903 518,983 
Cost of Sales 289,416 332,316 373,114 479,824 
Gross profit margin % 9.55 6.34 5.99 7.55 
Net Income Before 33,304 23,765 23,196 44,548 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 10.41 6.70 5.84 8.58 
Shareholders Equity 87,233 107,856 125,326 152,879 
Return on Equity % 23.44 19.42 14.87 22.15 
Total Assets 168,614 234,453 261,919 301,300 
Return on Assets % 12.13 8.93 7.12 11.24 
Long Tenn Debt 0 0 210 427 
Debt/Equity % 0 0 0.17 0.28 
Table C. 24 Financial performance of Lindner group for Section 7.4 
BiUllnger & Berger 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 4,099,820 4,011,805 3,653,778 3,631,142 3,645,000 
Cost of Sales 3,775,514 3,721,551 3,294,071 3,346,567 3,378,200 
Gross profit margin % 7.91 7.23 9.84 7.84 7.32 
Net Income Before (32,503) (103,178) 6,759 8,150 34,812 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % (0.79) (2.57) 0.18 0.22 0.96 
Shareholders Equity 708,371 638,094 633,518 667,557 1,091,068 
Return on Equity % 2.85 (7.27) 3.55 6.36 4.81 
Total Assets 3,054,440 2,863,659 3,075,281 3,000,178 3,310,600 
Return on Assets % 0.66 (1.62) 0.73 1.41 1.59 
Long Tenn Debt 12,286 10,714 111,639 110,021 110,701 
Debt/Equity % 1.73 1.68 17.62 16.48 10.15 
Table C. 25 Financial performance of Bilfinger & Berger group for Section 7.4 
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Dyckerhoff 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,676 1,766 2,197 2,448 2,443 
Cost of Sales 1,405 1,466 1,826 1,975 1,997 
Gross profit margin % 16.17 16.99 16.89 19.32 18.26 
Net Income Before 145 169 214 285 212 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 8.65 9.57 9.74 11.64 8.68 
Shareholders Equity 673 724 860 1,184 1,244 
Return on Equity % 12.48 12.57 13.26 10.05 7.64 
Total Assets 1,706 1,874 4,075 4,348 4,276 
Return on Assets % 4.92 4.86 2.80 2.74 2.22 
Long Term Debt 38 138 145 486 455 
Debt/Equity % 5.65 19.06 16.86 41.05 36.58 
Table C. 26 Financial performance of Dyckerhoff group for Section 7.4 
Hochtief 1 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 3,304,067 5,085,151 9,585,728 12,170,985 
Cost of Sales 2,850,201 4,659,347 9,300,596 11,528,894 
Gross profit margin % 13.74 8.37 2.97 5.28 
Net Income Before 249,616 301,027 205,013 78,370 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 7.55 5.92 2.14 0.64 
Shareholders Equity 1,885,349 2,034,186 1,902,228 2,175,535 
Return on Equity % 9.97 10.03 6.46 1.10 
Total Assets 4,444,329 5,982,817 6,569,375 8,015,901 
Return on Assets % 4.23 3.41 1.87 0.30 
Long Term Debt 354,408 52,526 49,323 221,652 
Debt/Equity % 18.80 2.58 2.59 10.19 
Table C. 27 Financial performance of Hochtief group for Section 7.4 
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Bienhaus 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 174,763 167,318 175,289 158,747 137,721 
Cost of Sales 
Gross profit margin % 17.41 16.28 15.14 15.84 15.41 
Net Income Before 6,957 7,294 9,112 9,166 3,383 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 3.98 4.36 5.20 5.77 2.46 
Shareholders Equity 33,597 36,224 38,627 39,504 37,180 
Return on Equity % 9.11 9.74 9.43 9.95 2.93 
Total Assets 120,704 115,674 112,224 102,601 97,606 
Return on Assets % 2.54 3.05 3.25 3.83 1.11 
Long Tenn Debt 23,936 18,342 16,490 10,801 11,249 
Debt/Equity % 71.24 50.63 42.69 27.34 30.26 
Table C. 28 Financial performance of Bienhaus group for Section 7.4 
Rheinhold & Mahla 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 484,372 466,370 676,714 762,421 731,619 
Cost of Sales 476,733 453,285 654,151 738,881 707,105 
Gross profit margin % 1.58 2.81 3.33 3.09 3.35 
Net Income Before 4,493 8,813 16,507 18,060 17,794 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 0.93 1.89 2.44 2.37 2.43 
Shareholders Equity 28,304 26,955 33,468 47,448 51,864 
Return on Equity % 2.99 3.84 29.37 24.58 20.96 
Total Assets 212,478 213,866 323,255 303,698 314,316 
Return on Assets % 0.40 0.48 3.04 3.84 3.46 
Long Term Debt 2,382 2,011 4,061 4,595 3,952 
Debt/Equity % 8.42 7.46 12.13 9.68 7.62 
Table C. 29 Financial performance of Rheinhold & Mahla for Section 7.4 
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Walter Bau 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,810,339 1,704,043 1,807,857 2,901,682 3,553,428 
Cost of Sales 1,673,793 1,570,252 1,681,843 2,690,918 3,304,188 
Gross profit margin % 7.54 7.85 6.97 7.26 7.01 
Net Income Before 8,000 8,691 (41,698) (3,605) (141,958) 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 0.44 0.51 (2.31) (0.12) (3.39) 
Shareholders Equity 255,970 249,546 200,623 299,901 175,399 
Return on Equity % 1.19 1.98 (23.12) (21.56) (131.79) 
Total Assets 1,290,354 1,264,577 1,271,811 1,864,499 1,609,717 
Return on Assets % 0.24 0.39 (3.65) (3.47) (14.36) 
Long Term Debt 8,703 9,658 4,258 8,043 12,455 
Debt/Equity % 3.40 3.87 2.12 2.68 7.10 
Table C. 30 Financial performance of Walter Bau group for Section 7.4 
Appendix CA Profitability of Leading French Contractors (C mill or otherwise) 
Colas 1 1997* 1998* 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 26,206 28,735 5,296 6,517 7,328 
Cost of Sales 24,085 26,301 4,839 5,924 6,758 
Gross profit margin % 8.09 8.47 8.63 9.10 7.78 
Net Income Before 545 671 147 220 299 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 2.08 2.34 2.78 3.38 4.08 
Shareholders Equity 4,113 4,338 752 742 894 
Return on Equity % 10.53 11.55 13.43 20.62 22.71 
Total Assets 16,647 17,317 3,337 3,895 4,136 
Return on Assets % 2.60 2.89 3.03 3.93 4.91 
Long Term Debt 772 622 151 234 197 
Debt/Equity % 18.77 14.34 20.08 31.54 22.04 
Table C. 31 Financial performance of Colas group for Section 7.4 (Million FF) 
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Vinci 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 8,140,316 8,011,500 9,057,000 14,126,801 17,172,384 
Cost of Sales 7,922,619 7,713,800 8,949,820 13,620,100 16,635,100 
Gross margin % 2.67 3.72 1.18 3.59 3.13 
Net Income 30,642 53,300 130,000 364,400 720,700 
Before I& tax 
Net Margin % 0.38 0.67 1.44 2.58 4.20 
Shareh'der Equity 423,198 468,317 1,400,000 1,834,200 2,372,700 
Return on Equity 11.10 19.71 10.43 16.35 19.11 
Total Assets 8,109,067 6,589,100 7,980,000 18,763,500 20,302,700 
Return on Assets 0.58 1.40 1.83 1.60 2.23 
Long Term Debt 179,433 222,700 501,000 2,958,400 3,830,300 
Debt/Equity % 42.40 47.55 35.79 161.29 161.43 
Table C. 32 Financial performance of Vinci group for Section 7.4 (C'0001s) 
Bou ues Y9 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 13,884 14,789 15,857 19,060 20,473 
Cost of Sales 13,041 13,822 14,590 17,229 18,843 
Gross profit margin % 6.07 6.53 7.99 9.61 7.96 
Net Income Before 341 390 432 772 772 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 2.46 2.64 2.73 4.05 3.77 
Shareholders Equity 1,193 1,222 2,115 4,147 4,614 
Return on Equity % 11.10 19.71 10.43 16.35 19.11 
Total Assets 8,109 6,589 7,980 18,763 20,302 
Return on Assets % 0.58 1.40 1.83 1.60 2.23 
Long Term Debt 1,682 1,618 2,453 2,919 2,960 
Debt/Equity % 141.04 132.38 115.99 70.39 64.15 
Table C. 33 Financial performance of Bouygues group for Section 7.4 
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Bouygues Construction 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 5,341 6,222 6,324 
Cost of Sales 4,507 5,348 5,411 
Gross profit margin % 15.62 14.05 14.44 
Net Income Before interest 120 117 69 
and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 2.25 1.88 1.09 
Shareholders Equity 158 199 187 
Return on Equity % 29.75 21.11 11.23 
Total Assets 4,375 4,801 5,087 
Return on Assets % 1.07 0.87 0.41 
Long Tenn Debt 35 193 190 
Debt/Equity % 22.15 96.98 101.60 
Table C. 34 Financial performance of Bouygues Construction for Se ction 7.4 
Eiffage 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 7,907,121 5,148,957 5,722,000 6,184,000 6,371,000 
Cost of Sales 7,901,241 5,047,525 5,541,000 5,966,000 6,106,000 
Gross profit margin % 0.07 1.97 3.16 3.53 4.16 
Net Income Before 75,895 51,224 84,000 122,000 147,000 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 0.96 0.99 1.47 1.97 2.31 
Shareholders Equity 479,124 518,322 586,711 661,000 780,500 
Return on Equity % 19.25 7.73 10.91 15.58 19.47 
Total Assets 4,545,483 4,373,037 4,895,000 4,960,000 5,187,000 
Return on Assets % 2.03 0.92 1.31 2.08 2.93 
Long Term Debt 862,467 253,358 210,000 141,000 89,000 
Debt/Equity % 180.01 48.88 35.79 21.33 11.40 
Table C. 35 Financial performance of Eiffage group for Section 7.4 (C'000's) 
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Gtie 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,649 1,735 1,845 2,970 2,966 
Cost of Sales 1,529 1,613 1,723 2,787 2,821 
Gross profit margin % 7.28 7.03 7.08 6.15 4.92 
Net Income Before 81 87 71 117 125 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 4.91 5.01 3.82 3.92 4.20 
Shareholders Equity 208 211 237 270 261 
Return on Equity % 21.63 22.21 15.51 28.83 30.8 
Total Assets 1,145 1,234 1,465 2,277 2,269 
Return on Assets % 3.93 3.80 2.51 3.42 3.55 
Long Tenn Debt 27.50 28.20 32.90 33.80 37.80 
Debt/Equity % 13.22 13.35 13.86 12.52 14.46 
Table C. 36 Financial performance of Gtie group for Section 7.4 
Bupygues Offshore 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 503,389 599,760 611,754 669,411 629,022 
Cost of Sales 434,945 513,798 528,109 563,070 527,407 
Gross profit margin % 13.60 14.33 13.67 15.89 16.15 
Net Income Before 15,619 27,948 30,162 32,368 30,772 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 3.10 4.66 4.93 4.84 4.89 
Shareholders Equity 77,537 101,348 109,577 112,249 116,848 
Return on Equity % 32.17 29.46 29.57 21.72 24.12 
Total Assets 345,487 412,803 538,371 620,577 684,388 
Return on Assets % 7.22 7.23 6.02 3.93 4.12 
Long Term Debt 18,589 15,103 13,993 9,113 35,544 
Debt/Equity % 23.97 14.90 12.77 8.12 30.42 
Table C. 37 Financial performance of Bouygues offshore for Section 7.4 (0000) 
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Desquenne et Giral 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 144,166 123,312 120,966 131,814 97,790 
Cost of Sales 138,456 119,857 115,426 130,459 96,572 
Gross profit margin % 3.96 2.80 4.58 1.03 1.25 
Net Income Before 4,066 3,673 2,322 (11) (2,053) 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 2.82 2.98 1.92 (0.01) (2.10) 
Shareholders Equity 16,868 15,969 17,952 14,480 13,575 
Return on Equity % 2.40 5.07 5.26 (9.08) (12.69) 
Total Assets 150,615 83,346 90,756 108,060 60,948 
Return on Assets % 0.27 0.97 1.04 (1.22) (2.83) 
Long Term Debt 15,504 14,274 16,553 16,451 15,629 
Debt/Equity % 91.91 89.39 92.21 113.61 115.13 
Table C. 38 Financial performance of Desquenne et Giral for Section 7A(C1000) 
Kaufmann 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 354,121 361,458 364,809 517,601 634,332 
Cost of Sales 285,645 298,145 290,238 417,615 514,305 
Gross profit margin % 19.34 17.52 20.44 19.32 18.92 
Net Income Before 33,124 31,151 34,147 51,254 62,023 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 9.35 8.62 9.36 9.90 9.78 
Shareholders Equity 51,236 54,829 56,839 116,879 137,137 
Return on Equity % 24.57 27.33 27.76 22.39 21.43 
Total Assets 254,896 259,847 263,384 513,279 800,300 
Return on Assets % 4.94 5.77 5.99 5.10 3.67 
Long Term Debt 4,958 5,011 4,960 12,035 6,785 
Debt/Equity % 9.68 9.14 8.73 10.30 4.95 
Table C. 39 Financial performance of Kaufmann for Section 7.4 (CI000) 
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Spie 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 2,760,723 3,278,596 3,407,308 
Cost of Sales 2,760,723 3,278,596 3,407,308 
Gross profit margin % 1.99 2.08 2.21 
Net Income Before interest 39,449 54,772 69,372 
and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 1.43 1.67 2.04 
Shareholders Equity 115,192 185,238 292,283 
Return on Equity % 22.03 20.98 16.94 
Total Assets 1,972,583 2,419,815 2,561,458 
Return on Assets % 1.29 1.61 1.93 
Long Term Debt 141,198 115,961 108,412 
Debt/Equity % 122.58 62.60 37.09 
Table C. 40 Financial performance of SPIE Group for Section 7.4 (0000) 
Appendix C. 5 Profitability of Leading Italian Contractors (VOOO's or otherwise) 
Snamprogetti 1997* 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 2,498 1,703,791 1,560,965 876,652 1,202,865 
Cost of Sales 2,441 1,665,058 1,521,600 872,755 1,190,204 
Gross profit margin % 2.28 2.27 2.52 0.44 1.05 
Net Income Before 224 105,874 87,644 38,558 57,881 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 8.97 6.21 5.61 4.40 4.81 
Shareholders Equity 432 240,150 242,939 223,189 250,153 
Return on Equity % 28.24 26.24 20.13 8.82 15.58 
Total Assets 3,472 1,938,261 1,518,588 1,569,402 1,492,275 
Return on Assets % 3.51 3.25 3.22 1.25 2.61 
Long Term Debt 53 4,648 777 3,100 3,018 
Debt/Equity % 12.27 1.94 0.32 1.39 1.21 
Table C. 41 Financial performance of Snamprogetti for Section 7.4 (*Lire mill) 
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CMC 1997* 1998* 1999* 2000 2001 
Sales 502,756 574,692 603,583 340,067 337,598 
Cost of Sales 499,141 561,529 583,796 321,092 316,406 
Gross profit margin % 0.72 2.29 3.28 5.58 6.28 
Net Income Before (9,100) 6,090 10,335 7,441 8,344 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % (1.81) 1.06 1.71 2.19 2.47 
Shareholders Equity 61,276 62,424 68,557 39,596 48,381 
Return on Equity % (15.46) 5.31 6.36 9.42 7.80 
Total Assets 1,081,819 1,341,676 1,485,221 874,455 863,459 
Return on Assets % (0.88) 0.25 0.29 0.43 0.44 
Long Tenn Debt 72,280 80,379 46,085 11,222 7,634 
Debt/Equity % 117.96 128.76 67.22 28.34 15.78 
Table C. 42 Financial performance of CMC Group for Section 7.4 (*Lire mill) 
Impregilo 1997* 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 3,104,250 1,834,971 2,049,277 2,132,234 2,467,555 
Cost of Sales 2,998,140 1,764,849 1,978,517 2,171,999 2,382,827 
Gross profit margin % 3.42 3.82 3.45 -1.86 3.43 
Net Income Before 31,874 33,059 35,162 (130,156) 42,854 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 1.03 1.80 1.72 -6.10 1.74 
Shareholders Equity 924,860 476,618 585,328 509,598 437,640 
Return on Equity % 1.67 3.91 3.38 (15.60) 9.35 
Total Assets 5,744,103 3,292,019 3,621,938 3,696,165 3,961,064 
Return on Assets % 0.27 0.57 0.55 (2.15) 1.03 
Long Tenn Debt 440,089 137,986 62,386 111,279 113,246 
Debt/Equity % 47.58 28.95 10.66 21.84 25.88 
Table C. 43 Financial performance of Impregilo for Section 7.4 (* Lire million) 
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Trevi 1999* 2000 2001 
Sales 514,737 316,285 369,739 
Cost of Sales 483,911 306,419 367,331 
Gross profit margin % 5.99 3.12 0.65 
Net Income Before 23,864 5,420 (5,527_ 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 4.64 1.71 (1.49) 
Shareholders Equity 204,355 108,502 102,449 
Return on Equity % 6.77 2.05 (3.82) 
Total Assets 585,098 335,039 376,615 
Return on Assets % 2.37 0.66 (1.04) 
Long Term Debt 71,495 46,235 58,292 
Debt/Equity % 34.99 42.61 56.90 
Table C. 44 Financial performance of the Trevi Group for Section 7.4 (*Lire 
million) 
Bonatti 1 1997* 1998* 1999* 2000 2001 
Sales 371,032 356,973 364,527 211,980 287,198 
Cost of Sales 348,607 347,467 361,412 216,963 282,661 
Gross profit margin % 6.04 2.66 0.85 (2.35) 1.58 
Net Income Before 9,591 13,716 6,317 (8,260) 4,902 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 2.58 3.84 1.73 (3.90) 1.71 
Shareholders Equity 87,927 89,020 88,264 36,206 37,041 
Return on Equity % 6.44 4.96 2.77 (25.34) 2.49 
Total Assets 420,043 397,547 449,370 266,080 295,945 
Return on Assets % 1.35 1.11 0.54 (3.45) 0.31 
Long Term Debt 45,543 11,708 56,565 14,517 4,753 
Debt/Equity % 51.80 13.15 64.09 40.10 12.83 
Table C. 45 Financial performance of the Bonatti Group for Section 7.4 (Lire 
million) 
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Saipem -r997* 1998x 1999X 2000x 200]x 
Sales 3,313 1,774 1,518 1,361 2,027 
Cost of Sales 3,047 1,618 1,413 1,228 1,771 
Gross profit margin % 8.03 8.79 6.92 9.77 12.63 
Net Income Before 261 149 90 105 219 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 7.88 8.40 5.93 7.71 10.80 
Shareholders Equity 1,219 895 961 1,011 1,158 
Return on Equity % 16.41 12.74 7.18 7.91 14.51 
Total Assets 3,381 1,980 2,335 2,585 2,921 
Return on Assets % 5.92 5.76 2.96 3.09 5.75 
Long Tenn Debt 95 44 42 113 116 
Debt/Equity % 7.79 4.92 4.37 11.18 10.02 
Table C. 46 Financial performance of Saipem for Section 7.4 (*Lire billion, x 
Cmillion) 
coopsette 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 139,689 147,238 184,167 266,840 355,491 
Cost of Sales 119,458 127,696 157,827 245,421 322,976 
Gross profit margin % 14.48 13.27 14.30 8.03 9.15 
Net Income Before 5,234 4,532 10,689 14,738 35,916 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 3.75 3.08 5.80 5.52 10.10 
Shareholders Equity 78,925 77,527 84,173 96,020 126,418 
Return on Equity % 4.34 3.64 8.50 12.41 25.32 
Total Assets 256,894 245,811 331,842 386,384 536,107 
Return on Assets % 1.33 1.15 2.16 3.08 5.97 
Long Term Debt 27,560 28,130 27,058 39,387 49,763 
Debt/Equity % 34.92 36.28 32.15 41.02 39.36 
Table C. 47 Financial performance of Coopsette for Section 7.4 
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Caltagirone 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 377,018 498,805 509,854 544,375 365,598 
Cost of Sales 328,600 407,489 411,270 393,305 278,126 
Gross profit margin % 12.84 18.31 19.34 27.75 23.93 
Net Income Before 3,888 32,218 51,051 76,530 2,911 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 1.03 6.46 10.01 14.06 0.80 
Shareholders Equity 275,214 288,314 298,270 322,224 523,564 
Return on Equity % 0.79 5.25 5.30 8.48 6.67 
Total Assets 978,292 1,030,431 1,033,499 1,165,353 1,217,574 
Return on Assets % 0.22 1.47 1.53 2.34 2.87 
Long Tenn Debt 32,337 36,574 37,069 73,202 93,109 
Debt/Equity % 11.75 12.69 12.43 22.72 17.78 
Table C. 48 Financial performance of Caltagirone for Section 7.4 
Vianni Lavori 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 120,206 181,133 173,253 147,677 148,002 
Cost of Sales 99,606 146,177 137,180 109,253 128,231 
Gross profit margin % 17.14 19.30 20.82 26.02 13.36 
Net Income Before 15,878 21,569 6,317 (8,260) 4,902 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 13.21 11.91 3.65 (5.59) 3.31 
Shareholders Equity 185,016 197,577 208,423 223,896 240,582 
Return on Equity % 10.25 9.87 8.31 15.59 8.99 
Total Assets 411,355 415,979 406,317 395,600 378,142 
Return on Assets % 4.61 4.69 4.26 8.82 5.72 
Long Term Debt 17,307 16,281 15,592 16,221 5,702 
Debt/Equity % 9.35 8.24 7.48 7.24 2.37 
Table C. 49 Financial performance of Vianni Lavori for Section 7.4 
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Astaldi 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,706,013 832,089 843,027 
Cost of Sales 1,627,007 771,710 757,945 
Gross profit margin % 4.63 7.26 10.09 
Net Income Before interest 34,549 22,434 28,867 
and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 2.03 2.70 3.42 
Shareholders Equity 200,319 129,227 148,089 
Return on Equity % 10.65 8.90 20.28 
Total Assets 1,928,526 1,054,577 1,015,206 
Return on Assets % 1.11 1.09 2.96 
Long Term Debt 214,984 158,795 151,556 
Debt/Equity % 107.32 122.88 102.34 
Table C. 50 Financial performance of Astaldi for Section 7.4 (Lire million) 
Appendix C. 6 Profitability of leading UK contractors (All figures in L's) 
Baffibur Beatty 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 4,478,000 3,670,000 2,635,000 2,342,000 2,734,000 
Cost of Sales 3,954,000 3,334,000 2,357,000 2,114,000 2,479,000 
Gross profit margin % 11.70 9.16 10.55 9.74 9.33 
Net Income Before 9,000 (60,000) (361,000) 98,000 111,000 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 0.20 (1.63) (13.70) 4.18 4.06 
Shareholders Equity 363,000 199,000 82,000 156,000 188,000 
Return on Equity % (15.15) (67.34) (45.12) 45.51 40.96 
Total Assets 2,184,000 1,797,000 1,119,000 1,302,000 1,505,000 
Return on Assets % (2.52) (7.46) (3.31) 5.45 5.12 
Long Term Debt 182,000 99,000 23,000 17,000 94,000 
Debt/Equity % 50.14 49.75 28.05 10.90 50.00 
Table C. 51 Financial performance of Balfour Beatty for Section 7.4 
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Taylor Woodrow 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,295,700 1,400,500 1,504,000 1,539,700 2,138,400 
Cost of Sales 1,086,700 1,157,000 1,210,100 1,226,700 1,772,500 
Gross profit margin % 16.13 17.39 19.54 20.33 17.11 
Net Income Before 99,800 121,100 150,000 225,800 236,600 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 7.70 8.65 9.97 14.67 11.06 
Shareholders Equity 612,700 683,700 750,300 887,700 1,335,100 
Return on Equity % 10.02 10.78 12.08 16.57 10.15 
Total Assets 1,360,400 1,498,900 1,562,600 1,646,900 2,330,800 
Return on Assets % 4.51 4.92 5.80 8.93 5.81 
Long Tenn Debt 168,400 190,100 228,800 229,500 199,300 
Debt/Equity % 27.48 27.80 30.49 25.85 14.93 
Table C. 52 Financial performance of Taylor Woodrow for Section 7.4 
wimpey 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,223,400 1,401,800 1,526,900 1,702,000 1,895,900 
Cost of Sales 1,053,300 1,204,200 1,313,800 1,425,000 1,578,500 
Gross profit margin % 13.90 14.10 13.96 16.27 16.74 
Net Income Before 84,600 113,100 132,200 170,600 186,800 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 6.92 8.07 8.66 10.02 9.85 
Shareholders Equity 475,000 515,900 582,900 672,600 764,000 
Return on Equity % 9.37 12.60 15.51 16.50 15.52 
Total Assets 1,029,200 1,051,300 1,091,000 1,308,900 1,951,500 
Return on Assets % 4.32 6.18 8.29 8.48 6.08 
Long Term Debt 179,500 177,700 188,200 208,100 354,100 
Debt/Equity % 37.79 34.44 32.29 30.94 46.35 
Table C. 53 Financial performance of Wimpey for Section 7.4 
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Barratt 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 714,400 890,500 1,008,800 1,250,000 1,509,100 
Cost of Sales 619,000 767,700 865,400 1,067,600 1,280,400 
Gross profit margin % 13.35 13.79 14.21 14.59 15.15 
Net Income Before 72,900 99,400 117,700 152,400 191,400 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 45,900 63,100 77,300 100,200 126,700 
Shareholders Equity 356,400 399,400 454,300 528,700 631,100 
Return on Equity % 12.88 15.80 17.02 18.95 20.08 
Total Assets 656,100 771,200 915,700 1,068,300 1,311,700 
Return on Assets % 7.00 8.18 8.44 9.38 9.66 
Long Term Debt 15,100 14,900 19,450 26,500 28,400 
Debt/Equity % 4.24 3.73 4.28 5.01 4.50 
Table C. 54 Financial performance of Barrat Construction for Section 7.4 
Interserve 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 523,550 641,100 769,200 929,300 1,250,300 
Cost of Sales 459,660 553,200 646,500 786,500 1,096,900 
Gross profit margin % 12.20 13.71 15.95 15.37 12.27 
Net Income Before 24,221 27,000 33,700 39,500 49,900 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 4.63 4.21 4.38 4.25 3.99 
Shareholders Equity 71,079 94,000 132,800 186,400 206,600 
Return on Equity % 21.84 17.23 14.23 12.77 13.17 
Total Assets 259,880 380,100 508,200 637,200 629,900 
Return on Assets % 5.97 4.26 3.72 3.74 4.32 
Long Term Debt 8,088 34,100 75,600 66,700 48,000 
Debt/Equity % 11.38 36.28 56.93 35.78 23.23 
Table C. 55 Financial performance of Interserve for Section 7.4 
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Amec 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 2,774,300 2,721,900 2,427,500 3,195,900 3,462,500 
Cost of Sales 1,724,000 1,994,000 1,879,000 2,947,000 3,605,000 
Gross profit margin % 6.21 7.33 7.74 9.22 10.41 
Net Income Before 79,600 80,700 86,400 109,300 103,400 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 2.87 2.96 3.56 3.42 2.99 
Shareholders Equity 194,800 209,700 258,800 300,000 306,500 
Return on Equity % 22.95 22.56 22.02 17.77 16.22 
Total Assets 1,187,700 1,337,600 1,258,800 1,949,100 1,912,300 
Return on Assets % 3.76 3.54 4.53 2.73 2.60 
Long Term Debt 71,000 48,500 46,900 292,200 293,100 
Debt/Equity % 36.50 23.08 18.12 97.40 95.63 
Table C. 56 Financial performance of Amec for Section 7.4 
bovis 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 423,936 549,560 874,305 1,100,501 649,484 
Cost of Sales 407,721 532,652 852,864 1,084,625 617,834 
Gross profit margin % 3.82 3.08 2.45 1.44 4.87 
Net Income Before 16,939 9,099 15,889 6,554 17,104 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 4.00 1.66 1.82 0.60 2.63 
Shareholders Equity 18,550 15,533 13,778 2,700 10,372 
Return on Equity % 52.31 39.14 72.16 195.67 112.53 
Total Assets 108,653 135,044 177,061 138,997 161,044 
Return on Assets % 8.93 4.50 5.62 3.80 7.25 
Long Term Debt 3,290 2,700 238 159 184 
Debt/Equity % 17.74 17.38 1.73 5.89 1.77 
Table C. 57 Financial performance of Bovis for Section 7.4 
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Mowlem 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 1,400,000 1,494,000 1,608,000 1,514,100 1,698,000 
Cost of Sales 1,370,200 1,457,500 1,563,700 1,491,500 1,670,500 
Gross profit margin % 2.13 2.44 2.75 1.49 1.62 
Net Income Before 12,400 39,400 41,100 17,100 29,500 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % (0.89) 2.64 2.56 1.13 1.74 
Shareholders Equity 119,400 127,800 143,100 131,200 148,500 
Return on Equity % (15.58) 22.54 20.41 7.09 14.88 
Total Assets 609,100 659,100 716,500 546,700 684,300 
Return on Assets % (3.05) 4.37 4.08 1.70 3.23 
Long Term Debt 46,200 51,100 13,300 1,600 34,900 
Debt/Equity % 38.69 39.98 9.29 1.22 23.50 
Table C. 58 Financial performance of John Mowlem for Section 7.4 
Persimmon 1997 - 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 525,462 572,407 695,854 742,164 1,477,467 
Cost of Sales 441,679 478,849 577,474 595,163 1,193,954 
Gross profit margin % 15.94 16.34 17.01 19.81 19.19 
Net Income Before 61,557 73,339 92,325 115,748 203,955 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 11.71 12.81 13.27 15.60 13.80 
Shareholders Equity 293,431 320,746 363,675 418,406 793,469 
Return on Equity % 12.86 13.97 15.85 17.64 14.68 
Total Assets 531,710 625,074 694,145 787,367 1,720,294 
Return on Assets % 7.10 7.17 8.30 9.38 6.77 
Long Tenn Debt 65,665 98,498 126,347 117,791 451,140 
Debt/Equity % 22.38 30.71 34.74 28.15 56.86 
Table C. 59 Financial performance of Persimmon for Section 7.4 
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Jarvis 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Sales 355,158 615,613 650,203 698,823 904,696 
Cost of Sales 289,556 507,667 543,294 584,665 752,276 
Gross profit margin % 18.47 17.53 16.44 16.34 16.85 
Net Income Before 40,119 46,654 42,522 43,038 57,899 
interest and tax 
Net Profit Margin % 11.30 7.58 6.54 6.16 6.40 
Shareholders Equity 40,352 165,892 178,664 184,639 198,372 
Return on Equity % 66.59 14.71 12.55 10.71 15.76 
Total Assets 209,669 537,573 546,884 684,878 618,942 
Return on Assets % 12.82 4.54 4.10 2.89 5.05 
Long Term Debt 25,738 118,419 131,067 113,892 112,677 
Debt/Equity % 63.78 71.38 73.36 61.68 56.80 
Table C. 60 Financial performance of Jarvis for Section 7.4 
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